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Abstract 
This dissertation uses the analytical tool of “competing visions” to examine the historical development of 
China’s Inner Asian highland from 1368 to 1600. Straddling the Chinese heartland, Tibetan plateau, and 
the Mongol steppe, the highland region was a convergence zone that facilitated a constant flow of people, 
goods, and knowledge. Competing visions over the highland, as both historical phenomena and research 
perspective, highlight the dynamic nature of the region and its function as a bridge for cross-cultural 
encounters and transregional geopolitical interactions. By investigating how and why different social 
groups understood the highland differently, this dissertation scrutinizes the operating mechanism of a 
borderland society and its role in macroregional geopolitics. Focusing on material exchanges, knowledge 
circulations, border-crossings, and contestations over territoriality through the lens of Ming emperors, 
highland regime lords, Tibetan Buddhist monks, Ming military deserters, and Mongol nomads, this 
dissertation highlights the formation of a borderland space as the outcome of constant compromise and 
negotiation. This dissertation argues that the conflict of ideas and agendas in the highland provided the 
driving force not only for the formation of its political-economic landscape, social structure, and human-
environment relations, but also the transformation of the highland from a middle ground where multiple 
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    Many people would agree that the pursuit of a Ph.D. is similar to taking a journey: 
there is tiredness, there are annoying surprises, there are doubts sometimes, but there 
is also beautiful scenery. Journeys are always full of memories, good and bad, but it is 
exactly such experiences that make the journey unforgettable. I still remember the 
first day of my journey, August 19th, 2015, when I landed at Newark Airport on a 
breezy afternoon. That was my first time traveling outside of Asia. But I was not a 
relaxed tourist taking a short vacation; instead, I was a nervous prospective Ph.D. 
student about to be challenged at one of the most prestigious universities in the world. 
I felt I was not ready for anything—a feeling that I have now for my future. But I 
have come to find that it is just this kind of uncertainty that makes a journey, be it 
academic or not, intriguing and appealing.  
    This dissertation would not have been feasible without the generous support, 
advice, honest critique, and friendship of many scholars, friends, and family 
members. First, from the bottom of my heart I would like to express my thanks for the 
members of my dissertation committee. I am deeply grateful for Prof. Siyen Fei’s 
constant encourgement and tough love over the years. Prof. Fei’s honest approach to 
learning and teaching—and life in general—will serve as an invaluable model to me 
for the rest of my career. Prof. Christopher Atwood familiarized me with the 
historiography of the Inner Asian world and has played the important but thankless 
role of devil’s advocate by challenging me to refine my arguments and rethink my 
assumptions. Prof. Frederick Dickinson has always been generous with his time. He 
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700 friends for their warm welcome and help that allowed me to familiarize with the 
US-style academic world; I am indebted to Prof. Gray Tuttle and the Khorlo group of 
Columbia University who have taught me so much about Tibetology; I really 
appreciate Prof. Paul Smith’s help, encouragement and mentorship when I was 
teaching at Haverford and I truly enjoy the time with my dear “Chinese Revolution” 
students; many thanks are due to my Chinese History Matters! friends with whom I 
have had tremendous fun in VP 251; my sincere gratitude for Joan Plonski and Penn 
staff whose generous help and support have made my life at Penn a lot easier than I 
thought; not to mention my Tibetan, Mongolian, and Japanese language teachers and 
partners who have opened up many other worlds for me. Last but not least, I want to 
thank those who I met during my fieldwork: our friendship and love shared at the 
hillfoot of Himalaya and on the vast Qinghai steppe will be with me forever.  
    Finally, I would like to thank wholeheartedly my wife, Dai Bingyi, for her patience 
in putting up with my bad temper, for her relentless encouragment, for her help in my 
































    This dissertation uses the analytical tool of “competing visions” to examine the 
historical development of China’s Inner Asian highland from 1368 to 1600. 
Straddling the Chinese heartland, Tibetan plateau, and the Mongol steppe, the 
highland region was a convergence zone that facilitated a constant flow of people, 
goods, and knowledge. Competing visions over the highland, as both historical 
phenomena and research perspective, highlight the dynamic nature of the region and 
its function as a bridge for cross-cultural encounters and transregional geopolitical 
interactions. By investigating how and why different social groups understood the 
highland differently, this dissertation scrutinizes the operating mechanism of a 
borderland society and its role in macroregional geopolitics.  Focusing on material 
exchanges, knowledge circulations, border-crossings, and contestations over 
territoriality through the lens of Ming emperors, highland regime lords, Tibetan 
Buddhist monks, Ming military deserters, and Mongol nomads, this dissertation 
highlights the formation of a borderland space as the outcome of constant 
compromise and negotiation. This dissertation argues that the conflict of ideas and 





political-economic landscape, social structure, and human-environment relations, but 
also the transformation of the highland from a middle ground where multiple 
territorial perceptions co-existed into a demarcating frontier between Ming China and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
    As its title suggests, the Collected Essays on the Statecraft of the August Ming 
(Ming jingshi wenbian 明經世文編) is an extensive corpus of political essays 
centering on statesmanship during the Ming dynasty. Compiled in the dynasty’s final 
decade, the work serves as an important lens through which later readers and 
researchers developed a panoramic view of how various policies, economic 
development plans, and cultural and ideological trends were perceived and discussed 
by Ming authors. In short, the collection reveals how Ming state actors filtered and 
coded their attitudes toward their own times.  
    The Ming empire, similar to many other dynasties in Chinese history, faced 
territorial challenges from all directions. As one of the central issues of imperial 
politics, frontier defense is a primary concern of many works in Collected Essays on 
Statecraft of the August Ming. But in terms of which specific frontier region was most 
pressing for imperial security, different authors had their own opinions. Nonetheless, 
the summary of the collection’s compilers could be treated as a fair comment with 
which many contemporaries as well as modern scholars would agree:  
Of the dangers created by the exotic barbarians, those from the 
northern barbarians (Beilu 北虜) are the most urgent; the next severe 
are the threats from the barbarians of Guangdong and Guangxi 
(Liangyue 兩粵), followed by the menace from the Yunnan and 
Sichuan barbarians (Dianshu 滇蜀) and the challenges posed by the 
barbaric Japanese dwarfs (Woyi 倭夷); what come at last are those 
westerly barbarians of Qiang (Xiqiang西羌).1    
    Many scholars of Ming China would agree with the late Ming intellectuals. The 
alleged northern barbarians were indeed the primary external threat for the regime; 
 





although defeated by the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, the Mongols had always 
been the greatest danger to Ming China.2 Their successful capture of a Ming emperor 
was one of the most torturous humiliations, haunting the Ming intellectuals for 
centuries. Next were the so-called barbarians of Liangyue and Dianshu. These 
southern non-Han communities had largely maintained autonomy throughout the 
dynasty and constituted constant military and cultural pressures for the Ming.3 During 
the Imjin war, the Japanese almost occupied and colonized Korea and thus 
considerably sabotaged the Ming-dominated East Asian world order.4 What comes at 
last is the allegedly barbaric Xiqiang people, the protagonists of this dissertation. 
Defining the Highland 
 
    The late Ming writings’ references to the Xiqiang barbarians correspond to the 
indigenous non-Han communities living in modern-day eastern Qinghai, southern 
Gansu, and northwest Sichuan, a region this dissertation designates as the highland. 
Straddling the Chinese heartland, Mongol steppe, and Tibetan Plateau, the highland 
area was a topographical upland with high altitude, cold and dry climate, and half-
agricultural, half-pastoral environment. Geographically speaking, it was the eastern 
end of the Hexi corridor, thus marking the gate to the Silk Road, and the northern part 
of the Chinese-Tibetan borderland that separated two cultural and political realms. 
From the geopolitical perspective, the highland region was the transitional zone that 
bridged the East and Inner Asian worlds (Fig. 1.1). 
 
 
2 Dardess, More than the Great Wall: The Northern Frontier and Ming National Security, 1368-1644. 
3 Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands; John Herman, Amid 
the Clouds and Mist: China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700. 






Fig. 1.1: Highland in East and Inner Asian worlds 
    My taking the highland as an analytical unit does not necessarily mean that this 
dissertation treats the region as a homogenous entity. None of the environmental and 
ecological criteria such as ruggedness, altitude, and remoteness are sufficient to define 
the region as a holistic geographical component. Quite the opposite, the region was— 
and still is—famous for its complicated topographical constitution and resultant 
diversity in its inhabitants’ ethnicity, livelihood, and even biological species. 
Therefore, the concept of the highland here is primarily an artificial one.  
     But the highland designation for the region does not appear out of nowhere; rather, 
it emerges from the Ming people’s perspective. First, the designation for the place and 
its inhabitants in Ming-produced texts are quite consistent. The area was called Fan 
Di (番地) in Ming sources, and the locals Fan Ren (番人) or Xifan (西番). 
Sometimes the Chinese character Qiang (羌) is also variously used to refer to either 
the people or the region, such as in the above-mentioned paragraph from Collected 
Essays on Statecraft of the August Ming. As later chapters will show, however, Qiang 
is most likely a romanticized designation for the so-called western barbarians, and the 
term of Fan is used with greater frequency throughout the Ming. Therefore, it was the 





homogenous group. This understanding, from a contemporary academic and 
ethnographical point of view, is most likely biased and cannot accurately reflect the 
situation on the ground. But from the late 14th to the late 16th century, it was such an 
idea that primarily drove the Ming court’s consistent economic, military, and religious 
policies exclusively applied to the region. This Ming perspective of the area is the 
historical root for this dissertation’s definition of the highland. 
    The concept of the highland, by its own definition, is a term from the Ming’s 
perspective. After all, it is only a ‘high-land’ when compared to the relatively low 
Chinese heartland. But this is not the only reason for me to adopt the term. Another 
imperative, perhaps more important in terms of historiography, is that the term 
“highland” implies a sense of distinctiveness. Mountainous regions in world history— 
no matter in the Mediterranean world, South American Andes, or southeast Asian 
Zomia area—have always been portrayed as realms of distinctive political economic 
and cultural traits. It is exactly this peculiarity of the mountain world that I would 
reveal. The highland world had its own social norms and political and cultural 
landscapes that in many ways were quite different from those of the lowland (i.e. 
Ming China). Therefore, employing the notion of the highland allows this dissertation 
to highlight such distinction and examine the history of the highland in its own light.  
    During the Ming dynasty, the highland region constituted the empire’s northwest 
frontier. Compared with other frontier regions, the area was less of a military concern 
for the Ming. Although put under the close supervision of the Ming military, the 
Ming-designated Fan-Qiang (番羌) indigenes of the highland maintained a relatively 
peaceful relationship with the Ming. This was mainly due to two reasons. First, the 
highland indigenes had no vendetta against the Ming regime. They were not like the 





political reasons. Second, resource competition between the highland indigenes and 
the Ming’s Han subjects was less fierce. Unlike the empire’s southern frontier region 
where the Ming’s civilian migration mingled with the local non-Han groups and thus 
frequently fought with each other for scarce resources, the highland region was not a 
destination for the Ming’s proactive civil migration. In contrast, throughout the 
duration of the dynasty, different highland regions were mostly the Ming’s military 
administration units. Therefore, Ming people who dwelled in the highland were 
relatively disciplined able-bodied soldiers checked by the empire’s passive military 
policy in the region. 
 
Fig. 1.2: Highland as the Ming empire’s northwestern frontier 
      If that is the case, one may wonder: Why would I focus on a seemingly less 
important frontier? A short answer to this question, I argue, is tied to how I 
understand the latest scholarly development of the fields of Ming history and Chinese 
frontier history. This dissertation downplays the decisive role of the state in Ming 
studies and conceptualizes the highland region not as an area under Ming China’s 





In this regard, the highland was a place where multiple political and religious forces 
constantly competed with each other, and their visions of the highland were at odds. It 
is exactly such diversity and dynamism on the highland that this dissertation 
addresses. 
Positioning the Highland in Ming Studies 
 
Like many other dynasties in Chinese history, by the end of its imperial evolution the 
Ming empire’s sociopolitical engagement had extensively exceeded the dynastic 
founder’s initial project. The tremendous changes that the Ming experienced over the 
arc of two and a half centuries have drawn considerable scholarly attention. A review 
of the extensive literature on Ming China suggests two major intellectual trends in the 
field: shifts from autocracy to state-society relations and center to frontier. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the decades-long debate on Ming dynasty state-society 
relations has the potential to inspire a revisit to Ming dynasty center-frontier 
interactions. The highlighted historical agency of Ming society allows me to 
challenge the central position of the state in current Ming frontier history, which 
overshadows to some extent the independence of frontier regions that oftentimes 
developed on their own terms. 
    The scholarly tendency to portray the early Ming as an autocratic state stemmed 
from the political concerns of the American academy in the 1970s, which sought to 
better understand the current despotic Chinese party-state through Chinese history. 
Political implications aside, I argue the research on early Ming autocracy served as 
the starting point for the long state-society debate to come. John Dardess’s 
Confucianism and Autocracy is one of the foundational works of the field that 
provides an in-depth analysis of the early Ming empire’s autocratic nature. In addition 





the bureaucratic system, Dardess pays specific attention to the early Ming Confucians, 
arguing that these intellectuals had formed an independent profession dedicated to 
ruling the state and thus contributed as much as Zhu himself to early Ming tyranny.5 
In contrast, Edward Farmer unpacks the ways that Zhu implemented power 
penetration into every capillaries of the imperial body. Focusing on Zhu’s legislation 
specifically, Farmer reveals how the Ming founder programmed social regulation 
through a sophisticated legal system.6 Because of these early studies, later scholars 
were primed to understand the Ming as an autocratic state. 
    Many of Zhu’s choices built the framework in which the Ming regime matured. 
Relying on the Ming founder’s policies for explanation thus became both a historical 
and historiographical phenomenon.7 But in contrast with the path following early 
Ming inertia that took whatever the Ming founder perceived as the set rules, what we 
see in the late Ming is a completely different outlook featuring vibrant commerce, 
upside-down social hierarchy, and liberated values. These new changes are well-
documented in Timothy Brook’s Confusion of Pleasure, which provides a close 
examination of how commercial culture reshaped the social and political landscape of 
late Ming.8 Along the same lines, Si-yen Fei’s monograph on late Ming Nanjing 
provides an apt example to showcase the tension between early Ming utopia for a 
rural society and the late Ming reality of rapid urbanization.9 Fei argues that cities, as 
an almost unremarked category in early Ming, played an important role as the 
dominant sphere of late Ming politics, economy, and culture. In a recent publication, 
Michael Szonyi aims to conclude the state-society debate by stating that the ongoing 
 
5 Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty. 
6 Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation: The Reordering of Chinese Society Following the Era of 
Mongol Rule. 
7 One attempt to systematically examine Zhu Yuanzhang’s influence on Ming dynasty as well as Chinese history is 
Schneewind, Long Live the Emperor!: Uses of the Ming Founder across Six Centuries of East Asian History. 
8 Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China. 





interaction between the state and the society should be understood not as “a story in 
which market displaces autocratic state,” but rather as a process of negotiation in 
which the state-society relationship was constantly restructured.10 In other words, the 
agency of society as a historiographical intervention is already evident and needs no 
more stressing. A much more productive angle is to look at how such agencies 
changed our understanding of the Ming state.  
    Similar to the state-society binary, I argue that the center-frontier paradigm should 
be understood along the same lines. Previously, the notion of the “frontier” as a 
conceptual tool oftentimes marginalizes peripheral regions in the process of state 
formation. When a specific region is positioned as a “frontier,” state expansion, ethnic 
unification, economic growth, and religious integration in that region are often cast as 
metropole-driven progress, which leaves little space for local agency and disguises 
the on-the-ground complexity. This stereotype may be recognized in a recent article 
by Chinese historical anthropologist, Du Shuhai, that discusses how south China, as a 
geographical frontier, was pulled into the imperial orbit. In total, the author 
categorizes five mechanisms through which the peripheral societies were brought into 
the imperial system, namely the imagination of common ancestries; construction of 
cultural landscapes; imposition of ideological discourse; mobilization of resources 
and population; and integration of worship rituals.11 In other words, the article 
identifies how the state gradually transformed many peripheral regions into part of 
China through different cultural and ideological means. Although the article admits 
that frontier social groups demonstrated the agency to proactively choose to cooperate 
with the center, usually for their own sake, the author suggests the inevitability of an 
overarching penetration of the frontier by the imperial center.  
 
10 Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China, 228.  





    This paradigm, I argue, is teleological and gives the imperial center too much 
credit. The Ming court was nothing like a modern state, able to penetrate deep into the 
frontier region. Its impact on the distant periphery was intermittent at best. In other 
words, although nominally belonging to the Ming empire, many frontier societies 
were in fact autonomous and followed their own logics of historical development. 
While the imperial intervention indeed provided part of the driving force, the 
historical evolution of the frontiers was not necessarily directed by the center. This 
dissertation argues that the agency of the frontier, just like the society in the state-
society binary, is self-evident. But unfortunately, it is still relatively understudied. 
Although scholars such as John Herman have persuasively foregrounded the historical 
trajectory of a frontier society on its own, scholarship that speaks to the agency of the 
frontier is still under-appreciated.12 This dissertation does not only highlight the 
imperative to understand frontier society in its own light; more importantly, it further 
explores how exactly portraying the highland as a frontier with agency could change 
our understanding of its history in relation to the so-called center. The answer to this 
question, to some extent, lies in how I position this dissertation within the 
historiography of Chinese frontier history.  
Positioning the Highland in the Field of Chinese Frontier History 
 
    Roughly since the 1990s, Chinese frontier history has become a popular topic 
among historians of China. Even though the field was not new in the 90s, it received 
increased attention at this point due to the rise of the so-called New Qing History 
School. Previously, scholars understood frontiers in Chinese history in relation to 
imperial centers, as if the former were destined to be annexed by the latter. The 
process of cultural integration (i.e. “civilizing missions”) accompanied the center’s 
 





military expansion, which, according to Stephen Harrell, grants imperial centers the 
dominating role while categorizing peripheral people as subordinate.13 The most 
representative variant of this “civilizing project” is the concept of “Sinicization” 
which served as the basic paradigm for Chinese frontier history for quite a long time.  
    Yet the New Qing History scholars harshly challenged this framework. Although 
quite diverse in their understanding of the Qing empire as a whole, the New Qing 
History scholars share one key value. They agree that the Manchus did not merely 
inherit the institutional legacy and political legitimacy from the Ming, as earlier 
generations of scholars had claimed, but also blended in certain Inner Asian 
characteristics in the process of empire-building and thus rendered the regime a multi-
ethnic/cultural political entity. This re-conceptualization of the Qing empire 
stimulated scholars’ interest in the history of these Inner-Asian frontier regions and 
thus extensively enriched the field of Chinese frontier history.  
     From the 90s to the first decade of the twenty-first century, scholars, primarily 
historians of Qing China, repositioned the frontiers in the imperial apparatus by 
revisiting the presupposed dominate-subordinate relationship between the imperial 
center and frontier. Recognizing the agency of frontier regions, historians further 
identified how the frontier history perspective could shed new light on the dynamics 
of China’s imperial centers, and they addressed this question from different analytical 
angles such as ethnicity, environment, gender, and religion. Pamela Crossley 
highlights the constructivist nature of ethnic identity in Qing China’s frontier regions. 
She proposes that both the Manchus and the Mongols went through the process of 
rephrasing origin legends and reclaiming genealogical lines and thus constructed a 
 





sense of collective mentality to serve specific political needs.14 Leo Shin, examining 
the Ming dynasty southern frontier, argues that the idea of Chineseness was fostered 
through Han people’s increased contacts with non-Han others and eventually factored 
in the formation of a Han-centric ethnic discourse.15 Such attempts to reveal the 
constructive essence of certain traits of the frontier are also seen in environmental 
studies. Jonathan Schlesinger, by focusing on the cultural connotations of pearls, 
mushrooms, and fur, argues that the image of the frontier’s pristine nature was in fact 
invented by the Qing court in response to the 19th century large-scale Han 
immigration to the empire’s northern frontiers.16 David Bello, along a similar line,  
identifies ecology as a variable for ethnicity formation as the Manchu rulers 
correspondently related certain ethnic traits to specific ecological settings.17 From 
both ethnic and environmental perspectives, these scholars have considerably 
challenged the Sinicization paradigm in Chinese frontier history. 
    Other scholars deployed the lens of gender and religion to examine center-frontier 
relations. In Goddess on the Frontier, Megan Bryson points out how the binary 
concepts of Chineseness-barbarity or center-periphery are gendered as the center 
controlled the image of frontier female as one way to instill imperial ideology.18 Johan 
Elverskog, in Our Great Qing, challenges the presupposition that Tibetan Buddhism 
functioned as an ideological tool for the Manchus to culturally integrate the Mongols 
into the empire. Instead, he argues that this was true only for a short period during the 
Qianlong dynasty and that very different types of state-religion relations persisted in 
 
14 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology;  “Making Mongols,” in Sutton 
Donald, Siu Helen, and Crossley Panela, eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early 
Modern China, 58-83.  
15 Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands. 
16 Schlesinger, A World Trimmed with Fur : Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule. 
17 Bello, Across Forest, Steppe and Mountain: Environment, Identity and Empire in Qing China’s Borderlands. 





other periods.19 Research privileging the frontier allows historians to examine center-
frontier interaction from various perspectives and thus reveals more nuance to 
understand how imperial apparatuses worked. 
    Rejecting the frontier’s subordinate role in relation to the center and acknowledging 
the subfield to be productive for revisiting many aspects of Chinese history, frontier 
history also allows for a trans-regional framework through which China may be 
understood in a macro-regional and even global context. This, I argue, indicates the 
newest trend in Chinese frontier history. Evelyn Rawski’s Early Modern China and 
Northeast Asia is a welcome attempt in this regard. By erasing obstacles that the 
modern nation-state framework has posed to historical studies, Rawski proposes that 
Northeast Asia should be understood as an analytical category on its own. If scholars 
could investigate the region’s historical development in its own right, then we might 
develop a new and deeper understanding of certain political events and cultural 
phenomenon in Korea, Japan, Manchurian China, and Russia.20 By so doing, Rawski 
proposes to unveil the diversity embedded in northeast Asian social-cultural 
landscape and revisit the region’s history as a product of constant trans-regional 
interaction.  
    This dissertation is inspired by the aforementioned historiographical trajectory in 
three ways. First, it perceives the highland, as the Ming’s northwest frontier, not as a 
place homogenized by the political center but as a region featuring diversity. It allows 
us to investigate the various approaches that the Ming adopted to its interaction with 
the highland society, and hence questions the conventional narrative that portrays the 
Ming as a purely Han-centered empire that only aimed at Sinicizing frontier regions. 
 
19 Elverskog, Our Great Qing. 





By examining the Ming’s flexible policies toward the highland, this dissertation 
highlights the imperial characteristics of the Ming as a multi-ethnic/cultural political 
entity. In this regard, we may even push further to question the image created by the 
New Qing History school that highlights the peculiarity of the Qing empire. If the 
Ming was also able to adopt different methods to interact and govern various frontier 
regions, to what extent was the Qing special in this vein? 
    Secondly, this dissertation, in addition to traditional political and economic 
perspectives, also widely consults environmental history, ethnic studies, religious 
studies, and material culture studies to examine frontier history from a bottom-up 
perspective. These disciplines not only help to excavate the agency of the highland 
society in providing the driving force for geopolitical changes, but also serve as a 
superb lens to examine previously unnoticed nuances in the highland’s interaction 
with the Ming. 
    Thirdly, this dissertation adopts a trans-regional perspective and argues that the 
highland was an area of contestation in which the Ming was only one among several 
players in the game. The highland was a place through which various types of people, 
goods, and information flowed constantly. With different communities flocking to the 
highland—carrying with them their diverse languages, religions, commodities, and 
epistemes, the region soon became a place where new ideas and norms overwrote old 
principles. Power struggles on the ground thus became dynamic, and the perception of 
various social groups for the highland were oftentimes at odds. This dissertation 
argues that it is exactly in such encounters, clashes, negotiations, and compromises 
that the highland provided driving forces for geopolitical changes. 
    Finally, let us go back to the earlier question: why choose to study this seemingly 





important or special from the Ming intellectuals’ perspective, it functions as a 
reference point for us to understand other frontiers in a comparative framework. Quite 
unlike the Ming’s other peripheral regions where military actions frequently took 
place, the relatively peaceful highland region represents the normal status of a 
frontier, whereas the highly charged Ming-Mongol borderland was peculiar in 
comparison and thus not representative. Therefore, observations drawn from the 
highland allow greater breadth for comparative studies in which scholars may detect 
shared experiences, tactics, and policies in the Ming’s other frontier regions. The 
highland, in this respect, was probably the least special Ming frontier, but it was also 
the most standard frontier through which the Ming’s overall attitude toward frontiers 
was revealed. Thus, the highland’s meaning to the Ming requires reevaluation, and its 
history requires revision.  
Materials and Methodologies 
 
    This dissertation chiefly examines four types of primary sources. The first type is 
Ming court records, mainly the Ming Silu (The Veritable Records of the Ming 
Dynasty 明實錄), imperial edicts, and imperial memorials, and they constitute a 
considerable portion of the source base of this dissertation. Though created by the 
Ming court and thus reflecting the Ming’s perspective, these records include details, 
often from transcribed memorials, that other sources could not provide. However, it is 
also important to note that many court policies were defined one way at court, but 
executed in the highland in another.   
    The second type of primary source is local materials that include, but are not 
limited to local gazetteers, atlases, military defense guidebooks, and local private 
writings. These primary sources, compared with the first type, were usually locally 





their diversified genres, it would be dangerous to lump them together and simplify 
them as materials of elite perspective. The ideas of literati on the frontier might differ 
from military men, and one gazetteer might provide opposing comments on certain 
issue than the other one. Such a wide array of voices needs to be treated carefully so 
as to avoid the appearance of an undifferentiated “Ming people” perspective. 
    The third type are primary sources in non-Han languages. These include religious 
history accounts and hagiographies in Tibetan and biographies and chronicles in 
Mongolian. Despite the fact that such non-Chinese language materials are not written 
contemporaneously but are produced in later periods, they still allow for a non-China-
centric point of view through which to understand highland history. However, 
hegemonic voices in these materials also require careful close reading. For example, 
many Tibetan materials about this region were produced after the 16th century, when 
the Geluk school became the dominating sectarian of Tibetan Buddhism. Therefore, 
when describing issues related to non-Geluk schools or even anti-Geluk forces, such 
materials oftentimes manipulated the narrative. Modern readers should not take these 
sources at face value and must compare them with other sources for the sake of 
accuracy. 
    The fourth type of primary source are what I consider as unpublished, on-the-
ground materials. These include stone tablet inscriptions, genealogies, or land 
contracts that are still scattered in rural areas and preserved by peasants and herders. 
Such private accounts are quite valuable because they let the voice of as yet silent 
grassroots to be heard. Also, it enables scholars to examine the frontier ramifications 
of center-imposed social and political norms. Still, many of these sources are in rough 
condition, and thus they are oftentimes hard to read. Meanwhile, because they were 





in these sources at best provide only certain aspects of the story but definitely not the 
whole picture.  
    In this dissertation, all these types of primary sources are examined with particular 
attention as to how and why they were produced. This is important because I use 
materials written by outsiders to reconfigure the history of the highland. Without 
question, these materials may be quite biased, either in the political or the cultural 
sense, and they at best only reveal parts of the picture. In this regard, reading between 
the lines is necessary to discern what happened on the ground and how they were 
portrayed for specific reasons. Keeping in mind such possible corruptions in texts can 
help to extract relatively objective information through close reading. 
    In order to manage these materials, this project particularly draws on cultural 
anthropology and digital humanities methods to reveal the natural complexity of 
borderland society. This dissertation first follows an ontological turn in the field and 
consults anthropological approaches to recalibrate a borderland logic. It relies on 
personal fieldwork to collect materials in the rural settings. The relative scarcity of 
official textual records on the highland history makes it necessary to turn to everyday 
manuscripts that are unknown to most scholars. It is equally important to collect oral 
materials during fieldwork, such as fragments of the historical records preserved in 
epics, folk songs, and local legends. These oral interviews expose a local cosmology 
which reflects the indigenous conceptualization of history and their perception of 
interactions with the outside world.   
    This dissertation also utilizes digital humanities approaches to reveal a detailed 
process of borderland power negotiation. Due to the scarcity of textual records of 
borderland history, digital humanities has become a new methodological trend in 





intends to establish three-dimensional topographical models via GIS mapping to 
visualize the spatial pattern of borderland military garrisons, Buddhist monasteries, 
and indigenous villages. This dissertation also adopts regulatory expression 
approaches, with the help of MARKUS, to conduct data mining and topic modeling of 
a large digitalized corpus. With digital humanities techniques, this dissertation intends 
to visualize the social dynamics of a mountainous borderland region that may be 
unknown to previous scholars, such as the mapped power relation between military 
and religious institutions and the correlation between the strength of indigenous 
community leaders, the frequency and intensity of tribute interactions, and the 
construction of routes.  
Chapter Outlines 
 
    In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion (Chapters 1 and 7), the main body of 
this dissertation has five chapters. Organized chronologically, each of these chapters 
focuses on one specific type of vision for the highland. By investigating how different 
groups of people or individuals understood the highland, this dissertation charts the 
historical evolution of the highland from 1368 to 1600.  
    Chapter 2, “Emperors,” charts how the Ming emperor’s understanding of the 
highland was the driving force for the region’s tremendous change between the 1370s 
and 1390s. The highland during the Mongol era was the strategic gate through which 
the Yuan dynasty administrated many Tibet-related affairs. Its geopolitical relevance 
did not change much after the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition. To protect the Ming’s 
communications with Tibet and to prevent the Mongol’s continuing interaction with 
its Inner Asian allies, the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang mounted a series of military 
campaigns against Mongol remnants in the area and eventually subordinated the 





also extensively changed the ethnic make-up of the highland population by promoting 
large-scale military migration. Many Han soldiers flocked to the region, settled down 
in Han-exclusive military towns, and hence marked the change of the highland’s 
political and social landscape in the ensuring centuries. 
    Chapter 3, “Lords,” takes the lens of certain highland figureheads to examine how 
they perceived the power structure of the highland society. In the early 15th century, 
these power dynamics were based on an exclusive social structure in which highland 
inhabitants grouped themselves in a dichotomous manner. Meanwhile, religion 
functioned as another source of legitimacy for highland rulership. When the Ming’s 
tributary system was recognized as one way to incorporate the highland into its 
imperial orbit, the highland regime leaders also mimicked this system and created a 
highland version of a tributary system in the mountains. With their strong military 
powers and religious authority, it was these regional leaders, not the Ming, that 
determined the social norms of the highland society.  
    Chapter 4, “Monks,” adopts the perspective of Tibetan Buddhist monks in the 
highland and examines how they reshaped the region’s religious landscape from the 
mid to late 15th century. Although Tibetan Buddhism was not intrinsic to many 
highland communities, many Tibetan Buddhists made full use of the preferential 
treatment they received from the Ming court to facilitate the spread of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the region. Relying on lineage networks or taking advantage of 
institutional loopholes, Tibetan Buddhists actively engaged  with highland society in 
the mid-15th century, and thus accomplished the rapid dissemination of Tibetan 
Buddhism that reconfigured the local social structure.  
    Chapter 5, “Soldiers,” explores the significance of the highland through the eyes of 





highland was a place where indigenes overpowered Ming soldiers. Many Ming 
soldiers were bullied, killed, and captured by the highland inhabitants and thus forced 
to enter the highland in a passive way. In the early 16th century, as a response to the 
rising Mongol threat, the Ming implemented large-scale reforms in its highland 
military. However, treating these new programs as opportunities to escape from heavy 
military duties, many Ming soldiers simply deserted into the highland, thus 
proactively de-Sinicizing themselves and altering the ethnic make-up of the highland 
society. 
    The last chapter, Chapter 6, “Nomads,” traces how the Mongols changed their 
perception of the highland from time to time in the late 16th century. Treating the 
highland as a military shelter, a religious bridge for Tibetan Buddhism, and a new 
settlement with abundant subjects and resources, the Mongols gradually transformed a 
half-controlled, half-autonomous military buffer zone to a new piece of territory with 
strategic importance. Such geopolitical changes stimulated the Ming to change its 
policies and perceptions of the highland in turn, which eventually resulted in the 
incorporation of the highland into the Ming’s imperial realm. By the late 16th century, 







Chapter 2: Emperors 
 
    Place names in China can be strange due to historical reasons. For example, 
scholars interested in Ming history may get confused when they travel in Lintan (臨
潭), a small county in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (甘南藏族自治州) of 
Gansu Province. Famous for its impressive early Ming city wall, Lintan also attracts 
historians of Ming China with the local people’s colorful historical memory. 
Nowadays, many Lintan inhabitants can still vividly recount stories of their 
adventurous early Ming ancestors, and many of these tales are supported by the 
detailed records in the yellowing genealogies that several Lintan families have 
preserved for centuries. But one would hardly believe that these ancient monuments 
and unfading legends cannot be found in the Lintan Old Town (臨潭舊城), where 
grandiose government buildings and fancy shopping malls are located; conversely, 
they are scattered in a place called Lintan New Town (臨潭新城). After all, a place 
bearing the designation of new, in northwest China, could easily be mistaken for a 
modern-era migration hub without much history and traceable past. Yet Lintan 
subverts outsiders’ common sense.   
    Lintan New Town is called as such for a reason. During the Ming dynasty, the 
region enjoyed much weightier geopolitical importance than it does today. Known as 
Taozhou in the early 14th century, the Lintan Old Town functioned as the regional 
commercial center. Yet when the Ming dynasty founder Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋 
1328-1398) ordered his army into the region, he was informed of hostile sentiment 





city, Zhu had a completely new walled fortress constructed to house the soldiers and 
also repress the animosity among the locals. This military base hence bore the name 
of “New Town” in the local context.  
    What happened in Taozhou was not unique. In the late 14th century, the emperor 
ordered large-scale military migration to many places in the Ming’s newly conquered 
northwest highland. As hundreds of thousands of Ming soldiers flocked into the 
region, the social and cultural landscape of the previously underpopulated highland 
were reconfigured. The somewhat confusing designation of Lintan New Town, in this 
regard, was only the tip of the iceberg. This chapter examines how the Ming emperor 
perceived the newly annexed highland, positioned it in his imperial blueprint, and 
reshaped the region’s landscape through his policy. Through an examination of the 
geopolitical role of the highland between East and Inner Asian worlds, its position 
and function in the emperor’s eyes, and the tension between highland locals and 
newcomers, this chapter illustrates how the highland entered a new epoch through a 
bumpy road. 
Resurrecting Sino-Tibetan Interactions 
    As a crossroads that connects the Chinese heartland with the Inner Asian world, the 
highland region has been considered as the gateway to the Tibetan plateau. This 
section situates the region’s strategic importance in the context of Ming-Tibet 
interaction during the early years of Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign. It argues that the half 
decade between 1369 to 1374 was the decisive period for the Ming to establish 
contact with Tibet and that the value of the highland was greatly cherished by the 
Ming court because of its role in facilitating such interactions. 
    Due to its geographical location, the highland region has been long considered the 





historiography as the intersection of Chinese and Tibetan cultural and political 
realms.21 This geopolitical role was clearly recognized from the Mongol era. In 1269, 
the Yuan dynasty founder Qubilai (忽必烈 1215-1294) established the Tufan and 
Vicinity Pacification Commission (吐蕃等處宣慰司) in the highland, and later chose 
the city of Hezhou (河州) as its administrative center.22 Being the very first Yuan 
dynasty local administrative office in the great Tibetan region and a subdivision of the 
central Office of Buddhism and Tibet (宣政院), the Tufan and Vicinity Pacification 
Commission was not only granted direct control over a vast territory in contemporary 
east Qinghai, South Gansu, and Northwest Sichuan, but also played an important role 
in many Tibet-related political, economic, and religious affairs.23  
    The highland region’s administrative function and geopolitical role in Yuan 
dynasty Tibet world greatly affected its position in the early Ming imperial blueprint. 
It was initially abandoned by the Ming’s frontline general for its dense non-Han 
population. In 1369, the Ming army marched into the region and took over the 
regional administrative center of Hezhou. But the commander Feng Sheng (馮勝) 
soon ordered a retreat, including the confiscation of all portable properties and 
captives, and burned the entire city down. Although criticized by his contemporaries 
for being extremely shortsighted, Feng Sheng, holding a somewhat racist viewpoint, 
considered Hezhou a non-Han place beyond civilization and thus not worth keeping.24  
 
21 Zhang, Yuandai Tubo Difang Xingzheng Tizhi Yanjiu,188. Dayang zongba banjue sangbu, Hanzang Shiji, 144. 
22 For the establishment time of the office, see Chen, “Yuandai guosima xuanweisi de shezhi niandai he 
mingcheng,” in Chen, Chen Qingying Zangxue Lunwen Ji, 332; for Hezhou’s position in the administrative unit, 
see Zhang, Yuandai Tubo Difang Xingzheng Tizhi Yanjiu, 185-188. This dissertation transcribes 吐蕃 as Tufan. 
For reasonings, see Toh, “’Tufan’ yuanchu ‘tu (tou)fa’ wenti xiyao,” in Toh, Lishi Yuwenxue Luncong Chubian, 
70-98. 
23 For details of Tufan and Vicinity Pacification Commission, see Z hang, Yuandai Tubo Difang Xingzheng Tizhi 
Yanjiu, 179-214. For the geographical range under the office’s administration, see Yuanshi, juan 63, dili 6, Heyuan 
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    The city was not left wasteland for too long. In May of 1370, only one year after 
Feng Sheng’s raid, Hezhou was recaptured by the Ming army under the command of 
general Deng Yu (鄧愈). Although the situation did not improve and actually 
worsened, this time the Ming troops stayed, most likely at the court’s request. This is 
probably because the Ming court had already noticed the strategic value of Hezhou. 
Regardless of its non-Han character, the area’s potential to grant the Ming access to 
the Inner Asian world, particularly Tibet, must have been promising for the newly 
founded dynasty. Yet the initial stage of the occupation did not go smoothly. Living 
in the dilapidated frontier town was not easy for military personnel, and Ming officers 
began to defect. In July, more than seven hundred soldiers deserted in a single night 
due to severe starvation.25 Aware of sinking morale and widespread dissatisfaction, 
Deng Yu could do nothing other than give touching speeches and reiterate army 
values. Fortunate for him, many soldiers were eventually convinced to stay.26 In the 
coming months, it was these soldiers, fed on bitter ferns and surrounded by corpses, 
who managed to build a new Hezhou.27  
    I propose that the reason for the sharp reversal of Hezhou’s fate in just one year lies 
in the emperor’s gradual realization of the region’s importance in facilitating Sino-
Tibetan interactions. The turning point was the surrender of certain iconic figures. In 
1370, shortly after Deng Yu retook Hezhou, the half-ruined city witnessed the arrival 
of several Yuan officials led by a certain He Sonam-po (何鎖南普).28 Not just 
someone with a prestigious family background, He Sonam-po was the last Yuan 
dynasty pacification commander-in-chief (吐蕃等處宣慰使司都元帥) of Tufan and 
 
25 Yu, Jishi Lu Jianzheng, 316. 
26 Yu, Jishi Lu Jianzheng, 316. 
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Vicinity Pacification Commission. In other words, he was not only the highest official 
overseeing Hezhou, but also Tibet-related affairs in the entire eastern fringe of the 
Tibetan plateau. From then on, more and more Ming officials and commanders began 
to recognize the region not as the terminus of the Chinese cultural realm, but rather as 
the outpost to exert Ming empire’s influence, if not total control, over Tibet. 
    The high geopolitical value of the region is most clearly highlighted by the Ming’s 
attempts at establishing diplomatic relations with and collecting intelligence from 
central Tibet. In June 1370, less than two months after occupying Hezhou, Zhu 
Yuanzhang named an esteemed monk, Ke Xin (克新 1321-1370), as his envoy and 
dispatched him to deliver an imperial order to the Tibetans.29 Two months later in 
August, a second envoy named Kunga Sonam (鞏哥鎖南) made his way to Tibet.30 
The purpose of these missions, as one Ming imperial edict shows, was to build a 
hierarchical system in which the Ming was the suzerain and Tibet the subordinate. 
Such a vision for the regional world order, I argue, was a restoration of the Mongol 
model. In this regard, sending two envoys in a row within a short time indicates Zhu 
Yuanzhang’s great eagerness to establish contact with Tibet. Such impatience attests 
to the emperor’s anxiety because foreign acknowledgements of his rulership did not 
meet his expectation. Scholars have pointed out that the emperor considered visits by 
foreign envoys as public confirmations of his legitimacy, especially to his domestic 
subjects.31 By the time he dispatched envoys to Tibet, Zhu Yuanzhang’s court had 
received several embassies from Champa, Dai Viet, and Koryo, but nothing from the 
rest of Asia.32 The emperor was longing to see more people from afar. 
 
29 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 7. For Ke Xin’s political and religious life, see Deng, “Mingchu Shizang 
Sengren Kexin Shiji Kao.” 
30 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 8. 
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    To Zhu’s disappointment, the envoys could not live up to his expectations. Though 
Ke Xin passed away en route before he even made to the plateau,33 Kunga Sonam did 
not achieve much either: eight months later after his departure, still nothing was heard 
from him. Thus in May 1371, the impatient emperor sent another delegation to Tibet, 
but this time with two Hezhou natives as group leaders.34 In retrospect, the Hezhou 
envoys did eventually accomplish their missions to facilitate Sino-Tibetan interaction, 
but the good news did not make it back to the metropole until four years later in 1374. 
During the years while they were gone, Zhu did not leave his officials in Hezhou 
unoccupied: they were busy with Tibet-related intelligence collection. 
    As the outpost for communication with Tibet, Hezhou played an important role in 
collecting accurate information for the Ming while the court was quite unfamiliar with 
this westerly neighbor. This is most typically revealed in the case of Jamyang Shakya 
Gyaltsen (章陽沙加堅贊1340-1373). In 1372, Zhu Yuanzhang received a report from 
a Hezhou official on an internecine feud in eastern Tibet. The official suggested 
having Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen settle it. He was confident that with this Tibetan’s 
help, not only could the clash successfully be dealt with, but also would the 
submission of the entire eastern Tibet region come along naturally.35 Upon hearing 
this idea, Zhu decreed that a jade seal, as well as the title of Anointed State Preceptor 
(灌頂國師), be conferred upon Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen , but requested him to 
relocate to a Hezhou monastery to educate his people.36  
    Zhu Yuanzhang’s response was improper in three ways. First and foremost, the 
emperor obviously did not know how powerful a figure Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen 
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was at the time. He was not an ordinary regional figurehead, but the nephew and 
successor of Changchub Gyaltsen (絳曲堅贊1302-1364), the founder of the 
Phagmodrupa government in Tibet. Historians have agreed that around the mid-14th 
century, the Sakya government, exclusively patronized by the Yuan court to preside 
over Tibet, had already largely been replaced by the powerful Phagmodrupa 
government.37 Immediately after Changchub Gyaltsen passed away, Jamyang Shakya 
Gyaltsen became the most powerful figure in central Tibet, and both his secular and 
religious authorities were recognized by the Yuan court.38 Yet the Ming emperor 
seemed to have no knowledge of him and simply noted him in the court records. 
Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang granted him only a religious title, and not even the most 
prestigious one, but no secular title that reflected his real power and role in Tibet. In 
addition, the Ming court requested that the Tibetan king move to into its territory and 
ordered him to educate its Tibetan subjects, which was a ludicrously ill-informed 
demand by any measure.  
    The emperor’s inappropriate responses stand in sharp contrast with the Hezhou 
officials’ efficient and accurate intelligence-gathering work. The officials in Hezhou 
were crystal clear about the changing political situation in the Tibetan heartland and 
suggested the most competent candidate to the court, while the court acted slower in 
an inattentive manner. Nevertheless, Hezhou still played a significant role in 
facilitating this first formal contact between the Ming and the most powerful secular 
ruler of Tibet. Two years later in 1374, it was Hezhou agents again that successfully 
brought the most prestigious religious leaders of central Tibet to the Ming realm. 
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    In May 1374, the two long-gone envoys finally made their way back to Hezhou. 
Together with them were the retainers of Sakya sect Buddhist master Kunga Gyaltsen 
Palzangpo (公哥堅藏巴藏卜), the descendent of Pakpa (八思巴),39 the most famous 
Tibetan Buddhist in the entire Mongol era. Although the Sakya school had lost certain 
authority in Tibet’s secular affairs by the 1370s, it was still highly influential in the 
religious realm. Recent scholarship has revealed that in the early Ming, Sakya 
doctrines were continuously popular, not only in Tibet but also in the Chinese 
heartland, and had greatly dominated the Ming court’s Buddhist realm.40 As a 
religious leader of the Sakya school and Pakpa’s successor, Kunga Gyaltsen 
Palzangpo’s willingness to build a relationship with the Ming, in Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
eyes, was a significant symbol of continued authority over Tibet from the Yuan to 
Ming, a religious legitimacy the Ming direly needed. Moreover, in addition to various 
gifts, the delegation brought many Yuan-issued documents to submit to the Ming 
officials and committed to send 2,000 horses to the Ming every three years as gifts.41 
In this vein, the Ming had acquired certain recognition from Tibet in the secular 
respect as well. The emperor was delighted by this breakthrough. Therefore, he 
granted Kunga Gyaltsen Palzangpo the title of “Great State Preceptor of Perfect 
Wisdom, Marvelous Enlightenment, and Magnificent Teaching” 
(圓智妙覺弘教大國師).42 In the whole of the Hongwu reign, this was the only Great 
State Preceptor title issued to Buddhists and certainly the highest. 
 
39Zhongguo zangxue zhongxin, Yuan Yilai Xizang Difang Yu Zhongyang Zhengfu Guanxi Dangan Shiliao 
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    Thus, the Ming emperor clearly recognized the contribution made by the Hezhou 
officials, as well as Hezhou’s strategic value in connecting Tibet. In July 1374, 
following the arrival of Kunga Gyaltsen Palzangpo’s delegation, Hezhou was elevated 
as the headquarter of Xi’an Auxiliary Regional Military Commission 
(西安行都指揮使司), an office designed to preside over the entire Tibetan region.43 
In early Ming imperial blueprints, this adjustment signified the restoration and even 
expansion of the role of Hezhou as not only one among several, but the highest 
administrative center of all Tibet. Although being largely Zhu Yuanzhang’s fantasy 
from a retrospective standpoint, the erection of Hezhou as the political center for the 
Tibetan world marked the consolidation of his authority in the empire’s westerly 
subordinating state. However, Zhu Yuanzhang was not the only one who was aware 
of the region’s importance and intended to control it—the Mongols set their sights 
there as well. 
The Haunting Mongol Shadow 
    The fact that the last Yuan emperor Toghon-Temür (妥懽帖睦尔) fled to Mongolia 
in 1368 does not signify the evaporation of Mongol powers in China proper overnight. 
The severe menace of the Mongol remnants came from far and near to challenge the 
nascent Ming. The highland region was one such arena. The region’s geopolitical 
function as a crossroads allowed the Mongols to outflank the Ming’s forces from all 
directions, and the local figureheads’ opportunistic character created extensive 
difficulties for the Ming to implement effective control. This section argues that the 
Ming emperor’s policies aimed at these two problems constituted the main reason for 
the highland’s fading Inner Asian character.  
 





    The Yuan dynasty implemented a multi-layered system of governance in the 
highland. With officials like He-Sonam-po in charge of civil affairs and Tibet-related 
issues, military authority was vested in several Mongol princes to prevent potential 
uproar.44 During the last days of the Yuan dynasty, there were chiefly three princes 
residing in the region: Dorjibal (朵爾只巴), the prince of Qi (岐王) who descended 
from imperial son-in-law Chikü (赤窟) of the Qonggirads (弘吉剌),45 Budnal 
(卜納剌), the Pacifier of the West and Prince of Wujing (鎮西武靖王) who was 
descended from Qubilai’s ninth son A’uruqči (奥魯赤),46 and Qošang (和賞), the 
prince of Gaochang (高昌) who descended from the Uighur Iduq-qut.47 One thing 
these non-Han aristocrats all shared was a personal connection, usually by blood or 
marriage ties, with the Mongol khans. In other words, they were imperial relatives 
whose legitimacy derived directly from the political center through non-bureaucratic 
but aristocratic linkages. 
    As the Ming forces swept the region, these three Mongol princes all surrendered.48 
Other than Dorjibal who soon regretted his decision, a case I will examine in detail 
later, both Budnal and Qošang chose to pledge loyalty to the Ming throne. However, 
their status was soon rendered titular. After their submission, both princes were 
granted honorary titles as the commanders of a nominal military institute.49 But this 
was no more than a political gesture. At that time, Zhu Yuanzhang was concerned 
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more with depicting himself as a model ruler who showed benevolence toward the 
“former Yuan imperial family members,”50 rather than with granting them substantial 
power. As a result, although the court promised the princes that their positions would 
be hereditary, we do not see any mention of the descendants of Budnal and Qošang in  
Ming documents after 1376.  
    With the substantial power of Mongol imperial princes taken away, one should not 
assume that the Ming intended to completely replace the local administrative system 
with a Han-Chinese style bureaucracy. For this newly occupied territory, in unstable 
political circumstances, the Ming still preferred to rely on intermediary agents to 
interact with and govern the locals. Therefore, after enfeebling top-level imperial 
nobles, the Ming emperor continued to assign local affairs to numerous indigenous 
non-Han leaders. In Hezhou, for example, among the fifteen senior officials,51 eleven 
were Tibetan or Mongol leaders.52 Thus, these surrendered officers constituted a large 
portion of the bureaucratic landscape of the region.  
    Taking on many daily administrative tasks on the ground did not necessarily make 
the non-Han officials the lords of the highland. They were given less power in the 
military and politics than their predecessors enjoyed. The regional leaders’ daily 
routine was occupied with drilling, provisioning the military, or lobbying for the 
submission of other groups. From time to time, they were also responsible for 
everyday administration such as collecting taxes and conducting censuses. 
Meanwhile, these regional leaders had to take on the work of postal station officers. 
As Lane Harris argues, early Ming empire heavily relied on roads to project its 
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imperial power into frontier regions and maintain effective, long-distance control.53 
And in the highland, such roads were maintained to guarantee transportation between 
China and Tibet.54 Although the roads to Tibet were established as early as the mid-
13th century, their condition was not ideal and often halted travelers’ progress.55 
Therefore, the Ming emperors initiated several rounds of road construction, and non-
Han groups were commonly dispatched for these works.56 The workload at these 
postal stations was so intensive that the early Ming court considered sending prisoners 
there as a form of punishment.57 Treated as cheap labor, some indigenous leaders 
rebelled, but many others chose to accept the status quo, until the rise of the Mongol 
Qi Prince Dorjibal brought them hope.  
    The rough interactions between the Qi Prince Dorjibal and the Ming forces in the 
highland exemplify the turbulent geopolitical situation in the late 14th century 
highland. In 1371, after other local figureheads such as He-Sonam-po, Budnal, and 
Qošang submitted to the Ming, Dorjibal also sent his underlings to the Ming’s 
military office to pledge allegiance. Yet he was merely sounding out the Ming’s 
reaction and did not plan to yield in the end.58 Later that year, after receiving another 
call to surrender, Dorjibal dispatched his nephew to Hezhou,59 and he even offered to 
marry his daughter to the Ming prince.60 The main reason that Dorjibal never fully 
surrendered to the Ming lies in his top position in the Mongol northern Yuan court at 
the time. One official document excavated from the northern Mongolian desert 
reveals that in 1371, Dorjibal still exerted great influence on the northern Yuan 
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bureaucracy and could intervene remotely in the court’s personnel appointments.61 He 
could not simply relinquish these privileges: he would to wait and see how 
geopolitical situations shifted.  
    In 1371, the Ming force in the highland was still trying to subjugate Dorjibal 
through peaceful means. But in 1372 and 1373, tensions escalated, and military 
clashes began to erupt. This shift resulted from the changing Ming-Mongol power 
dynamic in the north. In 1372, the Ming launched a large-scale northern expedition to 
eliminate the Mongol Yuan remnants on the steppe. However, due to strategic 
mistakes, among other reasons, the Ming’s northern expedition was a total failure. 
Among the campaigns in all directions of north China, the expeditionary army only 
achieved certain victories in the northwest, but suffered from tremendous causality in 
the north and northeast where the Ming’s main force was completely crushed.  
    The clash in 1372 changed the balance of power between the Ming and Mongol at 
the time, and the Ming’s defeat may have prompted the surrendered non-Han officers 
in the region to revisit their relationship with the Ming. What added fuel to the fire 
was the resurrection of the Mongol’s confidence to retake the highland. In January 
1373, a Buddhist official was dispatched from the Northern Yuan capital as the state 
preceptor of Qara-Qorum (和林國師) to the highland to lobby the local figureheads to 
rebel against the Ming.62 Although the monk was eventually captured by the Ming 
army, he had already completed his mission. During the summer of that year, the 
indigenous leaders in Taozhou secretly contacted Dorjibal. Likely suffering under the 
Ming’s heavy military occupation, these non-Han leaders persuaded Dorjibal to attack 
the Ming army and agree to be their inside man. This collaboration damaged the Ming 
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considerably. At the cost of many able-bodied soldiers, the Ming barely managed to 
repel the strike.63  
    However, winning one battle did not mean that Dorjibal could win the war. In the 
face of constant military retaliation by Ming troops, Dorjibal was frequently defeated. 
Therefore, at the end of 1373, he sent his son to the Ming capital to be a hostage in a 
gesture of submission.64 Although the Ming officials considered this act as a stalling 
tactic to escape the Ming’s intensive military campaigns, in retrospect it worked.65 
The two parties did not clash again for another three years.     
    For the Mongols, the highland’s strategic function as the crossroads between East 
and Inner Asia did not diminish after the dynastic transition. In Autumn 1375, a group 
of twenty-five envoys was dispatched by the Mongol Liang prince (梁王) in Dali to 
Qara-Qorum. The envoys’ mission was to forge a north-south alliance in order to 
surround the Ming. The mission travelled more than two thousand miles along the 
two panhandles of the Sino-Tibetan borderland and the Hexi corridor before they 
were eventually captured.66 It is natural to assume that the envoys already had 
conducted countless secret exchanges with the indigenous leaders over the course of 
their long journey. Although there are not enough materials to confirm the on-the-
ground ramifications of this diplomatic mission, we may speculate a thin connection 
between this diplomatic mission and the two rebels in 1376 who caused the deaths of 
several Ming diplomats. 
    Dorjibal kept a low profile in 1374 and 1375. He maintained a relatively peaceful 
relationship with the Ming, maintaining his Ming appointed military title and 
acknowledging the Ming’s authority in public. But in hindsight, these were all 
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strategic moves. Shortly after Dorjibal’s 1373 “surrender,” the Ming emperor 
assigned one diplomat, Xiong Ding (熊鼎 ?-1376), to Dorjibal’s office, most likely to 
oversee Dorjibal’s daily activities given his provocative actions. Indeed, as soon as 
Xiong arrived at the Mongol camp, he soon discovered that Dorjibal only pretended 
his subjugation, waiting for the right moment to rebel once more. After the Ming 
emperor received his reports, the official was requested to return to the court out of 
concern for his safety. But it was already too late. In month VI of 1376, Dorjibal 
finally turned his back on the Ming and murdered Xiong Ding, together with two 
other diplomats.67 The emperor was infuriated. But before he dispatched his army to 
punish Dorjibal’s betrayal, another seasoned diplomat, Kunga Sonam, whom the 
Ming court highly relied upon to communicate with Tibet, was also murdered by pro-
Mongol indigenes.68 It was not until then that Zhu Yuanzhang noticed the prevalence 
of pro-Mongol sentiment across the region.69 It is highly likely that the 1375 Mongol 
envoys from Yunnan  had a part in this shift in public opinion, but Dorjibal 
unquestionably played an important role to fomenting the dissension.  
    Turmoil caused by the local non-Han leaders’ rebellion continued in 1378 and 
1379. In mid-1378, scattered upheavals broke out in multiple places in the Qinghai 
part of the highland. Later that year, further social unrest emerged in the regions to the 
east and south of Hezhou.70 All these rebellions were kindled by Dorjibal, who by 
then was remotely planning more attacks in the area.71 Zhu Yuanzhang knew that 
allowing Dorjibal to continue disturbing the social stability of the highland would 
threat the Ming’s entire northern frontier. Therefore, instead of suppressing turmoil on 
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case-by-case, he planned to mount a large-scale decisive military campaign and solve 
the problem once and for all. 
    Zhu Yuanzhang’s expedition to put down the highland threats in the late 1370s has 
received little scholarly attention. However, I argue that it demonstrates the Ming 
emperor’s determination to scour the Mongol shadow from the highland in order to 
prevent the re-establishment of a Mongol-Tibet alliance, as well as to secure the 
newly formed Ming-Tibet relationship. Zhu’s emphasis on the campaign, as Qin Bo 
nicely points out in an unpublished article, is evidenced in three aspects. First, Zhu 
Yuanzhang worshiped the deities of mountain and river twice over the course of the 
battle, which was a political ritual that the emperor only conducted before campaigns 
of life and death significance to the entire empire. Second, Zhu dispatched the 
strongest Ming troops and virtually all his capable commanders to the highland, 
indicating his strong will to eradicate the Mongol threat. Third, the emperor expanded 
the campaign from a regional battle in the highland to one that involved the entire 
Chinese-Tibetan borderland and thus greatly affected the geopolitical landscape of 
western Sichuan.72 
    As the Ming emperor made up his mind, his frontline commanders and soldiers did 
not fail the emperor’s high expectations. After a series of clashes, the Ming troops 
finally wiped out the Mongol force in the region. Although Dorjibal was not caught, 
his name disappeared in Ming texts from that point on, indicating his fading influence 
in regional geopolitics. As the Mongols became less a military back-up, the highland 
non-Han leaders had no more choice but to accept the Ming’s control. This process, 
as described by Elliot Sperling when he examines the submission of many Tibetan 
 





figureheads, indicates “the decline of the area’s Tibetan character.”73 In fact, in 
addition to Tibetan character, I argue the region’s Inner Asian character faded since 
the Ming’s occupation. This was even more evident when many Han soldiers arrived 
and settled in the highland as the result of a large-scale military migration. 
Chinatown in the Mountains 
    Before the late 14th century, the highland had been, as the previous sections 
indicate, a place with dense Inner Asian influence. Although these is no way to 
assume the exact ratio between Han and non-Han people in the region, Han people 
were unlikely to be the ethnic majority. But this situation permanently changed. This 
section examines how and why many Han soldiers settled down in the highland 
through a case study of Taozhou (洮州).  
    Despite having cleared up more or less the pro-Mongol forces in the highland by 
1379, the Ming’s military force in the region was still insufficient. After all, most 
troops in the 1378 and 1379 battles were transferred from other parts of northern 
China, such as Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, and even the personal guard army of the 
Ming emperor was sent to join the northwestern fight.74 Therefore, immediately after 
taming the social turmoil, the emperor mounted a large-scale military migration in 
order to strengthen the Ming’s frontier presence. In this way, the highland was 
gradually transformed into a military society. 
    By 1380, there was no Ming army in Taozhou, or Lintan Old Town by its modern 
designation. In the late 1370s, the largest army in the area stationed at the 
geopolitically important Hezhou. However, from 1376 to 1379, three rebellions 
erupted in Taozhou one after the other as a result of indigenous leaders’ conspiracy 
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with Dorjibal.75 The destruction incensed the Ming emperor. He decided to increase 
the military power in Taozhou to prevent further unrests. Therefore, in 1379, shortly 
after putting down the third rebellion, Zhu Yuanzhang transferred half of the Hezhou 
troops to Taozhou.76 
    To use the terminology of the Ming’s military administrative system of guards and 
battalions (weisuo 衛所), the Hezhou army was constituted of two guards, each 
nominally comprised of 5,600 regular soldiers (正軍).77 But, as Zhang Yun points out, 
the actual number would have been higher since many frontier guards were larger in 
size compared to those in the Chinese heartland.78 Therefore, around 6,000 to 8,000 
regular soldiers in total were transferred to Taozhou.79 Some of these soldiers were 
what the Ming’s military system categorized as submitters (歸附), those individuals 
who used to fight for Zhu Yuanzhang’s foes but were accepted, registered, and 
incorporated into the Ming army after their surrender. Others were newcomers as 
fellow campaigners (從征) and banished soldiers (謫戍) who arrived in the highland 
from elsewhere. By William Guanglin Liu’s estimation, these newcomers took up half 
of the region’s military population.80 It is these military immigrants’ life stories that 
this section is about. 
    The military migration changed the social landscape of the highland in many ways. 
One of the most notable phenomena is the erection of many walled garrisons. In early 
1379, still in the middle of the battle, Li Wenzhong (李文忠), a Ming senior court 
official and also Zhu Yuanzhang’s nephew, was dispatched to the highland.81 Li’s 
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primary mission was to supervise military infrastructural construction, especially 
those pertinent to building, repairing, and walling garrison cities. Among several 
military bases, Li spent much time and effort on Taozhou, as it was treated as a 
geopolitical spot that needed urgent strengthening.82 It is in this context that the 
Taozhou guard city (洮州衛城), the Lintan New Town illustrated in the opening 
vignette, was built. 
    The soldiers transferred from Hezhou were the primary laborers in the building of 
the Taozhou guard city, and the construction was completed within a mere ten days.83 
Some scholars claim that this unbelievable speed is an exaggeration, but I argue that 
such records in fact reflect how military settlements in the late 14th century highland 
were built.84 One corroborating case is the construction of the Minzhou guard city. 
When Minzhou was built in late 1378, the soldiers were required to concentrate on 
garrison walls and moats as well as infrastructure works like weeding and paving, 
over improving their own barracks. The soldiers thus had to wait for several more 
months until something with a roof was erected in the city.85 The Taozhou guard city 
was most likely constructed in a similar manner: what was completed within ten days 
was only the most basic infrastructure of the garrison, while most buildings were not 
there yet. The rushed construction reflected the Ming emperor’s intent to use heavy 
military presence to intimidate the indigenes, dissuading them from engaging in 
future collusion with the Mongols. 
    The intimidating character of these military bases is also demonstrated in the 
location the Taozhou guard city, the Lintan New Town. The site of the garrison was 
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not randomly chosen but decided after meticulous strategic consideration. An 
inscription implies that it was only twenty steps away from the Zhudanghagai Temple 
(竹當哈蓋寺), a Tibetan Buddhist monastery that had been influential in the area for 
hundreds of years.86 This suggests that the garrison was likely built to intimidate the 
local Tibetan Buddhist community, who were potential threats from the perspective of 
the Ming empire. 
    Apart from strategic reasons, distinctive physical environmental factors also 
influenced the location of the Ming’s military bases. Fig. 2.1 indicates the spatial 
distribution of the military garrisons across Taozhou’s mountainous terrain. It is clear 
that military infrastructure was either built along the Tao River or the mountain passes 
leading to the intermountain basin where the Taozhou Guard sat. According to one 
local source, the Ming troops only tried once to build a fortress on the south side of 
the Tao River.87 But it was quickly abandoned, highlighting the Ming’s inability to 
install effective control beyond the relatively flat region on the north side of the Tao 
River. 
 
Fig. 2.1: Military garrisons in Taozhou 
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    Establishing many more settlements with heavy military characters in the highland, 
the Ming emperor also implemented some ethnic segregation policies. In 1379, Zhu 
Yuanzhang issued several imperial edicts to the generals in Taozhou. With line after 
line accusing the indigenes of corrupt morality and brutal barbarity, the emperor 
ordered his officers to drive all the non-Han inhabitants out of the Taozhou guard 
city.88 Similarly, all non-Han people were forced to move out of Maozhou in the 
Sichuan part of the highland in 1382.89 For those non-Han groups scattered in the 
region, the Ming strictly demanded that the indigenous leaders keep an eye on their 
subjects in case they wandered outside of their proper territory.90 In the initial stage of 
its occupation, the Ming wished to create a social landscape demarcated by ethnicity. 
Such an ethnically segregated landscape, I argue, even paralleled the Manchu cities 
during the Qing, which, according to Mark Elliot, were the “sites of the re-formation 
of Manchu ethnicity.”91 When an ethnic minority group entered a region of ethnic 
majority, forming a compact community seemed to be a commonly adopted way to 
maintain its integrity. 
    For the numerous Ming soldiers who were quite unfamiliar with the area, living in 
this newly incorporated frontier was not easy. Modern historians seldom have the 
opportunity to learn the life details of voiceless people like the Ming dynasty foot 
soldiers. But during my fieldwork in 2017, I was fortunate to find some unpublished 
primary source containing such extensive details. The local materials I found in this 
region include multiple genealogies and three Ming dynasty imperial edicts that were 
issued in the thirteenth year of Hongwu (1380) and the fourth and fifth years of 
Zhengtong (1439 and 1440) respectively (Fig. 2.2-2.4). These materials provide 
 
88 Zhu, Ming Taizu Ji, 175. 
89 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao,  61. 
90 Lattimore, “The Frontier in History,” 115. 





personal accounts which reveal the whole process of military migration and 
settlement in the late 14th century. 
 
Fig. 2.2: Ming dynasty imperial edict, 13th year, Hongwu Reign 
 
Fig. 2.3: Ming dynasty imperial edict, 4th year, Zhengtong Reign 
 






    Despite having several thousands of soldiers relocated to Taozhou in the 1370s, 
Zhu Yuanzhang was not satisfied with what happened on the ground. Therefore, in 
1380, more soldiers were transferred to Taozhou from various regions of China, 
including one named Liu Gui (劉貴). Liu Gui joined the Ming army as early as 1365 
and fought for the emperor in various places from the lower Yangtze delta, to the 
central plain, and the Sichuan basin. Then, in 1375, Liu Gui was dispatched to the 
northern frontier, officially registered as a military household in the Front Guard of 
Datong (大同前衛) in Shanxi under the title of company commander (百戶 also 
translated as centurion), but summoned to go to Taozhou in 1380.92  
    From the imperial edicts, we can speculate that Liu Gui’s transfer initially was 
meant to be temporary. His main job was to suppress scattered rebels, guard the 
Ming-occupied territory, and construct more fortresses in the region. He was even 
granted the privilege to recruit soldiers himself,93 which indicates the severe personnel 
shortage that the Taozhou military was facing. By 1392, although large-scale 
rebellions in the region were gradually put out, turmoil still took place to challenge 
the Ming’s control over the region here and there. Even a seasoned veteran like Liu 
Gui, who had fought for the Ming army for fifteen years by this point, was wounded 
in one of these skirmishes and died thousands of miles away from his hometown in 
the lower Yangtze delta.94  
    Liu Gui’s death made his son, Liu Shun (劉順), feel that their ‘temporary’ mission 
in this northwest strange land had officially ended. After all, his father had died for it. 
Therefore, in the autumn of 1392, Liu Shun sent a memorial to the court and pleaded 
to move back to Datong, where the Liu military household was originally registered. 
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Obviously, a place like Taozhou—where people continued to suffer from food 
shortage, cold weather, ethnic animosity, and loneliness—was not an ideal station in 
the eyes of Liu Shun. But the request was turned down by the emperor, followed by 
another imperial edict that forever changed the fate of the Liu lineage. In 1392, the 
Liu household was bestowed, or we may even say forced, to accept a hereditary 
military position in Taozhou, meaning the lineage had to live there permanently. 
Probably as a form of compensation, the emperor bestowed a piece of fertile land on 
Liu Shun and renamed the region Liushun Chuan (劉順川), meaning the Riverside of 
Liu Shun.95 The name still persists today. 
    Knowing that returning to Datong was not an option anymore, Liu Shun could only 
live with the status quo. The first thing he did was to build himself a place to live. 
Although not implied in any historical material, my personal fieldwork suggests it 
reasonable to assume that Liu Shun chose the location for his fortress, Liushun Fort 
(劉順堡), following the same logic for Taozhou guard city. Liu Shun’s fortress sits 
right in front of a mountain pass which connects the Taozhou guard city to the Tao 
river (see Map 1). This indicates that the Liu Shun’s concern was strategic: to keep 
Taozhou safe. Meanwhile, the fort was built within the vicinity of the Yuanjue 
Monastery (Chi: 園覺寺 Tib: yer ba dgon bsam grub gling), a Tibetan Buddhist 
monastery with great influence among the locals.96 When I talked with Mr. Liu, the 
local village leader and the direct descendent of Liu Shun, he constantly attacked the 
capriciousness of the Tibetans in the region and claimed that the existence of this fort 
was the only reason that these Tibetans had been relatively well-behaved. Despite the 
fact that there is no way to verify whether Mr. Liu’s 14th century ancestor understood 
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his mission in this way, the relationship between the indigenes and the newcomers, as 
shown in the previous section, was undoubtedly tense.  
    Having built a fort in a strategic location, Liu Shun’s next mission was to gather 
enough able-bodied men to guard the place. Just like his father who had to hire 
soldiers by himself, Liu Shun was also required to do so on his own. The way Liu 
Shun did this was through land. He must have known that in the mountainous 
Taozhou region, a relatively fertile riverside land was quite attractive. Therefore, he 
advertised his plowable land and convinced people to stay.97 Moreover, Liu Shun 
wanted people who came and worked the land to be not just short-term military 
tenants but permanent settlers. Therefore, he required that regular soldiers bring their 
wives and supernumeraries with them.98 Liu Shun hoped that, with the help of 
farmland, the new soldiers could treat the region as home, just as he had done. 
   With the hard work of Liu Gui and Liu Shun, the Liu lineage gradually put down 
roots in Taozhou and still live there today. But their life stories are but one drop in the 
ocean. Scholars have estimated that by the end of Hongwu’s reign, there were 
approximately 17,000 soldiers registered in the Hezhou, Taozhou and Minzhou 
armies as regular soldiers (正軍), and another 34,000 stationed as military household 
housemen or supernumeraries (舍人/軍余).99 In comparison, only 12,000 were 
registered as civilians.100 It is not an overstatement to say that at the end of the 14th 
century, the region had already become a military hub.  
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    This chapter has charted the tremendous change that took place in the highland 
society from the 1370s to the 1390s as part of the Ming dynasty founder Zhu 
Yuanzhang’s imperial designs. Connecting the Chinese heartland to the vast Inner 
Asian world, the highland was the strategic gate through which the Yuan dynasty 
administrated many Tibet-related affairs during the Mongol era. The area’s 
geopolitical role was also valued by Zhu Yuanzhang, who greatly relied upon the 
highland region to act as a diplomatic bridge to build connections with Tibetan 
religious and secular hierarchs, as well as an outpost for intelligence collection. To 
protect the Ming’s communications with Tibet and to prevent Mongol’s continuing 
interaction with its Inner Asian allies, the Ming further mounted a series of military 
campaigns against Mongol remnants in the area. Successfully eliminating the 
influence of Dorjibal, the Ming force had the highland non-Han leaders under control. 
The third stage for the Ming’s penetration of the highland revolved around changing 
the region’s settlement pattern. After implementing large-scale military migration, the 
Ming emperor extensively reconfigured the ethnic makeup of the highland population. 
Many Han soldiers flocked to the region, settled down in Han-exclusive military 
towns, and thus contributed to ethnic segregation.  
    The social and political landscape of the highland considerably changed within the 
two decades of the late 14th century following the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition. This 
chapter points out that Ming China’s imperial project and the arrival of Ming forces in 
the highland indeed provided the driving force for the changing of local power 
dynamics. These reconfigurations of the social order paved the way for the highland 







Chapter 3: Lords 
 
    The mountainous highland was not an easily accessible world to the Ming soldiers. 
Although they were able to muscle their way into the region and occupy important 
transportation intersections, towns, and other strategic spots, these new players of the 
highland’s geopolitical game could not penetrate deep into the realm in the early 15th 
century. The mountain society in the highland, therefore, was quite on its own. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the mountain inhabitants did not interact 
with the Ming; on the contrary, they had maintained frequent contact with the Chinese 
dynasties for centuries. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the highland inhabitants carried 
out active tea-horse trade with the Song dynasty primarily because the great, tall 
mounts raised in the highland were considered fine warhorses from Song China’s 
perspective.101 In the 12th and 13th centuries, multiple highland communities 
acknowledged the authority of the Mongol suzerain by accepting official titles, seals 
and letter-patents granted by the Yuan authority.102 The highland society, unlike that 
of the Zomia world in the Scottian sense, maintained various types of interaction with 
lowland political entities.  
    In that regard, how then should we measure the influence of these Chinese 
dynasties on the mountain society? The short and sweet answer is that the impact was 
quite dynamic: when the Chinese dynasties were relatively strong, their presence in 
the highland were also much more visible; when the Chinese dynasties weakened, 
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their authority, as the reasoning goes, was less recognized by the highland indigenous 
rulers. In the early 14th century when the Mongols’ influences began to dwindle in the 
region, the highland leaders were allowed more control over their local subjects, 
which was a change that Petech Luciano claims to have “apparently implied an 
increased degree of local autonomy.”103 Such considerable autonomy of the highland 
society, I argue, did not change much in the early 15th century. 
    This chapter examines the power dynamics of the northwest Sichuan mountain 
society from the perspective of the highland indigenous leaders. I investigate how and 
why various lords of the mountain regimes understood inter- and intra-community 
relationships in the local society and how the introduction of Ming political-
diplomatic norms created new changes for the power structure in the mountains. In 
other words, this chapter adopts an local history perspective to scrutinize how the 
highland lords themselves understood the mountain society and their relations with 
the outside world. 
Power Structure of the Mountain Society 
    In this chapter, I will explore the indigenous vision of the highland through the lens 
of two local regimes: Dongbuhanhu (董卜韓胡) and Zagu (雜谷), with the former as 
the protagonist. In late imperial Chinese sources, regimes like Dongbuhanhu and 
Zagu are usually deemed as tusi (土司), which could be literally translated as local 
office, because of their indigeneity and semi-autonomy within the administrative 
system of different Chinese dynasties. In the contemporary Chinese government’s 
minzu discourse, such historical political entities in northwest Sichuan A’ba and 
Ganze Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (阿壩&甘孜藏族自治州) are mostly 
 





identified as small chiefdoms of Gyalrong Tibetan (嘉絨藏族), a Tibetan subgroup 
living in the eastern Kham region. However, this label has been constantly denied and 
challenged by the locals who instead claim themselves to be an independent ethnic 
group of Gyalrong people. In the mid-15th century, both regimes attracted much 
attention from the Ming dynasty. But that does not mean their early histories were 
unknown. One local gazetteer of Yanzhou (雅州), modern-day Ya’an county (雅安), 
documents a brief but informative record. It reads:  
Dongbuhanhu used to be a subordinate of Jinchuan (金川). During the 
Yuan dynasty, Leduo (勒朵, most likely the leader of Dongbuhanhu at 
the time) paid tribute on behave of Jinchuan to the Yuan court. 
Completing the mission, Leduo returned with a seal specifically for 
Dongbuhanhu. Taking the bestowal of the seal as a recognition from 
the Yuan court, Dongbuhanhu broke away from Jinchuan, annexed six 
hamlets, and became a tributary of the Yuan on its own.104 
    This brief line on Dongbuhanhu points to three characteristics of the power 
dynamics of the mountain society: hierarchical structure, political alliance, and 
external source of legitimacy. These three traits, respectively, correspond to the intra-
regime relationship and inter-regime relationship in the mountain society and the 
relationship between mountain society and the outside world. The record indicates 
that during the Yuan era, Dongbuhanhu had its own intra-community hierarchy with 
Leduo being the de facto leader. Meanwhile, it was a political ally of Jinchuan, yet the 
alliance soon broke down as Dongbuhanhu managed to acquire supports from 
stronger external political forces. These three traits of political order were quite 
important as they determined the power dynamics in the mountain society before the 
Ming’s large-scale penetration and the ensuing reshuffling of regional geopolitics in 
the 16th century. This section will characterize these three traits briefly, and the 
 





following sections will use the rise of Dongbuhanhu and its interactions with Zagu as 
further illustrations. 
Hierarchical structure: 
    One of the easiest ways to characterize the political structure of the mountain 
regimes is to separate their members into two groups: the rulers and the ruled. The 
ruler was the head of the ruling class. In the highland society, most regime rulers 
ascended to their positions through military merits or with religious sacredness, and 
their authority was hereditary within a particular lineage. Although most mountain 
regimes followed the patriarchal rule, primogeniture was not always the case. Instead, 
it was quite popular that secular and religious authority were equally distributed 
between two brothers, and whether the elder inherited secular or religious power 
varied regime by regime. In addition to the ruling house, there were also a number of 
households whose leaders were generals, clergy, or advisors to the ruler of the regime. 
These military, civil, and religious aristocrats, together with the ruling house, 
constituted the ruling class of the regimes.  
    Despite having a recognized ruler, most mountain regimes were not autocratic. 
Instead, the power structure was quite de-centralized in these communities. This, I 
argue, largely resulted from the region’s topographical condition. The ragged terrain 
of the highland considerably limited the scale of local settlements. While some 
indigenes dwelled in the intermountain basins, many local settlements were on the hill 
slopes, and even those relatively larger ones boasted only several hundreds of 
households. Because many settlements were scattered across a wide array of 
mountain ranges, making communication and transportation quite difficult, a regime 
ruler had to rely on noble underlings to govern on his behalf. Fiefs were thus granted, 





vassals were also able to challenge the authority of the ruler when the latter became 
weak. This power dynamics constituted a quasi-feudal system of hierarchical, but not 
autocratic, mountain regimes. Such a structure allowed space for political re-
organization, especially when trans-regime political alliances were quite prevalent in 
the region. 
Political alliance: 
    As topography considerably shaped intra-regime relationships, it also affected how 
relationships between different regimes and communities were adjusted in the 
mountain society. The ways in which terrain molds settlements has been quite 
consistent throughout history. 7th century Chinese sources indicate that the region was 
of remote mountain and deep valley, and there was no supreme leader.105 One 18th 
century observer also commented on the correlation between settlements and 
mountain topography, writing that “the land is divided and guarded respectively as if 
such separations are heaven’s mandate to keep the locals from annexing each 
other.”106 In this scenario, forming political alliances with other regimes or 
communities was a political norm. But what makes political alliance in northwest 
Sichuan quite peculiar was its binary character. In other words, the local regimes 
tended to side with one group or another when it came to transregional competition, 
and common binary grouping categories include Big-surname and Small-surname (大
姓-小姓), Ox-tail and Sheep-tail (牛尾巴-羊尾巴), and Black and White (黑-白). 
Such dichotomic categories, according to Wang Mingke, resulted from the intense 
interpersonal relations in a resource-scarce society in which segmentary opposition 
was a basic social norm. People tended to imagine common ground with one another, 
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most often shared ancestry, in order to strengthen a sense of belonging and separate 
self-groups from other-groups.107 During the Ming dynasty, mountain regimes 
frequently clashed with one another, and the binary principle was an important 
consideration when they sought allies. Some scholars referred to such imagined 
communities in the 15th century northwest Sichuan as groups of clan-surname (族姓
zuxing);108 this dissertation will interpret them as ‘proto-clans.’  
    Although they functioned as important references for social grouping, binary 
taxonomies were not always the only decisive principle in alliance-making. Under 
certain circumstances, the binary norm could be outweighed by other factors, such as 
religious concerns, personal ambitions, or money. It was usually the emergence of 
powerful external threats which prompted the formation of mountain confederations 
that transcended the dichotomic social distinction. When Tibetan Buddhist forces 
began to spread and develop in the mountain society, the trans-regional Bön alliance 
took shape, and when the Ming dispatched its huge army to the mountain, the Big-
surname and Small-surname communities first cooperated to fight off the encroaching 
enemy. Attracted by material wealth or summoned by ambitious leaders, different 
proto-clans were also able to form temporary coalitions. The entanglement of all these 
social mechanisms constituted the fundamental, yet sophisticated political landscape 
of the mountain society. 
External source of legitimacy: 
    The mountain society was never completely isolated. The constant interactions 
between the mountain society and the outside world, in this case the Chinese 
dynasties, would further complicate the power structures mentioned above. As part of 
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the Chinese-Tibetan borderland, the mountain society sat at the outmost reaches of 
both the Chinese and the Tibetan cultural-political realms. Such a geopolitical 
position allowed the mountain society to interact with the outside in a much more 
flexible and even creative manner. Elsewhere I have published an article on Muli, a 
small kingdom in south Sichuan mountain, which illustrates how such borderland 
regimes used the geopolitical struggle between the Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans and 
Yunnanese in the late 16th and 17th century to its own advantage.109 It is exactly in 
such interactions with external, oftentimes stronger, political powers that we can see 
clearly the agency of mountain regimes. 
     The impact of the Chinese dynasties on the mountain society was two-fold. On the 
one hand, it had the potential to consolidate the mountain society’s hierarchical 
relationship because the sanction from external political powers would strengthen 
regime rulers’ authority within the community. On the other hand, just as the 
Dongbuhanhu-Jinchuan case indicates, support from the outside world could provide 
a shortcut for petty mountain regimes to gain power and thus disturb the presumed 
hierarchical order. The way that external political powers influenced the binary social 
structure was quite similar. Sometimes the Ming dynasty would strive to maintain the 
balance between the two proto-clan groups so that they would each check the 
development of the other; but in other scenarios, the binary proto-clans would choose 
to cooperate first in the face of external threats before they resumed their rivalry. 
Needless to say, all these dynamic modes of interaction were contingent, and their 
impact on the mountain society has to be analyzed case by case. 
 






    This introductory section has identified three characteristics fundamental to the 
power structure of the mountain society. As these three factors frequently 
intermingled and their relationship was quite resilient, exactly how they strengthened 
and undermined each other or contributed to the mountain society’s power dynamics 
is subject to specific contexts. The following sections will identity the power structure 
of Dongbuhanhu, how it rose to power in competition with Zagu based on the binary 
theory, and how its empire-building enterprise created a frontier crisis for Ming China 
at one of the dynasty’s weakest points.  
The Mountain Regime and its Political Structure 
    The rise of Dongbuhanhu was probably the most urgent frontier crisis that Ming 
China faced on its western side in the 15th century. However, Dongbuhanhu was not a 
regime with intrinsic geographical and geopolitical advantage. Quite removed from 
major overland and water transportation and hemmed in by various neighboring 
polities (Fig. 3.1), Dongbuhanhu did not demonstrate much potential as a major threat 
to the Ming if one considers its geographical and geopolitical conditions. The relative 
isolation of the regime probably explains why the pre-Ming history of Dongbuhanhu 
largely remains obscure: its outside contact was severely limited.110  
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Fig. 3.1: Dongbuhanhu hemmed in by multiple regional regimes, detached from 
major water and land routes that were guarded by Ming military garrisons (green 
squares) 
 
    Topography was another factor which contributed to Dongbuhanhu’s strategic 
disadvantage and impeded the region’s economic development. Landlocked in the 
deep mountains of northwest Sichuan, different Dongbuhanhu communities were 
most likely practicing “vertical trade,” a term coined by Wim Van Spengen to 
describe a barter form of transaction between animal products of the plateau-dwelling 
nomads and agricultural products of the sedentary residents.111 In comparison with 
inter-community exchanges that was relatively self-sufficient, non-local raw materials 
and goods had to be imported from places beyond the mountain ranges. But the 
sustainability of such supplies relied on one condition: functional routes. However, 
routes in mountainous northwest Sichuan were quite vulnerable. Mountain trails were 
not only few, but could also be easily blocked by either natural environmental causes 
such as storm, earthquake and landslide, or human factors like robbery.  
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    In fact, Dongbuhanhu’s very first appearance in Ming texts simply mentions a road 
blockage incident. In 1411, an armed conflict broke out between Ronglongmeng (容
隆蒙) and Diaomen (碉門), two neighboring regimes to the south of Dongbuhanhu.112 
Their struggle blocked Dongbuhanhu’s access to the Sichuan-Tibet route, which had 
been the major transportation route through the western Sichuan mountains and 
connecting Sichuan to Tibet since the Mongol era.113 Losing this passageway and 
access to the region’s most important trading network undoubtedly worried 
Dongbuhanhu’s leader, Namkha (南科/喃葛), who appealed to the Ming’s military 
intervention to solve the road-blocking issue for him.  
    It is likely unsurprising to modern readers that the Ming emperor did not act on 
Dongbuhanhu’s request. After all, mounting a military expedition to clear the route 
for a mountain regime located on the empire’s westmost frontier was of little interest 
to the Ming. But at the same time, I argue it is exactly such geographical and, in 
particular, political remoteness which would do Dongbuhanhu a favor: the regime 
was not under the close watch of the Ming, and it enjoyed more space to act on its 
own.  
    A comparison of Dongbuhanhu with other local regimes such as Zagu and 
Longzhou in terms of the ranks and tiles they received from the Ming speaks to how 
Dongbuhanhu’s distance from the Ming territory and imperial apparatus was 
advantageous for its development. When the Ming army firstly marched into the 
northwest Sichuan mountains in 1374, the ruler of the Longzhou regime was 
bestowed a 3B rank of Grand pacification commissioner (宣慰使).114 This was quite a 
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high-ranking official title, as during the Yuan dynasty the entire northwest Sichuan 
region was merely a 3A administrative unit, and Longzhou was just one among 
several local regimes.115 Considering the fact that Longzhou was one of the first local 
regimes to submit to the Ming, it is clear that the bestowal of the high rank was a 
political gesture to reward its quick submission. Therefore, as the Ming gradually 
gained control over the region with its settled military, the regime was downgraded to 
a 5B unit.116 Although the Longzhou leader requested to reclaim the 3A rank in 1427, 
the petition was rejected.117 Other regimes such as Zagu, due to their proximity to 
Ming’s territory and closer supervision by the Ming military, were designated as 5B 
administrative units as well.118 
    In contrast, Dongbuhanhu was able to acquire and, most importantly, keep a high-
ranking title because of its distance from the Ming’s imperial apparatus. When a 
Dongbuhanhu envoy reported to the Ming court on the road blockage issue in 1411, 
Namkha was still addressed as a local headman (地面頭目).119 But four years later in 
1415, Namkha was granted the 3B title of Grand pacification commissioner.120 This 
assignment should have been a case quite similar to that of Longzhou in which an 
early-submitted regime was granted complimentary high position. But the difference 
is that Dongbuhanhu’s title was not later downgraded. This is most likely because 
Dongbuhanhu was quite far away from the Ming’s substantial sphere of influence, 
and from the Ming’s perspective, a high-ranking title would work as a reminder to 
Dongbuhanhu of the privilege and trust it gained from the Ming, as well as its 
responsibility to maintain peace in the region for the heavenly kingdom.  
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    While bestowing various types of titles to mountain regimes supported the Ming’s 
constructed world order in which its peripheral regions were guarded by loyal non-
Han vassals, such endorsements meant something different for Dongbuhanhu. From a 
mountain regime’s perspective, a prestige title from the Ming indicated one’s political 
and strategic weight.121 The higher the title from the Ming, the more important and 
powerful the regime should be. According to this reasoning, once mountain regimes 
acquired high ranking titles from the Ming, they were justified to intervene in 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes between inferior title bearers or exert influence 
in other regimes’ domestic politics. Peter Schwieger has pointed out that the imperial 
titles and seals from the Chinese played a crucial role in the legitimization of political 
authority in 15th century central Tibet, and “perhaps the Tibetan headmen were even 
more eager to ask for imperial seals than that the emperor was interested in granting 
them.”122 These symbols of recognition from external powers most likely functioned 
in a similar manner in northwest Sichuan and to some degree laid the very foundation 
for Dongbuhanhu’s later development in the mid-15th century.  
    In addition to geographical, topographical, and geopolitical conditions, it is also 
important to examine the political configuration of the regime: this provides essential 
knowledge for understanding the power dynamics in the mountain society when 
Dongbuhanhu’s rise threated neighboring regimes. A standard mountain society 
political structure existed in Dongbuhanhu, as introduced in the previous section, in 
which the ruler acquired legitimacy through both military and religious approaches, 
was backed up by external powers, employed a hereditary system for authority 
succession, and relied on elite underlings for quasi-feudal governance.  
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    Let us first look at how Dongbuhanhu perceived secular and religious legitimacy in 
rulership. In 1415, when Namkha received the 3B title from the Ming, he also 
managed to have the Ming recognize his religious authority by sanctioning the 
establishment of a Prefectural Daoist Registry (道紀司),123 the supreme office for all 
Daoist-related affairs in the region. One must note that in the context of 15th century 
northwest Sichuan, the terms ‘Daoism’ and ‘Daoist’ did not refer to the Chinese-
origin indigenous philosophical tradition and its practitioners, but the Bön religion (苯
教). Though I will examine the prevalence of Bön in the region in detail later on, here 
it is more important to know that Bön functioned as a religious pillar of 
Dongbuhanhu’s rulership, and it was also recognized by external powers.  
    Both secular and religious authority provided legitimacy for Dongbuhanhu 
rulership, with the latter likely predominant. This is partially revealed by how the 
Dongbuhanhu ruler distributed power among his sons. In 1430, before his retirement, 
Namkha sent one of his sons, a Bön practitioner, to the Ming court. The so-called 
Bönpo Lama delivered Namhka’s wishes for the Ming’s sanction to allow his elder 
son, Panden Yeshe (班丹也失), to take charge of the religious population within 
Dongbuhanhu and his second son, Gelek Gyaltsen (克羅俄監粲), to rule the subjects 
in a civil capacity.124 As the Ming granted him these permissions, we see that in many 
other highland regimes, such as Zhuoni in southern Gansu, it was always the elder son 
inherited secular authority and the younger one the religious,125 the opposite happened 
in Dongbuhanhu. While it is not sufficient to argue that religious authority was more 
important to Dongbuhanhu rulership simply from the fact that it fell into the elder 
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son’s hands and secular authority to those of the younger, the significant role of 
religion to Dongbuhanhu regime was already evident. 
    Another feature of local political structure was the hierarchical relationship in 
which dominating regimes enjoyed lordship and subordinating regimes were vassals. 
This may be seen in both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu’s administrative organization. In 
the initial stage of Dongbuhanhu’s rise, Biesizhai (別思寨) was probably one among 
few vassal regimes under its governance. According to Map 2.1, we see that Biesizhai 
was a region to the northeast of Dongbuhanhu and functioned as a buffer zone 
between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu. Therefore, it was a distant but strategically 
important region for Dongbuhanhu. The fact that Namkha assigned Wu’re 
Duoerzhijian (兀惹朵兒只監), probably a military commander, to rule the region on 
his behalf indicated the quasi-feudal principle in the mountain society. But by that 
time, this Biesizhai community was not recognized in the Ming’s administrative 
system because it was only a later request made by Wu’re Duoerzhijian’s son, an 
action that led to severe punishments and caused his death.126 Such a situation 
rendered both Wu’re Duoerzhijian and his son as headmen (頭人) of Dongbuhanhu, a 
status that an early 20th century scholar summarized as “hereditary, but only refers to 
those who rule a small territory and do not process ranks and titles from imperial 
courts.”127  
    Such a lord-headmen hierarchy also existed between Zagu and Dasiman (達思蠻). 
Zagu was a regime to the east of Dongbuhanhu. It took shape during the time of 
A’piao (阿漂), a petty hamlet head who gradually rose to power and recognition in 
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local society in the late 14th century.128 In his initial expansion, A’piao was assisted by 
a military commander, Yan Tai, who was another hamlet head. After several decades 
wherein A’piao became the de facto leader of Zagu regime, Yan Tai was named the 
headmen of Dasiman, a vassal under Zagu’s rule.129 Therefore, similar to 
Dongbuhanhu, Zagu also implemented hierarchical governance. Moreover, it relied 
heavily upon religion for local control as well. It was said that there were countless 
monasteries within the domain of Zagu,130 and the vice commander of Dasiman was 
also a religious specialist.131 Zou Libo speculates that Bön was the dominating 
religion in Dongbuhanhu, and Zagu was a Tibetan Buddhist patron.132 But I argue that 
Zagu, similar to Dongbuhanhu, was also a pro-Bön regime. One of my strongest 
pieces of evidence is that Jinchuan, a stronghold of Bön, was one of Zagu’s vassals.133 
Jinchuan’s Bön tradition was so persistent that even during the Jinchuan wars in the 
18th century, it was still the foremost Bön enemy in the eyes of the Qing empire. 
Although in the 1440s Jinchuan submitted to Dongbuhanhu and migrated to 
Dongbuhanhu territory, a case we will examine later, this nevertheless points to the 
fact that Zagu was heavily influenced by Bön in the early 15th century.      
The Rise of a Bön Patron 
    As Dongbuhanhu and Zagu shared many common elements in their political 
structure and religious characteristics, they both began their first round of expansion 
in the name of Bön. Bön is an indigenous Tibetan religion. Yet its early history is 
quite obscure. While many believed that its initial development predates the 
introduction of Buddhism from India, others claim that the religion did not start to 
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take shape until the 11th century.134 Many scholars became acquainted with Bön by 
studying its clash with Tibetan Buddhist believers in 18th century northwest Sichuan 
during the Jinchuan wars.135 But in the early 15th century, Bön was already quite 
prevalent in the eastern Tibetan region, especially in modern-day northwest 
Sichuan.136  Although modern Tibetologists have documented some victories in which 
Tibetan Buddhists successfully defeated Bön competitors in the early 15th century,137 
in general, Bön forces enjoyed much more popularity at the time. Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries in the region had to adopt many Bön religious elements in their interior 
and exterior decorations,138 and even the author of mDo smad chos 'byung, the most 
authentic chronicle of Tibetan Buddhism in eastern Tibet, recognized the region as a 
spiritual realm of Bön.139 
    It is worth noting that in 15th century northwest Sichuan, while Bön is written in its 
transliterated form Benbu (奔卜) in Ming court records, in contemporary Tibetan 
materials as compiled by Zou Libo, bon (Bön) is used to translate the Chinese terms 
Daojiao (道教, Daoism) or Daoshi (道士, Daoist).140 Such a mistranslation points to 
the intriguing fact that when inhabitants in the mountain society imagined the 
relationship between Fo and Dao (佛道 Chan Buddhism and Daoism) in the Chinese 
heartland, the most suitable comparative reference they had in mind was the pair of 
Tibetan Buddhism and Bön, as the former one shared much common elements with 
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Chan Buddhism and the latter was much more indigenous. Therefore, Chinese texts 
produced in the northwest Sichuan context, especially those translated from Tibetan 
materials or transcribed from indigenous oral collections, adopted Daojiao or Daoshi 
to describe Bön and its clerics. 
 
 
Fig 3.2: Bön lama with protruding tongue holding trumpet, dagger, and bell and drum, 
chopper, and hair of 100 dead and 100 living people in a state of trance.141 
 
    Since Bön prevailed in the mountain society, acquiring Bön support and the 
ensuing religious legitimacy, to many local regimes, became a favorable approach to 
consolidating power and authority. Such patronage of Bön, if not for religious 
reasons, stemmed from the expectation of a rich return on investment: an identity as a 
Bön patron made it easier to attract followers that could be potentially converted into 
soldiers and accumulate wealth from religious donations. Dongbuhanhu was just one 
among many regimes that understood this logic well and acted resolutely, and its first 
 






step was to annex Gyalrong, the most sacred Bön realm in the entire eastern Tibetan 
region.142  
    The Gyalrong region’s religious significance derived primarily from Mt. Murdo, a 
sacred mountain in Bön cosmology located in the center of Gyalrong.143 Although 
large-scale cultural construction of Mt. Murdo’s sacredness primarily took place in 
the 18th century when abundant religious texts and pilgrimage guidebooks were 
produced,144 it was already a well-known religious landscape in the 15th century. Even 
Tibetan Buddhists acknowledged its divine significance. According to the 
hagiography of a 15th century Sakya sect Tibetan Buddhist, Mt. Murdo was a sacred 
mountain where deities and evil spirits (lha gnyan) existed.145 It is not an exaggeration 
to say that, in 15th century northwest Sichuan, whoever controlled Gyalrong and laid a 
hand on Mt. Murdo would have his reputation spread among the Bön communities.  
    Although we are not crystal clear about how exactly Dongbuhanhu brought 
Gyalrong to submit, whether through military actions or political-religious ruses, the 
whole process is, as Roger Greatrex convincingly points out, revealed through the 
changing bearer of a specific religious title.146 In 1425, one Gyalrong Bön master, 
Dorje Gyaltsen (朵兒只監藏), went to the Ming court and received the title of State 
Preceptor of Sublime Wisdom and Supernormal Awakening (妙智通悟國師).147 In 
1427 and 1429, he sent a so-called Wenbu (溫卜) Sakya Gyaltsen (釋夏監藏)  to 
Beijing twice.148 While Greatrex identifies Sakya Gyaltsen as Dorje Gyaltsen’s bursar, 
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I argue that the word Wenbu (溫卜) used in Ming texts as the prefix for Sakya 
Gyaltsen actually denotes Sakya Gyaltsen’s identity as Dorje Gyaltsen’s potential 
successor. This is because Wenbu (溫卜), similar to Wanbu (完卜), is the 
transliteration of Tibetan word dbon po, which refers to the nephew of nobles or 
religious masters.149 Choosing one’s own nephew as one’s religious successor was a 
rather common practice among Tibetan religious specialists at the time, and they 
indeed always sent their nephew-successors to Beijing to foster a relationship with the 
Chinese patron before the nephews’ formal succession. Yet as Ren Xiaobo claims that 
dbon po and the uncle-nephew principle were mainly used by Tibetan Buddhists,150 
here the case of Gyalrong indicates that the term and practice were also adopted by 
Bön masters.  
    Dorje Gyaltsen must have passed away in the early 1430s, because when Sakya 
Gyaltsen’s own nephew showed up at the Ming court in 1434, Sakya Gyaltsen was 
already addressed as the State Preceptor.151 However, when Sakya Gyaltsen’s name 
emerges again in Ming court records five years later in 1439, he was described not as 
the State Preceptor, but as the disciple of the demised State Preceptor Dorje 
Gyaltsen.152 It seems that he had already lost the title, which is exactly the case. 
Because another Ming court record indicates that one year prior, in 1438, the title of 
State Preceptor of Sublime Wisdom and Supernormal Awakening was given to 
Panden Yeshe, the religious leader of Dongbuhanhu.153 In other words, by the late 
1430s, Dongbuhanhu had already taken away the privileged title of the Gyalrong Bön 
leader, indicating its annexation of the Bön sacred realm. Although Sakya Gyaltsen 
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filed a complaint with the Ming court and requested to resume the title, he only 
received denial.154 
    Once grasping religious authority in hand by having Gyalrong under its control, 
Dongbuhanhu’s further religious expansion became quite smooth: it mounted 
religious warfare against multiple communities that followed Tibetan Buddhism in 
1440,155 subordinated the Bön-supporting regime in Khro-skyab to Gyalrong’s 
northwest in 1444,156 and in this process encroached on a new territory of 
considerable size and boosted power and authority in the mountain society. However, 
such an expansion strategy that combines military and religious approaches was not 
unique to Dongbuhanhu. Zagu was rising in the same manner. In 1431, the Zagu ruler 
murdered the head of a neighboring regime and forcefully occupied its territory;157 in 
1432, it invaded another several hamlets in significant strategic locations;158 in 1441, 
Zagu dispatched a Bön master to lobby in four hamlets and successfully gained their 
submission.159 The mountain society witnessed the rise and expansion of two 
powerful regimes in the 1430s, and hence an eventual clash between the two was 
unsurprising. 
Competition in a Binary World 
    As both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu were expanding in the 1430s, a conflict between 
the two seemed inevitable. This section charts their competition in the 1440s 
northwest Sichuan and highlights how the local binary social structure played a role in 
this power dynamic. 
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    The previous section explored how in the 15th century, Zagu was a 5B regime in the 
Ming’s administrative system, and Dongbuhanhu held the rank of 3B. While the 
rulers of Dongbuhanhu might have perceived this difference as an objective reflection 
of their distinct political weight and geopolitical significance, from a researcher’s 
perspective, it does not mean Zagu was weaker; rather, it was merely the effect of 
Zagu’s proximity to the Ming military, as the Ming felt it unnecessary to use a high-
ranking title to flatter the regime. Moreover, Zagu had one geopolitical advantage that 
Dongbuhanhu desperately desired: the control of major passageways that linked 
northwest Sichuan to the broader region.  
    Transportation routes in the mountainous area, as one can imagine, were limited 
and quite fixed in terms of passageway. Restricted by topographical conditions, 
movement in the northwest Sichuan mountains had to follow either river valleys or 
mountain trails, thus rendering certain ferries or mountain passes significant strategic 
spots. Sitting between Dongbuhanhu and the Ming territory, Zagu clearly understood 
how vital outbound access was to the development of Dongbuhanhu and took full 
advantage of its geographical and geopolitical position. In 1432, ignoring the Ming’s 
constant warnings, Zagu occupied six hamlets in Bao county. This was a pivotal move 
to check Dongbuhanhu because the hamlets were located along an important 
mountain route on which Dongbuhanhu heavily relied to dispatch envoys to Beijing. 
Keeping the route under control, Zagu effectively blocked Dongbuhanhu’s outbound 
contact.160 
    The competition between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu intensified in the 1440s as both 
regimes expanded. Routes remained at the center of their power struggle. In 1441, 
Zagu again chopped down numerous trees on a mountain trail in order to block 
 





Dongbuhanhu envoys. Although the latter eventually made their way to the Ming’s 
Sichuan office, Zagu successfully kept more than 200 horses in the mountain that 
Dongbuhanhu envoys were supposed to bring to Beijing as diplomatic gifts.161 
Despite promising to look into this conflict, the Ming obviously had not done much to 
resolve the situation because one year later in 1442, Dongbuhanhu was still in need of 
a functional route, and it was even forced to quell a local rebellion for the Ming in 
order to send the envoys to the other side of the mountain ranges.162  
    In the 1440s, the de facto ruler of Dongbuhanhu was the young and ambitious 
Gelek Gyaltsen, Namkha’s second son. Faced with Zagu’s blockade, Gelek Gyaltsen 
initially set his hopes in diplomatic channels. He wished to invite the Ming to 
mediate, just as his father did in 1411 when a route-blocking incident arose, but the 
result was similarly disappointing. In 1442, after crushing the rebellion for the Ming, 
Gelek Gyaltsen filed a report to request the opening of a new route since Zagu had cut 
off the old ones.163 But from the Ming’s viewpoint, the mountain passageway 
Dongbuhanhu asked for was of strategic importance,164 and since envoys from 
Dongbuhanhu had made it to the court in 1441 and 1442 after all, there was no need 
for new routes.165 As the road-opening request was denied, Dongbuhanhu’s next 
diplomatic mission in 1443 was again unsurprisingly sabotaged by Zagu.166  
    Gelek Gyaltsen’s failure to gain the Ming’s support resulted from the different 
expectations of the two sides. For Gelek Gyaltsen, functional routes to the Ming realm 
function primarily not as a conduit to send envoys to Beijing to pay homage to the 
Ming emperor, but as an entrance to a trans-regional commercial network. Therefore, 
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what Zagu blocked was not Gelek Gyaltsen’s opportunity to be a loyal subject, but 
Dongbuhanhu’s opportunity for wealth. However, what the Ming valued more was 
the political implication of the Dongbuhanhu envoys’ arrival – that Dongbuhanbu 
submitted to the Ming’s heavenly authority and dispatched envoys periodically to 
show its respect. As long as the envoys managed to get to Beijing, the Ming would 
not expend much effort to intervene in a clash in a distant frontier region. In this 
regard, both sides acted accordingly based on their understandings of the mutual 
relation. However, Gelek Gyaltsen overestimated Dongbuhanhu’s political weight to 
the Ming. 
    When the Ming refused to substantially intervene against Zagu’s unfriendly 
actions, Dongbuhanhu was left on its own to deal with their competitor. And 
Dongbuhanhu’s strategy, in the 1440s, was to form a transregional anti-Zagu alliance 
based on the binary principle of the mountain society. 
    The major allies that Dongbuhanhu sided with were two Bön communities: one 
was Jinchuan, the other Shangba (商巴). As briefly mentioned earlier, Jinchuan was a 
vassal regime under Zagu’s control in the early 15th century. It was at first located to 
the east of Zagu and well known as a Bön stronghold. In 1439, Bön practitioners from 
more than 800 hamlets complained to the Ming court that their routes were blocked 
by some raw barbarians. And the Jinchuan Bön master was most likely the leader of 
the group, as it was him who drafted the correspondence.167 Similarly, Shangba was 
also a Bön center. Located to the south of Songpan, it was powerful enough that even 
the Ming hesitated to confront it directly. In a skirmish in 1440, the Ming military 
captured and jailed the Shangba religious leader who seemed to be calling for a raid 
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on the Ming’s grain caravan and a siege of a Ming fortress. These actions soon led to 
large-scale retaliation, as Bön followers occupied mountain passes, blocked routes, 
and razed many Ming fortresses and postal stations.168 Despite the pressing requests of 
the local military officers to dispatch a sizeable army to tame the unrest, the Ming 
instead executed the top commander of the Songpan military and exiled the vice 
commander. In the meantime, the Shangba Bön leader was released and even given 
the tile of State Preceptor in appeasement.169 
    What seemed to exist between Dongbuhanhu, Jinchuan, and Shangba was a 
religious alliance. But was that the case? It should be noted that while Dongbuhanhu 
was well-known as a Bön patron, Zagu also maintained a supportive attitude toward 
the religion since Jinchuan was just one of its vassals. In this regard, why did 
Jinchuan and Shangba then side with Dongbuhanhu? The answer to this question lies 
in the binary proto-clan social structure in northwest Sichuan. 
    As briefly discussed in the introductory section above, the binary structure of the 
mountain society, according to some historical anthropologists, derived from the 
intense interpersonal relationships in a resource-scarce society. Such a social structure 
could have existed since the late 14th century. One late Ming author points out that 
when an early Ming general, Ding Yu (丁玉), came to the region, he noticed the 
binary distinction that indigenes adopted to distinguish one from another. Some 
indigenes called themselves “Ox Hair” or “Ox Brain” (牛毛/牛脑), and others 
“Sheep Hair” or “Sheep Brain” (羊毛/羊脑). Probably finding these designations 
strange and ridiculous, Ding Yu renamed them “Big Surname” and “Small Surname” 
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(大姓&小姓).170 In another undated Ming dynasty source, they were also recorded as 
the “Big Clan” and “Small Clan” (大族&小族).171 
    The relations between these binary proto-clan groups were dynamic. In peace 
times, the dichotomic distinction seemed to play little role. Different proto-clans had 
their inhabitances interdigitated in the mountain.172 They continued to intermarry,173 
and they even cooperated to fight common enemies from time to time.174 But when 
tension erupted, even in skirmishes, the idea of binary distinction surfaced and hence 
became a decisive factor in ally-making. It was exactly in this context that Jinchuan 
and Shangba cliqued with Dongbuhanhu: not for religious reasons, but for their 
shared, even if primarily imagined, blood ties. It is recorded that Dongbuhanhu and 
Jinchuan were both Small Clan communities, while Zagu and Dasiman were both Big 
Clans.175 This shared proto-clan background, I argue, was the primary reason that 
Jinchuan was expelled from its original settlement under Zagu to a location in 
Dongbuhanhu’s territory.176 In this case, even if Jinchuan was an important Bön 
center that could boost Zagu’s religious authority, the proto-clan code came first when 
tensions were escalating. 
   A similar situation in which the proto-clan principle outweighed religious values 
was also seen in a clash involving Shangba. In 1441, when an interpreter was 
dispatched by the Ming court to northwest Sichuan to investigate the growing tension 
on the ground, he noticed that what was behind a seemingly religious clash between 
Shangba, a Bön community, and Liba, a Tibetan Buddhist community, was actually a 
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proto-clan power struggle in which Shangba was the Big Clan and Liba was the Small 
Clan. Therefore, in his report to the court, the interpreter suggested that the Ming 
intervene to settle the conflict by dividing the local communities according to their 
proto-clan background. This way, the interpreter claimed, would restore peace in the 
region.177 
    Reminded by the interpreter that proto-clan distinctions were a deeper layer of the 
social structure of northwest Sichuan, did the Ming act accordingly by striking a 
balance between the two proto-clan groups so as to use one to check another? The 
short answer is no. The Ming did not care much about the conflicts on the ground as 
long as it did not threaten the Ming’s imperial integrity, and thus the court did not 
adopt any sophisticated strategy to solve frontier tension. Such an attitude is most 
typically illustrated in its response to the Dong Min-Wang Yong vendetta. 
    The blood feud between the Dong Min (董敏) and Wang Yong (王永) cliques  
lasted almost two decades in the mid-15th century, during which the several years 
from 1443 to 1447 witnessed the most intensified clash. Both Dong and Wang were 
members of influential households in the local society of northwest Sichuan. 
Although they were from Big and Small Clans respectively, the two households kept 
the peace and even maintained continued to intermarry for generations.178 But since 
Dong Min was a proto-clan ally with Dongbuhanhu and Wang Yon was aligned with 
Zagu,179 Dong Min and Wang Yong were also dragged into the chaos when the 
relationship between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu soured.  
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    In 1443, Dong Min was appointed by the Ming to be the chief of Baozi Pass (保子
關), an important mountain transit point. His brother-in-law, Wang Yong, went to the 
celebration banquet to congratulate him on his promotion. But for some reason, the 
two began to fight after several rounds of drinking,180 and the whole situation went 
out of control when Wang Yong murdered Dong Min’s son in addition to more than 
twenty family members of Dong.181 While Dong Min himself managed to escape and 
went into hiding in Guan county,182 Wang Yong managed to get Dong Min’s seal and 
usurped the coveted mountain pass chief position.183 
    Shortly after murdering the Dong family, Wang Yong planned the murder of a 
second mountain pass chief, the chief of Hanshui Pass (寒水關). In 1443, Wang Yong 
instigated Jiawu (加悟), the leader of the so-called Caopo hamlet (草坡寨), to mount 
an attack on Hanshui Pass and kill the mountain pass chief and more than 500 of his 
family members and underlings.184 After the massacre, Jiawu himself rushed to Zagu 
and hid under the ruler’s protection. These two bloodbaths were not random incidents: 
I argue that they were part of a well-planned vendetta carried out by the Big Clans—
the Zagu, Wang Yong and Caopo clique—against Small Clan communities. 
Moreover, the mountain pass chiefs were not chosen as targets without reason. Their 
murders were part of a clear political agenda, as Zagu made every effort to control 
strategic transportation point in the mountain. 
    The Ming received reports of these violent outbursts soon after they happened. But 
once again, the Ming did not intervene to punish the perpetrators. Instead, the Ming 
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absolved both of the culprits only several months later. In 1443, Wang Yong was 
pardoned after he sent his nephew to Beijing to plea for mercy.185 In 1444, Jiawu was 
also exonerated when the Zagu ruler went so far as to plead for him.186 Quite 
ironically, it was Dong Min, the victim of the feud, that was reported as wanted by the 
Ming because he refused to let things go.187 At last, Dong Min was hunted down by 
the Ming military in 1447.188 Gelek Gyaltsen, sent a memorial to the Ming court to 
plead mercy for Dong Min, just as the Zagu ruler did for Jiawu. Yet it was turned 
down, and Dong Min was executed by the Ming later that year. 189 
    The Dong Min–Wang Yong struggle is a great case for examining the role Ming 
China played in the power dynamics of the binary mountain society and the Chinese 
dynasty’s perception of the region. First, what concerned the Ming the most was 
whether its suzerainty received sufficient respect: it cared a lot about its mighty 
heavenly lordship but showed little interest in acting as a fair judge. The way that 
Ming China settled Dong-Wang disputes was measured by how deep the mountain 
regime rulers bowed down: when Wang Yong and Jiawu pled guilty shortly after they 
committed the crime and sent envoys to Beijing to show their submissive obedience, 
the Ming acted the magnanimous overlord and soon pardoned them. But for Dong 
Min, the real victim who believed he did nothing wrong and refused to seek the 
Ming’s forgiveness, the Ming accused him of disturbing the regional order and 
eventually had him executed. In other words, the Ming perceived those who dared to 
challenge its authority the dangerous troublemaker, while those who shed real blood 
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merely made forgivable mistakes. It held a condescending view toward dealing with 
mountain society affairs.  
    Relevant to the first feature, a second point one may argue about Ming’s role in 
1440s mountain society was its passive and indifferent stance. The Ming did not pool 
many resources, be it military, personal, or economic, to this western mountain 
frontier. As long as there was no critical social unrest, the Ming court was willing to 
compromise, even if it meant executing a few military officers or pardoning several 
murderers. While one might interpret this as meticulous calculation, I argue it was 
more of an aloof attitude that points to the Ming’s carelessness toward the region. The 
Ming demonstrated little interest in penetrating the local society and thus made little 
use of the taxonomic information collected by the interpreter about the mountain 
society. Such an attitude, I argue, resulted from two reasons. On one hand, the 
exhausting war in 1420s northwest Sichuan had made it clear to the Ming court that 
ruling the mountain society was too costly to bear. Instead, a passive style of indirect 
rule was much more appealing. On the other hand, in the 1440s, the Ming court was 
busy with other frontier affairs, as both the Ming- Mongol trade in the north and the 
Luchuan wars in the southwest created huge political and economic burdens for the 
Ming. Therefore, the clash between two frontier figureheads and their cliques was of 
little importance from the Ming court’s perspective.  
    In the 1440s proto-clan competition, the Zagu clique was undoubtedly the winner. 
This is clearly shown through diplomatic frequency: while there was only an average 
of 0.8 Dongbuhanhu emissaries traveling to Beijing each year in the 1440s, Zagu 
envoys presented at the Ming court four times just in 1447. The changing power 
balance in the Dongbuhanhu-Zagu competition even created fissures in the proto-clan 





supposedly loyalist allies to Dongbuhanhu, began to have second thoughts. The 
Biesizhai ruler not only forged a seal and claimed himself to be the Grand pacification 
commissioner, the 3B rank which equaled to the Dongbuhanhu ruler, but also sided 
with Zagu and other Big Clan groups to attack Dongbuhanhu communities. This was 
seen as a direct challenge to the authority of Dongbuhanhu, the nominal leader of the 
Small Clan clique, and tremendously upset the Dongbuhanhu leader Gelek Gyaltsen. 
Through a series of tactics, Gelek Gyaltsen captured the Biesizhai ruler, found his 
fake seal, and gouged out his eyes.190 The torture was certainly for punishing the 
Biesizhai ruler’s betrayal, but should also be understood as an indication of Gelek 
Gyaltsen’s fury related to Zagu’s rise to power. 
The Tributary System in the Mountains 
    As the underdog in the power struggle in the 1440s, Gelek Gyaltsen must have 
been furious about the situation. Therefore, when he was informed of the domestic 
strife in Zagu, Gelek Gyaltsen took radical but resolute moves. In 1447, the concubine 
of the ruler of Zagu, for some reason, poisoned her husband and son, resulting in the 
death of the Zagu ruler and his potential successor.191 At the same time, the new Zagu 
regent was obviously not very good at ruling. He not only humiliated the leader of 
Dasiman and other important members of Zagu’s ruling class, but also failed to stop 
them from leaving Zagu to submit to Dongbuhanhu.192  Gelek Gyaltsen saw these 
geopolitical changes as great opportunities. He thought the greatly weakened Zagu 
could not check him anymore, and his joy is obvious in the memorial he sent to the 
Ming: “Now, we have prepared horses and local goods as tributary gifts and are about 
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to set off. We will open a new route that traverses the Zagu mountain. Please have 
officials and our escorts wait on the other side of the mountain.”193 
   In what sounds like a notification rather than a plea, Gelek Gyaltsen caught the 
Ming in a moment of weakness as the empire was mired in the Luchuan campaign.194 
Moreover, I argue that Gelek Gyaltsen did not report the domestic calamity of Zagu’s 
ruling house for no reason: it points to a taboo that the Ming cared about in frontier 
society. Although the Ming maintained an indifferent attitude toward the power 
struggles in the mountain society, one thing that it did pay attention to was rulership 
succession. The Ming emperor perceived himself as the overlord of the mountain 
regimes and thus the only superior who could justify or nullify the legitimacy of 
mountain regime rulers. Therefore, when the Zagu ruler’s concubine killed her 
husband and son, it not only directly challenged the Ming’s hegemony over 
succession affairs, but also violated the Ming-promoted Confucius orthodoxy in 
which women should obey men. This on all accounts undermined the legitimacy of 
Zagu and also justified Dongbuhanhu’s further anti-Zagu actions. 
    Gelek Gyaltsen’s claim to open up a new route in the mountain, pointed out by a 
Ming official, was just a smokescreen for Dongbuhanhu’s invasion of Zagu.195 And 
indeed, Gelek Gyaltsen did invade Zagu. In 1448 and 1449, Dongbuhanhu mounted a 
series of attacks and successfully occupied a not insignificant amount of Zagu 
territory.196 The Ming did not react in any substantial way because it was busy with 
the Ming-Mongol struggle and the ensuing succession crisis when the emperor was 
captured alive by the Mongols. But this does not necessarily mean that Zagu did not 
try to get the Ming involved. In fact, Zagu sent an envoy to bring important political 
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messages to the Ming, but the court failed to address them. But before we dive into 
this diplomatic incident, it is important to first introduce how we should understand 
the so-called tributary system in the context of Ming-highland interactions. 
    The tributary system was a cosmological, ideological, and diplomatic framework 
that many Chinese dynasties employed when interacting with the outside world, and 
the Ming dynasty is often singled out as the model.197 Power asymmetry forms the 
core of the system: it assumed China’s top position in the inter-polity hierarchy, 
which other participants of the system had to acknowledge if they sought to establish 
trade and diplomatic relations with China. For the Ming, the system embodied the 
empire’s superiority and hegemony, and Chinese historical materials always 
document it as the predominant framework that provided basic principles for the 
Ming’s foreign communication.198 
    Research on the tributary system is abundant, and many scholars would agree that 
most historical materials we have reflect a China-centric view and thus can disguise 
certain aspects of the cross-regional contact. Peter Schweiger, in one of his recent 
papers, convincingly suggests that Tibetans never used the word dpya, which had 
been the Tibetan term for “tribute” (贡 gong), to describe their historical interactions 
with China, even though this narrative is commonly adopted in Ming and Qing court 
records.199 This supports the argument that the Tibetans, and probably all participants 
of the tributary system, might have their own interpretations for the tributary 
interactions with China. 
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    This section examines the so-called tributary interactions between the Ming and the 
northwest Sichuan mountain society from the perspective of material culture. Instead 
of court narratives, it pays more attention to the on-the-ground ramifications of the 
transregional diplomatic framework. In other words, it focuses on how mountain 
regime rulers and inhabitants perceived their interactions with the Ming, and what 
exactly the tributary system brought to the mountain society. Two cases will be 
analyzed in detail, the first one related to Zagu and the second to Dongbuhanhu. 
    In 1448, Zagu sent a monk called Nangezang (南哥藏) to Beijing. In Ming court 
records, Nangezang’s arrival was documented as a tributary mission, and the 
materials he brought along with him—some swords and armors—were hence 
recorded as tributary gifts.200 In Ming official records, formal diplomatic contacts 
such as tributary activities were always documented carefully, and tributary items—
be it religious objects, horses, or local goods—were usually clearly laid out. In this 
regard, swords and armor were the only tribute gifts Nangezang presented to the 
Ming. Faced with such items from the mountain society, the Ming reception official 
commented that the swords and armor were of little value, and thus Nangezang was 
nothing but a petty swindler who sought to trade the Ming’s rewards for some scrap 
metal. Therefore, the Ming officials reduced the return rewards and harshly criticized 
Nanggezang. This humiliation tremendously outraged Nangezang, who then refused 
to kneel down to accept the downgraded rewards.201 Because of such a reaction, 
Nangezang was eventually thrown into jail for disgracing the Ming emperor. 202 
    In Ming court records, nearly all foreigners from abroad were documented as 
tributary envoys, and their arrivals were perceived as gestures of subordination to the 
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Ming’s supremacy. In this regard, Nangezang seemed to be quite greedy and rude for 
offering inferior tributes and confronting the Ming court. This was exactly the 
message the Ming source intended to convey. But I argue that the confrontation 
caused by Nangezang’s behavior could be understood differently from a borderland 
standpoint. First, the timing and geopolitical context here are particularly important: 
Nangezang came to the Ming court in 1448. It was only several months after the Zagu 
leader suddenly died at the stake in the Zagu and Dongbuhanhu competition. Relying 
on the Ming’s support to compete with Dongbuhanhu for years,203 the Zagu ruling 
class immediately dispatched an envoy to Beijing since the regime was in great need 
of the Ming’s support. Therefore, it is less likely that Nangezang, who was chosen to 
carry out such an important mission, would bring the Ming a pile of trash.  
    The gifts of swords and armor further prove that the Ming misunderstood 
Nangezang. These seemingly strange “tributary gifts” were not traditional tribute 
items one might expect, such as horses, Buddhist statues, or spices, and they were not 
even locally made, seeing as in other places they were also designated as Ming-made 
swords and armor (明刀劍、明甲). From the Ming official’s perspective, they were 
nothing more than scrap metal that frontier swindlers used to trick the Ming in return 
for rewards. But in the mountain society, swords and armor had specific political 
meaning: they were tokens of political alliance and symbols of submission and peace-
making. Sending weaponry was a symbolic action that expressed one’s wish for non-
violent dialogue and peaceful submission. When Gelek Gyaltsen was trying to call for 
an alliance, he sent envoys to bring armor to his potential allies to demonstrate his 
sincerity.204 When Jiawu wished to plead for mercy from the Ming for his brutality at 
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the Hanshui Mountain Pass, he also sent six sets of iron armor to the Ming court to 
ask for forgiveness.205  
    In this regard, Nangezang was not disrespectful at all: he brought along the most 
important and appropriate token for such a scenario at a time when Zagu was 
desperate for Ming’s support to compete with Dongbuhanhu. But this intention was 
beyond the Ming’s comprehension: on the contrary, the Ming accused Zagu of 
lacking sincerity, even though they were a regular tribute payer. Similar 
misunderstanding also applied to some Ming officials’ scornful comments when they 
describe the Buddhist statues and relics (舍利) that some Tibetan Buddhist monks 
brought to the Ming court as valueless scrap.206 However, in a Buddhist society like 
Tibet, religious items were considered the most precious things. And even the fine 
fabrics and silk that the Tibetans received from the Ming were tailored to make huge 
Thangkas for rituals or added to the raw materials to make Buddha statues.207 Such 
cases prove that the tributary interactions might mean quite differently to different 
participants. Downgrading their reward was the Ming’s reaction after evaluating the 
economic value of Zagu’s “tributes;” but from Nangezang’s point of view, it was the 
indicator that suggested the breaking of a long-term friendship between the Ming and 
Zagu at a fatal moment. Of course, Nangezang was greatly outraged by this response. 
When this diplomatic mission failed, Zagu gradually withdrew from the competition 
with Dongbuhanhu as well. 
    While the rise of Zagu abruptly halted in the late 1440s, Gelek Gyaltsen developed 
a taste for aggression and pushed further on. In 1450, he wished to send a delegation 
to Beijing, and the tributary gifts he prepared were horses, swords, and armor. Horses 
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had always been a top tributary item that the Ming lacked and hence desired to 
receive from northwest Sichhuan. Swords and armor, in this context, most likely 
indicated Gelek Gyaltsen’s intention to use a peace-making token to lessen the 
Ming’s vigilance. But Gelek Gyaltsen’s wishful thinking failed as his delegation 
proposal was rejected by the Ming’s Sichuan officials, who could not tell Gelek 
Gyaltsen’s real intentions based on his recent bold and illegal actions.208 Yet Gelek 
Gyaltsen was not someone who easily gave up. In 1451, he requested to send a tribute 
delegation to Ming court again. But when the Ming officials approached the envoys to 
communicate their second denial, the tribute envoys replied: “Alas! It is too late. The 
horses were already on the way.”209 This clearly shows that Gelek Gyaltsen had 
already decided to ignore the Ming’s regulation since the Chinese empire could not 
check him anyway. Quite by coincidence, this arrogant envoy was killed shortly after 
he took the horses into the Zagu territory, and all the horses were forced back to 
Dongbuhanhu’s territory.210 This incident provided Gelek Gyaltsen an ideal catalyst to 
escalate his aggressive actions. Later that year, he ordered more than 2000 soldiers to 
march into Zagu territory, and the justification for this action was to escort a mere 100 
tribute horses.211 In this case, we can see that going to Beijing to pay tribute had 
become an excuse that provided Gelek Gyaltsen a legitimate reason to move armed 
soldiers around and march into the territory of neighboring polity.  
    The Tumu incident in 1449 and the resulting political turbulence at the Ming court 
forced the Ming to adopt a smoother way to interact with Dongbuhanhu. Comparing a 
1450 imperial edict with one from 1447, we see that outright rebukes were already 
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replaced by gentle and cautious suggestions.212 Moreover, since the Ming still had the 
impression that Gelek Gyaltsen was a mere mountain regime figurehead thirsty for 
power and money, the court kept raising Gelek Gyaltsen’s ranking and granting him 
many tribute rewards in exchange for frontier peace. In 1452, the court decided to 
raise Gelek Gyaltsen to the level of a regional Military Commissioner-in-chief (都指
揮使), which was a 2A ranking in the Ming’s bureaucratic system. In return, the Ming 
wished that Gelek Gyaltsen would return the territory that he had annexed back to 
Zagu.213 When Gelek Gyaltsen seemed to have followed the Ming’s instruction, the 
Ming emperor was quite delighted and even praised Gelek Gyaltsen as the “number 
one iron mountain guarding the empire’s west.”214 At the same time, the court granted 
preferential treatment to tributary groups from Dongbuhanhu. In 1452 and 1453, a 
total of eight Dongbuhanhu embassies went to Beijing. This is exactly the privilege 
that only Zagu could enjoy several years ago.  Although these envoys behaved quite 
rudely on their way to Beijing and frequently conducted illegal activities, the court 
decided to pardon their criminal behavior.215 After all, from the Ming court’s 
perspective, Gelek Gyaltsen was just a greedy barbarian who only pursued material 
benefits from the tributary system.216 
    In 1453, a Ming official filed a complaint to the Ming court about Dongbuhanhu’s 
tributary group and how they had disturbed the social order along the route. This 
document allows us to, on one hand, get a sense of what kind of scene the 
Dongbuhanhu envoys had made in the Chinese heartland, and on the other hand, 
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investigate what exactly Dongbuhanhu had gained from such tributary trips. The 
memorial reads: 
Li Shi, Grand Coordinator and Right Censor-in-chief in Huguang (巡
撫湖廣右都御史) submits the following memorial: 
When the fan monks (番僧), State Preceptors (國師), Meditation 
Masters (禪師) and Lama (剌麻) from Sichuan Dongbuhanhu Grand 
Pacification Commission (四川董卜韓胡宣慰司) completed their 
tributary mission, they were allowed to bring tea back. With this 
permission, [these envoy monks] purchased over ten thousand catties 
of tea as well as articles made of copper, tin, iron, and porcelain. [The 
envoys] requested boats to transport all the goods to Chengdu and then 
hired porters to carry them into the mountains. Certain areas along 
their return path, such as 10 li in Qiong county (邛縣), 2 li in 
Mingshan County (名山縣), 4 li in Yingjing County (滎經縣) and 10 
li in Yazhou (雅州), were primarily dwelled in by Bo-Yi indigenes (僰
夷⼟⺠). [These non-Han people] were not used to shouldering loads, 
but preferred to hoist them on their back. For places where proceeding 
was difficult, even women were required to help lift the goods for as 
far as four to five hundred li. But when goods were delivered, these 
porters were to be blamed [by Dongbuhanhu envoys] for stealing and 
were forced to pay for the loss. Moreover, the regions [these envoys 
and porters travelled through] were of precipitous terrain and scarce 
population. The envoys and their retinue travelled and rested in the 
wilderness day and night, and hence disturbed the honest Hua-xia 
ethos with their barbaric and vulgar customs. When passing through 
postal stations, these people always asked for copious wine and food 
and tended to harm people with their weapons when their needs were 
not met. Even those chiliarches and centurions appointed [by the Ming 
court] as their accompaniment could not stop such behaviors. Noticing 
the material benefits of such tributary missions, our frontier subjects 
began to encourage their sons to learn the foreign language so as to 
sneak into tributary groups as fan monks and interpreters. Now I 
propose that the Investigation Bureau (都察院) should ban behaviors 
such as private contacts with fan monks, trading tea and other articles 
made of copper, tin, iron, and porcelain with them, and sending their 
sons to be monks and interpreters. Anyone who dares to violate should 
be banished beyond the northern border to be frontier soldiers, and his 
neighbors who fail to report [the outlaw actions] would be punished 
accordingly as well.217 
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    This lengthy but rich memorial highlights at least three aspects of Dongbuhanhu’s 
participation in the tributary system. First, it indicates that the interaction between the 
Ming and the mountain society had already affected regions beyond the highland 
world. The memorial was written by an official who stationed at Huguang, which was 
an important distribution center for trans-Yangtze trade. According to Chen Zhigang, 
in the mid-15th century, the price for tea at Huguang was much cheaper than that of 
Sichuan,218 and this was most likely why Dongbuhanhu envoys chose to purchase tea 
at Huguang. Although Huguang was quite far away from Dongbuhanhu, the envoys 
did not need to worry about the shipping cost; according to the Ming’s regulation, all 
expenses for the tributary envoys’ round trip, including lodging, accommodations, 
and transportation, were at the Ming’s cost. Technically the envoys had to buy and 
transport things on their own; but oftentimes, as this memorial demonstrates, the 
Ming had to take care of the shipment of goods that envoys acquired through private 
trade as well. It is reasonable to speculate that the Dongbuhanhu envoys must have 
bought a tremendous amount of goods at Huguang and requested the local 
administrative office to summon labor for transportation, to the great annoyance of  
the local official.  
    Second, the memorial indicates that what really worried the Ming officials was the 
disturbance such tributary groups caused to the social order in Chinese heartland. Not 
only did it create a financial burden for regional governments to host the tributary 
envoys and additional workload for commoners’ corvée labor, but the official also 
claimed that the tributary groups had generated considerable bad influence on the 
Ming’s subjects and culture as a whole. He argued that the tributary groups’ frequent 
travel along the Ming’s postal network and their alleged barbaric behaviors had 
 





become a landscape that stained Confucius culture, and more importantly, corrupted 
those who lived near the frontier region. As many of the Ming’s frontier subjects 
began to engage with the tributary groups illegally, either by faking their identities 
and sneaked into the tributary groups or conducting private trade with them, the Ming 
lost not only potential taxpayers but also regulation on frontier affairs. Therefore, in 
the eyes of this official, the Donbuhanhu envoys, probably together with other 
mountain regime tributary groups that enjoyed court privileges, had done China no 
good whatsoever. 
    Third, this memorial paves the way for my discussion of the meaning of the 
tributary system for the Dongbuhanhu regime’s own development. There are, again, 
three points on this issue. The first, as explicitly revealed in the memorial, has to do 
with Donghuhanhu’s economic development. One conventional narrative about the 
tributary system is that while the Chinese dynasties acquired political and ideological 
satisfaction when the tributary regimes came to pay homage, the tributary regimes 
were mainly interested in the material benefits behind the interaction. Such an 
interpretation, I argue, is somewhat oversimplified. On one hand, as my examinations 
above have demonstrated, participating in the tributary system also benefited 
mountain regimes politically, as they could have their authority recognized by an 
external source of legitimacy. On the other hand, few studies discuss what the 
material benefits meant to tributary regimes. This is not a self-evident question; 
rather, it points to the issue of how tributary regimes spent the wealth they had gained 
after they returned from their trip.  
    In the case of Dongbuhanhu, we see that the envoys primarily brought two types of 





to contain the basic nutrition to keep various kinds of barbarians alive,219 tea actually 
carried important social functions in the mountain society as well. It firstly helped 
mountain regimes like Dongbuhanhu consolidate patronage over religious 
communities. Religious groups in the mid-15th century Tibetan world had huge 
demand for tea. One source indicates that one monastery requested 50,000 catties of 
tea from the Ming.220 Another documents that one monk alone sought to purchase 
6,000 catties of tea in the Chinese heartland.221 Therefore, Dongbuhanhu could use 
the huge amount of tea that it acquired through tributary missions to win the support 
of the religious communities to strengthen local governance. Moreover, it indicates 
that religious communities under Dongbuhanhu’s rule could enjoy higher tea 
purchase quota from the Ming court.222 This, undoubtedly, would provide incentive 
for more religious communities to submit to Dongbuhanhu.  
     In addition to appealing to religious communities, tea in the mountain society was 
also used in transactions. Although we do not have 15th century sources, a study on 
18th century eastern Tibet shows that tea, because of its broad acceptance, easy 
preservation, and wide circulation, was in fact used as currency in barter exchange.223 
It is highly possible that tea was already used in this way several centuries earlier by 
the mountain regimes to compensate the labor of their subjects. Therefore, the more 
tea these regimes acquired from the Ming, the better they could control the local 
economy. 
    There are few sources dealing with how Dongbuhanhu rulers made use of the metal 
articles that the envoys bought back. But here are some of my speculative hypotheses. 
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In addition to daily instruments such as cooking utensils and farming implements, 
iron articles were most likely recast to make weapons, and this was a tactic frequently 
adopted by the Mongols at the time.224 In the same manner, copper and tin articles 
could either be used as everyday items or smelted into bronze for weaponry, religious 
items such as Buddhist statues, or decorative ornaments. In terms of porcelain, I argue 
it was more of a social status marker in the mountain society. For most mountain 
inhabitants at the time, porcelain from the Chinese heartland was not easily 
accessible. Therefore, they were most likely precious items circulated among the 
ruling class to highlight their elite identity. As this reasoning goes, porcelain, together 
with other tributary rewards that I will examine in the following paragraphs, might 
also have functioned in making political alliances for their luxury value.  
    The second aspect of the tributary system’s local meaning is that it facilitated trans-
regional communication and interaction among multiple mountain regimes. Going to 
Beijing to pay tribute became an important and legitimate reason for regime rulers 
and their reliable agents to travel to other regimes, and thus these trips were a good 
opportunity to strengthen social networks or form political alliances. The memorial 
reveals that while Dongbuhanhu envoys travelled through the mountainous areas on 
their way back, they interacted closely with the so-called Bo-Yi indigenes. Another 
memorial vividly illustrates how tribute missions allowed Dongbuhanhu and its close 
ally, Shangba, to dispatch messengers between themselves for various types of 
conspiracies.  
    In 1452, before the Dongbuhanhu tributary envoys’ departure for Beijing, the 
Shangba leader sent an underling named Lazhong (臘仲) to bring 120 horses to 
Dongbuhanhu. Lazhong’s mission was to assume a Dongbuhanhu envoy identity so 
 





as to bring the horses to Beijing as tributary horses and thereby take a share of the 
rewards. Using the fake identity of an interpreter named Sonam Rinchen (鎖南領占), 
Lazhong traveled to Beijing, presented the “tributary horses,” visited the palace of the 
Shu Prince (蜀王府) in Chengdu on his way back, and was at last detected by the 
Ming military and captured. After torturing and executing Lazhong, the Ming military 
on one hand made up a certificate of Lazhong’s death by illness and informed 
Dongbuhanhu, and on the other hand learned that Lazhong had using taken advantage 
of multiple tribute missions to frequently travel between Dongbuhanhu and Shangba 
as a messenger.225 Such a function of the tributary system was most likely beyond the 
Ming court’s imagination. Moreover, since the Ming required all tributary envoys to 
stay at Huitong Guan, the Ming’s official site to accommodate diplomatic 
delegations, tributary envoys from the mountain society had many chances to interact 
in Beijing, probably even more than when they were in northwest Sichuan. For 
highland inhabitants who had fewer chances to interact with strangers from other 
regions, delivering tribute horses in Beijing, the great metropolitan city, had 
undoubtably opened a new world for them. Of course, there was also a downside to 
such interactions, as one fight between western Sichuan and Ryukyu envoys resulted 
in some serious injuries and Ming’s ensuring punishments.226 
    The third way that the tributary system affected the Dongbuhanhu regime’s 
development is that it functioned as a model which Gelek Gyaltsen could mimic when 
building a Dongbuhanhu-centered regional hierarchical system, and the tributary 
rewards and all kinds of material goods that Dongbuhanhu envoys acquired in the 
Chinese heartland in turn became Dongbuhanhu’s material basis to construct its own 
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regional order. One 1452 memorial reveals how Dongbuhanhu was creating its mini 
tributary system in the mountain society. At the time, a Tibetan Buddhist monk was 
wandering around among mountain communities to lobby them to go to Beijing to 
pay tribute, and in return, the monk himself might be rewarded by the Ming court for 
such merits. But later he noticed that the so-called raw barbarians he successfully 
convinced were stopped halfway by Dongbuhanhu henchmen. In addition, the 
henchmen promised those who were about to go to Beijing that if they paid tribute to 
Dongbuhanhu, instead of to the Ming court, each person in their communities would 
receive four bolts of Sansuo cloth (三梭布). For the community leaders, their needs 
for gold seals, silver seals, or high-ranking official titles might also be satisfied.227  
    This message, though probably not the intention of the Tibetan Buddhist monk, 
revealed the wealth Dongbuhanhu had at the time. Sansuo cloth was primarily made 
in the lower Yangtze delta region, the center for Ming China’s textile industry, and 
hence was of supreme quality. One reference here is that while Gelek Gyaltsen 
promised those who joined him would receive four bolts personally, the Ming could 
only reward those who refused Dongbuhanhu’s offer with one bolt of Sansuo cloth 
per person.228 Undoubtedly, Dongbuhanhu had acquired a huge amount of such 
products through the tributary system, together with other gold and silver items. In 
that regard, the Ming’s tributary system not only served as a geopolitical model for 
Gelek Gyaltsen to imagine the hierarchical order in the mountain world, but also 
provided him with the capital to build such a system. But one must note that Gelek 
Gyaltsen was not constructing an identical system to the Ming model: he was mixing 
the Ming’s tributary system with the religious order that had dominated the mountain 
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world for quite a while. In 1452, an Ming interpreter reported to the court that 
Dongbuhanhu had dispatched an underling to a community called A’sigong (阿思貢) 
with a set of armor, and the Dongbuhanhu envoy told the A’sigong leader to convert 
from Tibetan Buddhism to Bön.229 If he agreed to do so, Gelek Gyaltsen would build a 
Bön temple in A’sigong and allocate five hundred Bön monks under his command.230 
This message not only proves my earlier argument that armor and weaponry were 
widely used in the mountain society to make political alliances or show an intention 
for peace talks, but also indicates that building an empire featuring Bön religion had 
always been at the center of Gelek Gyaltsen’s vision.  
    By the early 1450s, Gelek Gyaltsen had successfully eliminated the Zagu threat that 
had haunted him for quite some time, accumulated a considerably amount of wealth 
through its tributary interactions with the Ming, and started his empire-building 
enterprise that feature a combination of the Ming-style tributary system and 
mountain-style Bön belief. His next move was to break through the barriers of the 
mountain and invade the Ming. 
The War that Never Happened 
    While the Ming still saw Gelek Gyaltsen as a greedy barbarian who was only 
interested in the material benefits of the tributary system, his ambition had only 
grown larger by the early 1450s. He started to plan an invasion of the Sichuan plain, 
the most important and economically developed region in the empire’s west. 
    In 1452, Gelek Gyaltsen wished the Ming to provide him some books and gave a 
list to a Ming frontier official. The list began with some works from the Confucian 
canon, such as Zhou Yi (Book of Changes 周易), Shangshu (Book of Documents 尚
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書), and Mao Shi (Book of Songs 毛詩). But two geographic guidebooks appear at the 
end: Fangyu shenglan (Travelogue to Sites of Scenic Beauty 方輿勝覽) and Chengdu 
ji (Records of Chengdu 成都記). Although Gelek Gyaltsen’s requests were made with 
a modest and respectful tone, as the Ming official remarked, there was more behind 
the book list. The Ming official pointed out that the Confucian classics that Gelek 
Gyaltsen requested could be easily purchased at any bookstore. Therefore, this was  
merely subterfuge to mask the last two titles on the list that contained important 
geographical information on the Chengdu plain and could thus be referenced for 
military purposes.231 Figuring out this rebellious intention, the official did not give 
Gelek Gyaltsen what he asked for. 
    Together with the book list, Gelek Gyaltsen also sent some valuable items, 
including a silver wine jar and a gold pearl, for the official personally.232 This was 
obviously a bribe, a way of interaction that was prevalent at the time between 
mountain inhabitants and Ming officials. Ming records documented many cases in 
which corrupt Ming officials were caught and punished for extorting bribes from the 
locals.233 Gelek Gyaltsen even knew how to take advantage of the Ming’s low 
tolerance for frontier corruption at times for specific purposes. When he reported the 
Zagu incident to the Ming court in which the Zagu ruler was poisoned by his 
concubine, he also claimed that this lady had bribed a Ming chiliarch to slander 
Dongbuhanhu, a rhetoric that might further damage Zagu’s image as a loyal regime.234 
When the Ming military commander, Kou Shen, repeatedly rejected Gelek Gyaltsen’s 
requests to open up new routes in the mountain, the Dongbuhanhu ruler sent 
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memorials to the court to impeach Kou Shen for taking bribes from Zagu, abusing 
underlings, and adultery.235 Although there is no way for us to discern whether Gelek 
Gyaltsen’s accusations were founded or not, these claims did cause the Ming to 
investigate those who leaned toward Zagu or created obstacles for Dongbuhanhu and 
temporarily suspend or remove them from their positions. 
    Collecting geographical information on Ming territory and sabotaging the 
credibility of Ming officials, Gelek Gyaltsen also challenged the Ming’s authority by 
re-opening the Dong Min-Wang Yong case. Feeling that the Ming was far from fair in 
settling the disputes, Gelek Gyaltsen promised Dong Min’s nephew that he would 
hunt down Wang Yong and get revenge for Dong Ming who received wrongful 
treatment and died in vein.236 This decision greatly upset the Ming court because 
Gelek Gyaltsen was openly questioning the Ming’s role as the highest authority and 
arbiter of justice. Gelek Gyaltsen’s ambition to take up hegemony over social order in 
the mountain society is also seen in the process of Shangba succession: when the old 
Shangba religious leader passed away, it was Gelek Gyaltsen who addressed the Ming 
that he had picked the next Shangba religious leader in the Ming’s stead.237  
    Tension between the Ming and Dongbuhanhu also escalated over territorial 
disputes. At first, the Ming wished to act out its role as overlord by requesting Gelek 
Gyaltsen to return the territory he occupied in recent years. Gelek Gyaltsen indeed 
gave the land back to Zagu and Dasiman following the Ming’s instructions. The Ming 
was at first satisfied with this result and praised Gelek Gyaltsen for his cooperation,238  
but later found out that Gelek Gyaltsen in fact had withheld the seals of those 
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regions,239 which means that Zagu and Dasiman only regained their rulership 
nominally, while Dongbuhanhu still controlled these regions in the jurisdictional 
sense. In other words, Gelek Gyaltsen still maintained control over a large portion of 
Zagu and Dasiman territory.240 Moreover, worried that those who lived in Zagu and 
Dasiman territory might reveal strategic information to the Ming military, Gelek 
Gyaltsen forcefully relocated many of the inhabitants to the hinterlands of the 
mountain society.241 
    Compared with the territories of Zagu and Dasiman, Weizhou (威州) was an asset 
Gelek Gyaltsen refused to give up. From the Ming’s perspective, Weizhou was of 
strategic importance and a significant spot to control the northwest Sichuan mountain 
region.242 Before the 1450s, the Ming had sanctioned Zagu to implement indirect rule 
over the region until Dongbuhanhu took it over. The Ming was quite sensitive about 
Dongbuhanhu’s control over Weizhou because it allowed Dongbuhanhu’s army,\ 
during wartime to come down from the mountain from all four directions 
simultaneously, an advantage the Ming was unable to curb.243 But when the Ming 
court requested the return of Weizhou, Gelek Gyaltsen replied in an extremely 
offensive tone: “We took Weizhou from the hands of the Zagu people, not you Han 
people. For nine days and nine nights, I could not figure out [the logic] of this 
imperial edict [that asks us to give it back to the Ming]. Weizhou is merely a rocky 
mountain smaller than a fist, you’d better not keep pushing to take it back. If you 
insist on taking it back, a bloody war that can last one thousand years awaits you!”244 
These lines clearly demonstrated that Gelek Gyaltsen did not take the Ming’s 
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political superiority seriously anymore and refused the court’s further intervention of 
regional affairs, and he obviously was not afraid of military confrontation. Faced 
with such a resolution, the Ming court ordered frontier officials to drop the case for 
the time being.245 
    While Gelek Gyaltsen was busy building his empire and new regional world order 
in the mountain, the Ming was not just sitting around waiting for Dongbuhanhu’s 
further moves. In response to the near completion of Dongbuhanhu watchtowers just 
outside the west gate of Songpan and more and more spies watching the Ming’s 
military deployment,246 the court began to gear up for a seemingly inevitable clash. 
In 1452, the Ming was on one hand trying to divide the Dongbuhanhu alliance by 
surrendering or killing some of Gelek Gyaltsen’s allies, and on the other hand 
acquiring support from Gelek Gyaltsen’s old foe, Wang Yong, who agreed to mount 
a flank attack on Dongbuhanhu once the war started.247 From 1453 to 1455, Ming 
soldiers and military logisticians were dispatched to strategic locations,248 military 
meetings and personnel rearrangements were frequent,249 and a new battalion in 
Guanxian county, the place the Ming officials thought to be the site of 
Dongbuhanhu’s first attack, was quickly whipped into fighting shape.250 The war 
could break out at any moment. 
    In the summer of 1455, after years of preparation for the Dongbuhanhu invasion, 
the Ming court suddenly received news of Gelek Gyaltsen’s death. No one saw this 
coming. The news came so abruptly that even senior court officials did not believe it 
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at first and hastened their underlings to double check.251 Several months later, a 
memorial in the name of Gelek Gyaltsen came to court. However, neither the tone 
nor the addressed title looked like Gelek Gyaltsen.252 This confirmed the court 
officials’ supposition that something unusual had taken place in the Dongbuhanhu 
ruling house: Gelek Gyaltsen might really be dead. Yet historical materials never 
specify the true reason for the unexpected death of this ambitious leader.  
With Gelek Gyaltsen’s death, the threat that Dongbuhanhu posed to the Ming 
gradually faded away. In retrospect, the Dongbuhanhu turmoil was one of the biggest 
crises that took place in the Ming empire’s western frontier; the next one did not arise 
until the arrival of the Mongols one century later. The Ming-centered tributary 
system, ironically, contributed considerably to this mid-15th century frontier 
emergency. The vicissitudes of the Dongbuhanhu regime closely correlate to its 
participation in the tributary system: among all the Dongbuhanhu tributary missions 
to the Ming from 1415 to 1626, around one quarter of them took place within the two 
decades of the 1440s and 1450s. Dongbuhanhu’s rise, as a local consequence of the 
tributary system, was most likely unexpected to the Ming: after all, the system was 
originally perceived and designed to consolidate the empire’s authority, not to 
undermine it. 
Summary 
    Through the lens of a group of mountain regimes, Dongbuhanhu in particular, this 
chapter has examined how the locals of northwest Sichuan understood the mountain 
society and its relationship with the Chinese dynasty. In the early to mid-15th century 
when Ming China’s infiltration was still limited, the mountain society was largely on 
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its own, and it had peculiar social organization modes, secular and religious 
hierarchies, and norms and principles for inter-community interactions. When 
interacting with Ming China, the mountain regimes spoke fluently in the language of 
the tributary system but acted primarily to their own benefit. 
    The mountainous geomorphology of northwest Sichuan considerably shaped the 
region’s geopolitical power dynamics: because of the ragged terrain, the indigenous 
regimes were limited in terms of growth and they frequently clashed with one 
another. Yet due to logistic, communications, and military difficulties and the ensuing 
high cost in managing a centralized regime, the mountain society demonstrated a 
rather scattered power pattern in which multiple regimes frequently clashed, yet were 
unable to fully annex each other, and therefore were forced to co-exist. Certain 
elements, such as religion, blood ties, or ambitious leadership might transcend the 
social and natural boundaries to foster cross-regional confederation, but such alliances 
were usually quite fragile and hence not perennial. 
    By analyzing the features of early to mid-15th century mountain society, I hope to 
further dialogue with the literature in two ways. First, my argument positions itself in 
relation to the so-called Zomia model. It is tricky to say whether northwest Sichuan 
belongs to what James Scott identifies as the Zomia region. After all, Scott only 
claims that “parts of Sichuan” fall into his Zomia category, but he does not specify 
which specific parts he is referring to.253 But even if northwest Sichuan is only the 
margin of Zomia, it still indicates certain elements that might revise Scott’s 
characterization of the Zomia world. First, while Scott claims that Zomia features 
anarchy, in northwest Sichuan we see a highly hierarchical society where rulership 
was legitimized in many ways. For both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu, the rulers managed 
 





intra- and inter-regime relationships with sophisticated techniques and proactively 
promoted such ruling norms to other mountain regimes. Secondly, while Scott 
highlights the agency of highland inhabitants as they proactively escaped from 
lowland states, in northwest Sichuan the mountain regimes were not escaping at all. 
Quite the opposite, they approached the lowland Ming China for various reasons, and 
Dongbuhanhu even wished to invade and occupy lowland territory. Such a highland-
lowland relationship as that we see between Ming China and the mountain society 
might expand Scott’s Zomia model to some degree. 
    The frequent interaction between the mountain world and Chinese dynasties 
points to the second intervention of this chapter: the studies on the tributary system. 
Historiographically speaking, scholarly focus on Ming China’s tributary interaction 
has been quite unbalanced. Most previous research centered on foreign polities but 
seldom paid attention to the Ming’s frontier regimes. Such a vacuum in the literature 
disguises important historical facts such as the local ramifications of the tributary 
system and how exactly frontier regimes perceived and made use of it. This chapter 
has addressed these issues from two vantage points. The first one is material culture. 
Above I have highlighted how different material goods, whether they were called 
tributary gifts or not, carried different cultural connotations as they flowed within the 
transregional network. Therefore, misunderstandings likely occurred, and those so-
called tributary items functioned differently in different scenarios. Such minor yet 
nuanced details have been largely omitted in the previous macro-historical narrative 
about the tributary system. Secondly, I have pointed out how the supposedly Ming-
centered tributary system could backfire on the Ming when participants in the system 
made use of it in ways that beyond the court’s expectations. In the Ming’s eyes, the 





frontier; but from the perspective of the mountain regimes, the system was a supply 
line through which they could acquire political capital and material resources for their 
own benefit. Wealth and power provided by the Ming not only caused competition 
between various mountain regimes, but also nursed the ambition of highland rulers 





Chapter 4: Monks 
 
    Tibetan Buddhism, in late imperial Chinese and Inner Asian history, was a 
religious belief, an identity marker, an administrative device, and a source of 
legitimacy for rulership. The spread of Tibetan Buddhism was initiated in many ways, 
and various individuals and communities patronized the religion for different 
political, ideological, and economic reasons. This chapter investigates the activities of 
Tibetan Buddhist monks in the highland and their perceptions of the region from the 
1430s to the late 15th century. It examines how Tibetan Buddhism spread and 
gradually gained power in the early 15th century, experienced rapid development in  
highland society under the patronage of the Ming court in the mid-15th century, and 
continued to prosper in the late 15th century, even when Ming support was substituted 
by strict regulation. In this regard, this chapter takes a local history perspective to 
examine Tibetan Buddhism’s development in the highland. Instead of understanding 
it as an instrument of the imperial center for the control of the frontier region, this 
chapter considers Tibetan Buddhism as a significant social mechanism that provided 
the driving force that changed the course of the highland’s historical development. 
    Some clarifications about terms and concepts must first be made. This chapter 
includes extensive discussion of religious and ethnic terms, many of which have 
similar English translations. Two Chinese characters, 漢 and 番, frequently appear in 
in this chapter’s primary sources. But in Chinese texts, they can refer to either ethnic 
or religious concepts depending on the context. Hence in this chapter, when indicating 





Han and Fan, to refer to the ethnic groups of Han people (漢人) and Fan people 
(番人). But when used as religious concepts to refer to 漢傳佛教 and 藏傳佛教 (or 
番教 Fanjiao in Ming documents), the concepts will be translated as Chinese 
Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism. In this regard, phrases such as “Tibetan Buddhist” 
would merely point to one’s religious identity. If the Tibetan Buddhist’s ethnic 
background needs to be emphasized, I will use “ethnic-Han Tibetan Buddhist” or 
“ethnic-Fan Tibetan Buddhist” to specify the difference. 
Domino Effect in the Eurasian World 
    Sitting at the easternmost fringes of the Tibetan plateau, the highland region has 
long been the periphery in the Tibetan world. Throughout history, it intermittently 
received cultural and political influence from central Tibet, but was mostly a world of 
its own. However, the geopolitical role of the highland was redefined by one marked 
break: Islam’s eastward expansion. 
    From the 13th century on, a macro-scale geopolitical reshuffling in eastern Eurasia 
triggered by the development of Islam considerably affected Tibet’s outreach 
interactions. To Tibet’s north, the spread of Islam had reached the eastern Chagatai 
Khanate by the early 14th century, competed with Buddhist communities, and 
converted a considerable portion of the local population by the end of the 14th 
century.254 As Buddhism to a great extent bridged Tibet with its northern neighbor, 
such interaction soon became marginal when Buddhists were expelled from the 
region. Similar changes took place in regions south and west of Tibet. With the mid-
14th century rise of Tamerlane, who established Islam as the ideological pillar of his 
reign and extended his military forces south to northwest India,255 Tibet’s western gate 
 
254 Dai Matsui, “A Mongolian Decree from the Chaghataid Khanate Discovered at Dunhuang,” 159-178. 





was closed, and its spiritual influence could reach as far west as Ladakh but never 
beyond the Hindu Kush.256 In the south, ever since the Delhi Sultanate took over north 
India and destroyed the Buddhist bases there, Tibet was treated no differently than a 
land of infidels in the eyes of the Islamized Indians.257 It is only natural to assume that 
the trade volume between Tibet and India diminished at the same time as their 
tenuous religious contacts.  
    Facing the Islamized and thus estranged regions to its north, west, and south, Tibet 
gradually turned its outreach efforts to the east. This does not mean Tibet’s interaction 
with the east only started at that time. But still, the geopolitical reconfiguration 
undoubtedly intensified such communications. When more and more Tibetans began 
to migrate to the east and thus intensified trans-regional interactions, the demographic 
pattern of the Tibetan world changed as a result. As Elliot Sperling describes, “the 
once marginalized region was integrated with the Tibetan core.”258 The growth of new 
market towns in eastern Tibet, most famously Dartsedo, was just one phenomena that 
emerged out of these geopolitical changes. What followed this growing contact 
between eastern and central Tibet was a changing of geographical perception within 
the Tibetan world. Historical materials indicate that by the early 14th century, the two 
sub-divisions of eastern Tibet—Mdo-smad (later widely referred as Amdo) and Mdo-
khams (Dokham, also known as Kham)—had officially taken shape, which marked 
the ultimate formation of the so-called three Tibetan regions.259 
    As the contact between central and eastern Tibet strengthened in the mid-14th 
century, a growing religious population also began to move eastward. Because of the 
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religious domination of the Sakya school in central Tibet, many other sects chose to 
open new religious realms in the east. For example, Rangjung Dorje, the religious 
leader of the Kagyu School traveled to places as far as Mt. Kawagerbo and Mt. Konka 
in the Chinese-Tibetan borderland. In these far-east Tibetan regions, Rangjung Dorje 
not only actively participated in monastic construction and organized religious 
gatherings, but also mediated conflicts among local figureheads.260 These contacts 
exposed many eastern Tibet inhabitants to Tibetan Buddhism. 
It is noteworthy that the eastward movement of many Tibetan Buddhist communities 
did not necessarily lead to its religious booming in the highland region. Tibetan 
Buddhism’s impending popularity in the area was not spontaneous or unconditioned. 
Instead, it was the product of a series of negotiations, competitions and even 
coincidences. This chapter argues that Ming China’s frontier policies pertaining to 
Tibetan Buddhism played a significant role in facilitating the religion’s dissemination 
and penetration in the highland. These Ming policies’ unexpected ramifications on the 
ground eventually changed the highland society’s religious landscape.  
A Humble Start for Tibetan Buddhism: The Case of Songpan 
    As a proclaimed Han-Chinese empire, Ming China has long been perceived as 
unable to wield Tibetan Buddhism as an instrument to rule the empire’s margin, 
especially in comparison to its predecessor, the Mongol Yuan empire, and its 
successor, the Manchu Qing empire.261 But some recent scholarship has begun to 
challenge this cliché. Some scholars point out that the early Ming court was in fact 
quite active in patronizing Tibetan Buddhist monasteries along its Tibetan frontier as 
one form of pacification.262 Others claim that Tibetan Buddhism was also a significant 
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diplomatic tool that Ming China employed to interact with the East and Inner Asian 
polities that were immersed in a transregional network of monastic Buddhism.263 Yet 
all this scholarship mainly takes the top-down perspective of the court and seldom 
sheds light on what exactly happened on the ground in the highland. In other words, 
we know little about how and why Tibetan Buddhism was employed as part of the 
Ming’s pacifying-frontier agenda and what ramifications such religious policies had 
in the local society. This section uses the establishment of religious offices in 
Songpan as a case study to illustrate how Tibetan Buddhism was incorporated in the 
Ming’s frontier policy as a pragmatic administrative tool. 
    Songpan (松潘), also known as Zungchu-kha or Sharkhog in Tibetan, is located in 
modern-day northwest Sichuan. In the Ming dynasty, it was one of the most important 
strategic strongholds in the Chinese-Tibetan borderlands. But even if Songpan was 
where the Ming held the heaviest army in northwest Sichuan, the military there, as 
Elliot Sperling astutely argues, was incompetent in governing the region.264 In fact, 
they often made things worse. In 1427, the local Ming army intentionally provoked a 
rebellion that consisted of more than ten thousand indigenes just because the military 
needed to find an excuse to keep them from redeployment.265 In 1430, a military 
officer who was praised as a hero for suppressing the 1427 rebellion was exposed for 
severe military abuse, lynching, and conducting unremitting violence against the non-
Han inhabitants. He was eventually executed.266 Moreover, the Songpan military 
frequently meddled in local conflicts, played various communities against each other, 
and pillaged the locals’ property. Simply put, the malfeasance and low efficiency of 
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the Ming’s military at Songpan prevented them from implementing effective control 
in the region.  
    Since the military was unable to keep the peace in Songpan, the Ming began to 
assign religious officials as supplementary authorities to maintain social order. 
Appointing religious officials was a policy widely applied in many regions of the 
highland. In some places, such as Hezhou and Xining, religious officials were 
dispatched as early as 1389,267 and most of the dispatched religious officials were 
Tibetan Buddhist monks. These Buddhists were deemed Buddhist clergy (僧官) in the 
Ming’s bureaucratic system. Buddhist clergy at the prefectural level were registered 
in the Prefectural Buddhist Registry (僧綱司) as Prefectural Buddhist (Vice) Superior 
(都綱/副都綱), and those at subperceptual and county level were designated as 
Subprefectural Buddhist Chief (僧正) and District Buddhist Superior (僧會). 
Technically, the major duty for Buddhist clergy was to govern and administrate local 
Buddhist communities and educate non-Han highland inhabitants with Dharma 
doctrines. 
    The first Prefectural Buddhist Registry in Songpan, the Prefectural Buddhist 
Registry of Civilian & Military Guard Commands of Songpan and its Vicinity 
(松潘等處軍民指揮使司僧綱司), was established in 1431.268 The fact that this office 
was set up less than one year after the corrupted military officer’s beheading is most 
likely a reflection of the Ming court’s disappointment with the Songpan military and 
also its high expectations for religious officials to pacify the region. The Songpan 
Buddhist Registry was instituted at Dabei Monastery (大悲寺), right outside the walls 
 
267 Ge, Jinling Fancha Zhi, 58-59. 





of Songpan city.269 At first, the monastery abbot, as well as the Buddhist clergyman, 
was a certain Buddhist Master called Yueguang (月光). Later, the Dharma throne and 
official seal were passed to Master Zhizhong (智中).270   
  The religious training and professional experience of both Yueguang and Zhizhong 
speak to certain peculiar features of this institution. Yueguang’s personal background 
is not specified in historical materials. But he was not a Songpan native and was 
transferred to the region and appointed the Songpan Prefectural Buddhist Superior.271 
Yet as a total outsider, an ethnic Han monk who practiced Chinese Buddhism, 
Yueguang was said to be able to pacify the region and guide the local non-Han 
inhabitants toward good.272 This might not be an exaggeration in Chinese sources 
because even a local ethnic Fan chose to take him as Dharma instructor. Ming texts 
record this Fan person as Yuandan Zangbu (Yonten Zangpo遠丹藏卜). But the first 
two characters of his name are the Chinese transliteration of the Tibetan word Yon-
tan (ཡོན་ཏན), which literarily means wisdom, or zhi in Chinese (智). This attests 
precisely to the fact that he was a disciple of Yueguang because he shared the same 
generational designation of Zhi with Zhizhong, another disciple of Yueguang. In fact, 
some Chinese texts just refer to this Tibetan as Zhi-Yonten Zangpo (智遠丹藏卜),273 
which is redundant from a semantic perspective but solid evidence to prove his 
relationship with Master Yueguang and Zhizhong. 
    Compared with Yueguang or Yonten Zangpo, Zhizhong left more of an impression 
in historical documents. As an ethnic Han born in Zhejiang surnamed Jiang (姜),274 
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Zhizhong became Yueguang’s disciple at the age of twelve and later followed his 
mentor to Songpan.275 Probably because of his young age, Zhizhong was capable of 
speaking Tibetan as he was described as having mastered “bird language,” a 
convention in Chinese historiography to refer to non-Han languages. 276 When 
Yueguang retired, Zhizhong filled his position and did quite well.277 He boosted the 
influence of the Dabei Monastery and incorporated other regional temples as Dabei 
Monastery’s sub-monasteries.278 Later, Zhizhong himself turned to Master Chushan 
Shaoqi (楚山紹琦) for Dharma instruction and thus was recognized as one of the 
carriers in the 28th generation of the Linji Chan lineage.279 
    In addition to the religious aspect, Zhizhong is praised in Buddhist texts for 
pacifying the rebellious non-Han locals.280 As one Ming scholar observed: “The Fan 
people rebelled and fought with each other all the time. But once the Buddhists 
approached them, the Fan people would immediately prostrated themselves, swore an 
oath, and dispersed.”281 However, in comparison with this description of the 
Buddhists’ mild actions, another primary source indicates that Zhizhong was once 
dispatched to devise a night strike on a community the Ming military considered a 
threat. Zhizhong was described as gallant and swift in the military action, and he 
personally led the troops to eliminate the entire community.282 In this regard, the 
Buddhist clerics were indeed taking over the Ming military’s job. Although such 
actions obviously violated Buddhist officials’ commitments to abstaining from 
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killing, to the Ming, the value of these clergy lay precisely in their capacity to keep 
the frontier safe, rather than their religious achievement. After years of service in 
Songpan, Zhizhong retired and moved to one Fazang Monastery near Chengdu, just 
as Yueguang did,283 and the position of registry superior was filled by Yonten Zangpo 
and then a certain Master Zichang.284 
    Many aspects concerning this Buddhist Registry remain unclear to scholars today. 
For example, although both ethnic Han and ethnic Fan monks lived in the monastery, 
did they practice Chinese Buddhism or Tibetan Buddhism? In Contesting the Yellow 
Dragon, Xiaofei Kang and Donald Sutton claim that the religious background of both 
Master Zhizhong and the Dabei Monastery was somewhat hybrid with Tibetan 
Buddhist features that indicate “Ming tolerance of Tibetan religion.”285 This 
observation, I argue, derives from their misreading of the materials. So far, no 
material could attest to the Tibetan Buddhist characters of either Zhizhong or the 
Dabei Monastery. When Master Zhizhong received a Zangjing (藏經), Kang and 
Sutton translate it as Tibetan scriptures, but in fact Zangjing refers to Tipitaka and 
thus has nothing to do with Tibetan scriptures. For the alleged Tibetan theme of the 
Dabei Monastery, the evidence the two authors give is the scripture-turning pavilion 
(轉經樓) in the monastery where a revolving sutra bookcase was installed. But this 
was not a distinctly Tibetan Buddhist feature and was widely used in Chinese 
Buddhism as well.286 In contrast to these scholars’ opinions and judging from the 
existing materials as well as Yueguang and Zhizhong’s training, I argue it is almost 
certain that the Dabei Monastery was a Chinese Buddhist monastery (漢傳佛寺). But 
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still, this does not rule out the possibility that many Dabei Monastery monks had 
developed a certain level of knowledge about esoteric Buddhism, and many of them 
were bilingual.  
    Setting up shortly after the Ming military in Songpan was proven incompetent, the 
first Songpan Buddhist Registry and its clergy maintained social order in the region to 
a certain degree. But as the previous chapter points out, there were also other two 
religions prevailed in the 1440s northwest Sichuan: Bön and Tibetan Buddhism, and 
their followers were in constant and intense competition. Facing such a situation, the 
Ming, granted more support to the Tibetan Buddhist monks with the purpose of 
checking Dongbuhanhu clique. 
    In 1440, the Ming dispatched a translator to Songpan to investigate the charged 
situation on the ground between Bön and Tibetan Buddhist communities. When he 
returned, he filed a report with the court. In the report he pointed out that the Bön 
followers led by State Preceptor (國師) Zhangpa Lodrö Gyaltsen  and the Tibetan 
Buddhists led by meditation Master (禪師) Chörin had been engaged in fierce 
conflicts for a long time. Hence, the Ming should take action to ease the tension.287  
Only two weeks after receiving the report, the Ming court made a swift decision to 
upgrade Chörin, the Tibetan Buddhist leader, from Buddhist master to State 
Preceptor.288 By doing this while the Bön master was happened to be at the Ming 
court, the Ming conveyed a clear signal: the empire now recognized Tibetan 
Buddhism in northwest Sichuan as high as Bön in terms of religious status and 
importance. 
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    It is in this context that the Ming set up the second Buddhist Registry in Songpan. 
In 1441, roughly around the same time when Chörin was promoted to state preceptor, 
the Ming announced the establishment of the second Prefectural Buddhist Registry in 
Songpan, the Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Songpan Guard (松潘衛僧綱司).289  
But unlike the one in Dabei Monastery where Chinese Buddhists without local roots 
took charge, the new office was established for an indigenous religious leader, 
Sangerzhe Xianjie (桑兒者先結), who had provided military information and local 
guidance to the Ming troops.290 Unlike Yueguang and Zhizhong, Sangerzhe Xianjie 
was a practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism. But similar to the relationship of Yueguang 
and Yonten Zangpo, he had one disciple named Zhang Heshang (長和尚), who was 
very possibly an ethnic-Han judging from his name. One could even speculate that 
this Zhang Heshang was the translator for Sangerzhe Xianjie’s interaction with the 
Ming military. As the Ming granted seals and imperial edicts that legitimized 
Sangerzhe Xianjie’s clerical position, the indigenous leader was also permitted to 
build a monastery and govern fellow Buddhists on his own.291  
    Tibetan Buddhism in Songpan, as this section has demonstrated, was not always 
popular and powerful in the highland region. It is only around the 1440s that Tibetan 
Buddhist groups in the region began to gain more support from Ming China as higher 
ranks of titles were granted and new institutions created. The purpose of these actions 
was to uplift Tibetan Buddhism to check the powerful Bön communities. Tibetan 
Buddhism’s further development in the region, as the next sections will show, only 
came later with the Ming court’s support as the major incentive. 
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The Ethnic Features and Institutional Affiliations of Tibetan Buddhist 
Communities in the Highland  
    Within ten years, the Ming had set up two Prefectural Buddhist Registries in 
Songpan, indicating the empire’s intention to wield religion to govern its frontier. The 
reasons for establishing the two institutions were unquestionably different. But do 
they have other differences and similarities? And more importantly, what can they tell 
us about the religious landscape of the highland as a whole?  
    In terms of similarities, the ethnic hybridity of both Songpan Buddhist Registries 
allows for an investigation of how the correlation between religion and ethnicity was 
perceived in the early 15th century highland. Some people would probably feel 
confused when they learn that the non-Han highland local Yonten Zangpo would take 
an ethnic-Han Buddhist monk such as Yueguang as master to learn Chinese 
Buddhism. From a modern-day perspective, this might seem quite strange as many 
people tend to presume that Tibetan Buddhism was intrinsic to the ethnic Tibetans.292 
But in the early 15th century, religion transcended both ethnic and linguistic 
boundaries. As Hoong Teik Toh reminds us, “a ‘Tibetan monk’ or a lama in the Ming 
period could refer to any Buddhist monk who practiced Tibetan Buddhism regardless 
of his actual ethnicity.”293 One’s Buddhist training did not have correlate with his 
ethnicity. Buddhist officials’ appointments followed a similar logic. In the ethnic 
regard, at Songpan we have cases that Han Buddhist monks from Zhejiang, Ming 
China’s coastal area, were appointed to a position in the empire’s outmost west region 
where the ethnic Fan were the majority. In the religious regard, elsewhere we also 
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have examples that a northwest native Tibetan Buddhist monk was named the 
Prefectural Buddhist Superior of Suzhou (蘇州),294 a place that has always been, to 
my knowledge, a stronghold of Chinese Buddhism. What these seemingly strange 
imperial orders precisely point out is that the early 15th century Ming court did not 
necessarily assume a correspondence between religion and ethnicity. It is highly 
possible that for Ming emperors at the time, the two religions were after all both 
Buddhist branches, and thus there was no need to take their distinctions too seriously. 
From the Ming court’s viewpoint, as long as the religious official was competent, his 
ethnicity or religious denomination would not pose any obstacle. Projecting modern-
day views into pre-modern scenarios is ahistorical. 
    In contrast, what really differentiates the two Songpan Buddhist Registries were 
their different positions in the Ming bureaucratic system: they corresponded to two 
types of officials that the Ming usually set up in frontier regions. Those who were 
transferred to a highland office from the Chinese heartland should be understood as 
Ming China’s liuguan (rotating officialdom 流官), while those indigenous religious 
leaders fall into the category of tuguan (native officialdom 土官). Compared with 
tuguan, liuguan was a relatively common title by the Ming’s standard. They were the 
empire’s regular bureaucrats who usually received systematic training before being 
assigned to specific institutional positions. A civil official in this meritocracy, for 
example, required years of learning Confucian classics and success in the laborious 
civil examination system. A military or religious official was expected to meet certain 
criteria and pass evaluations as well. In a certain sense, liuguan were institutionally 
closer to the Ming’s imperial apparatus. Judging from Yueguang and Zhizhong’s 
 





professional traits, they were definitely liuguan at Songpan, and this is precisely why 
the contemporaries designated their institution at Dabei Monastery as the “inner 
Buddhist Registry” (內僧司), which conveys a sense of belonging and direct 
governance under the Ming.295  
    As the designation of “inner Buddhist Registry” implies otherwise, the second 
Buddhist Registry was relatively distant from the Ming’s imperial apparatus: it falls 
into the tuguan category. Tuguan, or native officialdom, was a Ming bureaucratic title 
passed down from the Yuan dynasty. But unlike the Yuan dynasty during which such 
offices were considered as part of the standard bureaucracy, the Ming separated the 
category from the regularly appointed officials,296 and only set up tuguan positions in 
non-Han areas along the empire’s frontiers or certain inland mountainous regions 
occupied by non-Han groups. Therefore, tuguan were not required to go through the 
Ming’s meritocratic examinations, and their position and power were mainly 
hereditary. Because of its somewhat autonomous nature, tuguan were usually granted 
power to preside over their own subjects, constituting what John Herman called “dual 
sovereignty in the internal frontier.”297 The indigenous religious leaders in Songpan 
met precisely these criteria. Ming texts dedicate less than 100 characters to Sangerzhe 
Xianjie and the second Songpan Buddhist registry, pointing to a tenuous relationship 
between this religious institution and the Ming’s normal bureaucratic structure. In 
addition, the fact that Ming records never specify this office’s location speaks exactly 
to its nature as an institute quite beyond the Ming’s direct reach.  
    Coexisting as parallel offices, the two Songpan Buddhist Registries served the 
Ming’s frontier policies well in their initial implementations. This situation was not 
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unique in Songpan. From the late 14th to the mid-15th century, such juxtapositions 
prevailed in many places in the highland region (Table 4.1-4.4). But the relationship 
between the two offices varied in different places. In Songpan for example, the 
function of the two Buddhist Registries was differentiated along a jurisdictional line. 
While the first office, Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Civilian & Military Guard 
Commands of Songpan and its Vicinity (松潘等處軍民指揮使司僧綱司) would be 
partially affiliated with the region’s civil affair system, the second office, Prefectural 
Buddhist Registry of Songpan Guard, was under the military’s direct administration. 
Such a division also existed in Taozhou. In other places like Hezhou and Minzhou, 
the two offices were divided by religious denomination and designated as Prefectural 
Buddhist Registry of Chinese Monks (漢僧僧綱司) and Prefectural Buddhist Registry 
of Tibetan Monks (番僧僧綱司). Similar divisions existed in Ningxia and Turpan as 
well.298 By 1440, the dual-track Buddhist Registries were set up in Hezhou, Minzhou, 
Taozhou and Songpan parts of the highland, as is shown in Table. 4.1 to 4.4:   
 
 Prefectural Buddhist Registry 
of Hezhou 
Hanseng河州漢僧綱司 (1393) 
Prefectural Buddhist Registry 




Han Buddhism Tibetan Buddhism 
Institutional Feature Rotating Officialdom Native Officialdom 
Table. 4.1: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Hezhou (河州) 299 
 
 Prefectural Buddhist Registry 
of Minzhou 
Hanseng岷州漢僧綱司(1428) 
Prefectural Buddhist Registry 




Han Buddhism  Tibetan Buddhism 
Institutional Feature Rotating Officialdom Native Officialdom 
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Table. 4.2: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Minzhou (岷州) 300 
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Han Buddhism Tibetan Buddhism 
Institutional Feature Rotating Officialdom Native Officialdom 
Table. 4.3: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Songpan (松潘) 
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Tibetan Buddhism Tibetan Buddhism 
Institutional Feature Native Officialdom Native Officialdom 
Table. 4.4: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Taozhou (洮州)301   
 
    One can see from these religious offices that although Tibetan Buddhism tended to 
be more well-received in certain regions, in general there were no overly unbalanced 
power dynamics between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism by the 1440s. 
Yet things started to change from then on, especially with the intervention of the 
Ming court. While the development of Tibetan Buddhism in mid-15th century 
northwest Sichuan was devised specifically for the purpose of checking the Bön 
forces, Bön did not prevail in the entire highland. In most parts of the region, the 
 
300 The Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Minzhou Hanseng was established in Guangfu Monastery (Vast Blessing 
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spread of Tibetan Buddhism was facilitated by a series of privileges granted by 
several mid-15th century Ming emperors out of personal interest in the religion.  
Religion and Lineage: The Case of Minzhou 
    One question left unanswered from the Songpan case is which of the two offices 
was more well-received on the ground. In hindsight, it was the native officialdom. 
Although after Zhizhong’s retirement, his two successors, Yonten Zangpo and 
Zichang, were also credited for being recognized as competent clergy by the 
indigenes and capable frontier officials by the Ming,302 their contemporaries did not 
remember further Songpan court clergy after 1470s. However, one should not quickly 
reduce such a diminished influence to an ethnocultural-essentialist explanation. It 
could be ahistorical to assume that mid-Ming ethnic Tibetans would naturally choose 
Tibetan Buddhism over Chinese Buddhism simply because they were Tibetan. The 
following two sections argue that a series of Ming policies in the mid-15th century 
extensively contributed to the development and flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism in 
the highland. Through two more case studies, the following sections historicize a 
process in which Tibetan Buddhism outweighed Han Buddhism because of specific 
institutional causes. In this regard, it was the Ming itself that made the liuguan’s work 
harder and harder, but not an inherent ethnoreligious Tibetan force built in the 
highland.  
    The Ming court’s patronage of Tibetan Buddhism has received considerable 
scholarly attention in recent years. Reexamining conventional narratives about the 
Ming court’s lack of religious engagement, scholars argue that Tibetan Buddhism 
retained its privilege after the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition and was of particular 
 





importance during the Ming at least before the 16th century.303 But in these revisionist 
works, most attention has been given to the reigns of Emperor Hongwu and Yongle, 
leaving the court’s engagement of Tibetan Buddhism in the mid- to late 15th century 
largely untouched.304 In fact, Ming emperors in this period, including Emperor 
Xuande, Zhengtong, Jingtai, and Chenghua, all devoted tremendous passion to 
Tibetan Buddhism, if not as fully-fledged practitioners.305 They frequently invited 
Tibetan Buddhists to court for religious affairs, and many of these Tibetan Buddhist 
hierarchs in fact came from the highland region. 
    Tibetan Buddhism was present in the Ming capital from the dynasty’s beginnings, 
yet its prosperity began in the early 15th century. During the 1430s, three strongholds 
of Tibetan Buddhism gradually took shape in Beijing, and they each were favored by 
a specific Tibetan Buddhist sect: Geluk sect monks tended to station at Daci’en 
Monastery (大慈恩寺); Kagyu sect monks usually stayed at Dalongshan Monastery 
(大隆善寺); and Da’nengren Monastery (大能仁寺) was always preferred by Sakya 
sect monks.306 What is worth particular attention here is that all three monasteries had 
strong connections with Tibetan Buddhists from the highland region. The leader of 
Daci’en Monastery, Daci Fawang Shakya Yeshe (大慈法王釋迦也失), was buried in 
Hezhou, and thereafter many Geluk monks from the highland began to travel to the 
Ming court frequently.307 Dalongshan Monastery was where Dazhi Fawang Penden 
Trashi (大智法王班丹扎釋) and his disciples stationed, and Penden Trashi himself 
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was a Minzhou native. Da’nengren Monastery, similarly, was controlled by 
indigenous clergy from the highland, specifically from Baota Monastery (寶塔寺) of 
Lintao (臨洮), where a native monk Dondrup Rinchen was the first to establish 
authority at the Da’nengren Monastery and acquire the title of Damin fawang 
(大敏法王).308 In this vein, one can even say that the three monasteries had become 
the religious outposts of the highland Buddhist communities in Beijing.   
    Having established religious bases in the Ming capital, Tibetan Buddhists from the 
highland had the chance to build networks at court and even developed direct contact 
with the Ming throne. Some of them frequently hosted religious ceremonies and gave 
Dharma teachings for the Ming elites, and many others were hired to translate 
Buddhist cannons specifically for court use.309 Meanwhile, from the 1430s, the 
Tibetan Buddhists were allowed to stay in Beijing for quite a long time without any 
limit on their stay.310 As a result, many of these special treatments from the Ming 
court were subsequently used by the highland Tibetan Buddhist monks to accumulate 
political capital and gain religious authority. 
    As more and more Tibetan Buddhist monks enjoyed privileges at the Ming court, 
they began to project this power back to the highland society. In this process, the 
monks’ personal connections in local society, especially blood ties, often played an 
important role. One can even say that these Tibetan Buddhists’ local networks 
functioned as irrigation canals that transported nutriments for the development of 
Tibetan Buddhism on the ground. 
    The case of Dazhi Fawang Penden Trashi and the spread of Tibetan Buddhism in 
Minzhou effectively illustrates how the religion took root in the highland society 
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through genealogical connections. Born in rural Minzhou (岷州 modern-day 岷縣) in 
1377 from the Hou (后) Lineage and ordained a monk at the age of 13, Penden 
Trashi’s life changed for good when he was invited to the Ming court in 1405 to 
prepare for the reception of Dezhin Shekpa, the fifth Karmapa of Kagyu school of 
Tibetan Buddhism.311 In 1406, Penden Trashi was dispatched to Tibet to greet Dezhin 
Shekpa and accompanied him all the way back to the Ming capital.312 From then on, 
Penden Trashi played an active role in the religious diplomacy between Ming and 
Tibet. He served as a middleman who brought numerous Buddhist statues and 
scriptures to Tibetan hierarchs and delivered their requests and concerns back to the 
Ming court. In 1423, Penden Trashi was dispatched to Tibet to inspect the authenticity 
of the reincarnation of Dezhin Shekpa.313 Because of this successful mission, he was 
promoted to Grand State Preceptor (大国师) and relocated to Dalongshan Monastery, 
which later became the central base for Minzhou Tibetan Buddhists in Beijing. 314 
    After the trip to Tibet in 1423, Panden Trashi spent most of his time in Dalongshan 
Monastery in Beijing. It was also during this period that he fostered an intimate 
relationship with Emperor Xuande. Emperor Xuande’s interest in Tibetan Buddhism 
has never been systematically examined in the scholarship of any language, but he 
was most likely a devoted Tibetan Buddhist practitioner. He frequently attended 
Penden Traishi’s Dharma instructions and ritual ceremonies, and he asked Penden 
Trashi to translate Buddhist sutras solely for his private use.315 In 1428, Penden Trashi 
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conducted a grand-wheel empowerment and an Amitāyus empowerment for Emperor 
Xuande.316 From a religious perspective, this means that the emperor had officially 
acknowledged Penden Trashi’s mentorship and was willing to follow his Dharma 
instructions. In 1435, Penden Trashi’s disciples in Beijing made him a statue. In the 
stele inscription of the statue, he was juxtaposed with Po-Śrīmitra, Vajrabodhi and 
Amoghavajra, all eminent Indian monks who had brought Buddhist knowledge to 
China.317 It is clear that in the 1430s, Penden Trashi already held extensive influence 
at the Ming court. 
    Upon securing his position in the Ming capital, Penden Trashi began to extend his 
religious authority and political power back into the highland society. In 1431, he sent 
a Dharma edict (法旨) to his disciples at Dachongjiao Monastery (大崇教寺) in 
Minzhou. Only recently discovered in rural Gansu, the Dharma edict was issued by 
Penden Trashi as instructions for abbotship succession in Dachongjiao Monastery. 
Built in 1417 under Penden Trashi’s order,318 Dachongjiao Monastery was expanded 
in 1427 with the Ming court’s financial and labor support.319 But when Penden Trashi 
found out he was too busy for the daily management of the monastery, he issued the 
Dharma edict in 1431 and passed the abbotship to his disciple, Śākya Śrī Palzangpo. 
However, in the same Dharma edict, Penden Trashi also appointed his own nephew, 
Chödrup Zangpo, to be the next monastery abbot after Śākya Śrī Pel Zangpo. Such a 
way of appointing successors created friction between the two candidates. When the 
tension between the two successors was too intense to mediate, Penden Trashi issued 
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a second Dharma edict in 1449 and announced a verdict of property division between 
the two.320   
    One may think that Penden Trashi’s appointing two generations of successors at 
one time was not a smart move to maintain stability in Dachongjiao Monastery. But I 
argue this seemingly troublesome decision attests to Penden Trashi’s intention to keep 
the control of Dachongjiao Monastery in the hands of his own lineage members. In 
this vein, what the Dharma edicts indicate is a shifting pattern of abbotship 
transmission from master-disciple succession to blood succession, and in this specific 
case, between uncle and nephew. In a broader context, retaining secular and religious 
authorities within the lineage was a common strategy for powerful northwest non-Han 
households to build local influence, and it proved quite effective in areas with a large 
Tibetan Buddhist population.321 As one of Penden Trashi’s most important religious 
achievements in Minzhou, Dachongjiao Monastery was not something the monk was 
willing to give away to non-lineage members, even to his own disciple.  
    Chödrup Zangpo, Penden Trashi’s nephew, became the abbot of Dachongjiao 
Monastery in 1449. From then on, we see a gradual convergence between religious 
privilege and lineage authority in Minzhou. This trend drastically shaped the power 
structure of local society in which influential lineages became more and more visible 
in the religious arena. In my fieldwork in the region from 2017 to 2019, I found that 
16 monasteries I investigated were constructed during the Ming, and they all 
preserved either paper documents or historical memory of the lineage of the 
monastery abbot. The details are shown in Table. 4.5:  
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Hou 1417 Yongning 
Si 
Bao (包) Ming 
Hongjiao/D
azhan Si 
Hou Ming Sanzhu/Elu 
Si 
Bao Ming 
Yuanjue Si Hou Ming Guangde/Qi
jia Si 
Qi (祁) Ming 
(Hongwu) 
Cangjing Si Chang 
(常) 
 Hongfu Si Qi (漆) Ming 
Gongbu Si Chang  Shiya Si Jin (⾦) Ming 
Chaoding Si Chang  Fazang Si Ding 
(丁) 
 
Table. 4.5: Minzhou Tributary Monasteries and Family Background of Abbots 
    As the table indicates, five out of the sixteen monasteries belonged to the Hou 
lineage. That is not surprising considering the fact that the Hou lineage was the family 
from which Penden Trashi came. In fact, the Hou lineage should have controlled more 
monasteries in the Ming because many monasteries originally owned by them were 
sold to or taken by other lineages later. For example, Gongbu Monastery, whose 
abbot bore the surname of Chang according to survey results, only began to associate 
with the Chang lineage from the early Qing dynasty. According to a Qing dynasty 
contract, it was originally a Hou lineage property built on a piece of land that Penden 
Trashi purchased.322 Other monasteries, such as Fazang Monastery, should also have 
belonged to the Hou lineage as it was only given to Śākya Śrī Palzangpo in 1449.323 
Since many Tibetan Buddhist monasteries simultaneously functioned as political 
arbitrators, religious mentors, estate managers, taxation collectors, and corvée 
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enforcements, it is quite reasonable to speculate that the Hou lineage was the biggest 
landlord in Ming dynasty Minzhou.324  
    The mutual reinforcement of religious and lineage organizations was quite common 
in the highland society. It was also the case in Taozhou, as all five Taozhou 
indigenous cleric offices were associated with and hereditary within privileged 
lineages.325 This poses an interesting contrast with what was concurrently happening 
in Central Tibet. As Peter Schweiger suggests, in 15th-century central Tibet, “the 
degree to which individual aristocratic families were able to influence monastic 
affairs was weakened, as was the dependence on the political and economic fate of a 
single family.”326 But in the highland region, monastery-based networks overlapped 
with the lineage-based social web. This convergence exemplified a Tibetan-style 
rulership that featured the unity of religious and lay authority, rendering Minzhou a 
society heavily charged with religious domination.   
    As the religious-genealogical organization in Minzhou rose to power, its 
relationship with two other social groups in the local society, the Ming military and 
Chinese Buddhist communities, also changed. Chapter 1 has already indicated how 
the Ming military built many fortresses intentionally near Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries as a way to oversee non-Han dwellers and prevent possible rebellions. 
But the situation started to change as the Tibetan Buddhist communities grew 
stronger. As early as in 1429, one of the Hou lineage members was already using 
Penden Trashi’s rising status at court as support to reclaim land and estates in 
Minzhou that were taken away by the local Ming military earlier.327 The changing 
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power dynamic is most typically indicated through the location of newly constructed 
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Minzhou. Fig.4.1 indicates the spatial pattern of the 
military infrastructure in Minzhou. As is shown, the Minzhou guard itself sat on the 
intersection of the U-shape Min River and the Diezang River that runs southeast to 
northwest, while other fortresses were scattered upstream of the Min River and the 
Diezang River, indicating a strategic concern that protected Minzhou from possible 
attack from the west. But the distribution of Minzhou monasteries demonstrates a 
different pattern. From Fig. 4.2, it is clear that many monasteries were located 
downstream of the Min River. Considering that most of the military stations were 
constructed in the early Ming, prior to the religious sites, we may infer that the monks 
intentionally chose regions with weaker military presence for religious expansion in 
order to bypass the military’s surveillance. To keep their distance from the Chinese 
military forces, even far-off and underpopulated regions such as Lü jing (閭井), a 
steppe region with a relatively high altitude of 2600 meters highlighted in the Map, 







Fig. 4.1: Military Forts in Minzhou 
 
Fig. 4.2: Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries in Minzhou  
    Tibetan Buddhist communities’ relationship with the Chinese Buddhist groups also 
changed as the former grew stronger. In 1428 and 1429, two Prefectural Buddhist 
Registries of Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism were established in Minzhou. 
The registry for Chinese Buddhism was built and backed by the Ming prince of Han 
(韓王), meaning that the clerk and staff in the princely palace constituted a great 
proportion of the local Chinese Buddhist community. However, by at least 1441, the 
Minzhou Chinese Buddhist registry had already been recorded as a Tibetan Buddhist 
registry in Ming court documents with its Buddhist clergy showing up in Beijing as a 
tributary monk.328 And the next year, the position of Prefectural Buddhist Superior 
was given by a Chinese Buddhist to a Tibetan Buddhist monk.329  
    A similar situation in which Chinese Buddhists converted to Tibetan Buddhism is 
also typically indicated in the case of Chongfu Monastery (崇福寺). Located in 
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modern-day Dingxi (定西), a county not far from Minzhou, Chongfu Monastery was 
an ancient yet dilapidated Chinese Buddhist complex. During the Hongwu reign, a 
Chinese Buddhist named Liaorang (了让) started to rebuild the monastery. Later the 
job was passed down to Liaorang’s disciple, Wumao (悟瑁), an ethnic Han surnamed 
Kang.330 At first, Wumao relied on public donations to collect funding for monastery 
construction. But this proved to be a slow and inefficient fundraising channel. 
Therefore, Wumao began to make money by himself. Skilled at calligraphy, Wumao 
hired himself out to copy Buddhist sutras for others and gradually won renown for 
this work. From then on, not only social elites in the area, but also high-level patrons 
in Beijing and Nanjing started to invite Wumao to copy sutras for them. Devoting 
himself to his master’s unfinished work, Wumao kept pouring the remuneration he 
received from his hard labor into the welfare of the monastery. From 1432 to 1444, he 
gradually repaired old Buddhist halls or built new ones for the monastery, and such an 
effort was highly praised in the local society. Yet in 1447, in one of his memorials to 
the court, Wumao claimed Chongfu Monastery to be the sub-monastery of 
Dachongjiao Monastery, and he himself the disciple of Penden Trashi.331 Because of 
this new identity, the Ming court issued imperial edicts to the monastery and an ivory 
seal to Wumao.332 
    Some people might find it reasonable to call Wumao a traitor. After all, he deserted 
the Dharma lineage of his Chinese Buddhist master, re-submitted to a Tibetan 
Buddhist master, adopted a Tibetan name as Yeshe Dondrup, and even converted a 
Chinese Buddhist monastery into a Tibetan Buddhist one. But I argue that what 
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Wumao did, though controversial, was for the best of the monastery and its 
dependents. The time when Wumao subordinated himself and the monastery to 
Tibetan Buddhism was the time that Pendan Trashi and Dachongjiao Monastery were 
at their peak. The privileges and preferential policies, not to mention wealth they 
received from the Ming court, were enormous, and it is wise for Wumao, whose 
monastery was merely 100 miles away from Dachongjiao Monastery, to conform to 
the trend of the times by joining them and thus prospering together. 
    This section, through a case study of Minzhou, portrays how Tibetan Buddhism 
was able to penetrate deep into highland society via certain Tibetan Buddhist monks’ 
local connections. Chinese Buddhist monks, in contrast, did not enjoy such 
advantages, and many of them even converted to Tibetan Buddhism in pursuit of a 
better living. In this regard, I argue that the increasingly wide discrepancy between 
the two groups’ divergent paths derived from social factors, not ethnocultural causes. 
The next section, along a similar line, will illustrate how institutional factors such as 
legal privileges further contribute to the development of Tibetan Buddhism in the 
highland.  
Spreading the Dharma Seeds: The Case of Wondering Monks 
    Lineage networks were important vehicles for Tibetan Buddhism to spread in the 
highland. However, other privileges granted by the mid-15th century Ming court also 
enabled Tibetan Buddhism to gradually outgrow Chinese Buddhism. Unrestrained 
preaching activities, exemption from Ming law, and imperial protections over 
monastic property all extensively contributed to these changing power dynamics. 
Similar to the previous section, this section will also rely on local materials to 






    Compared to other special treatments at court, the permission of free travel for 
Tibetan Buddhists seems to be rather trivial. But in the mid-15th century, this was a 
privilege given exclusively to the Tibetan Buddhists. Free travel by Chinese 
Buddhists, in contrast, was severely restricted.333 Sanctioned by the Ming court as a 
privilege, Tibetan Buddhists from the highland could travel freely and stay in any 
monastery, be it Chinese Buddhist or Tibetan Buddhist, for Dharma practice. 
Numerous indigenous clergy brought such demands to the Ming court, and many 
were allowed to dwell in Chinese Buddhist monasteries in and near the highland,334 
resulting in the spread of Tibetan Buddhism over a wider geographical area.  
    While the primary sources do not offer enough detail for a full scan of how such 
“visiting monk” programs worked and what their religious lives were like in those 
stationing monasteries, it is certain that many Tibetan Buddhist monks were quite 
interested in monasteries with rich religious backgrounds which for some reason were 
damaged or long abandoned. For such monasteries, the wandering monk would just 
occupy the space, repair the buildings, and then claim to be the monastery’s new host. 
What they gained in return was enormous political and economic capital. By restoring 
the religious complex, the monk could acquire not only fame and followers, but also 
wealth, influence, and authority. 
    One example of Faquan Monastery (白銀法泉寺) in modern-day Baiying of Gansu 
indicates how such processes took place. As a famous religious complex dating back 
to the Song dynasty, Faquan Monastery was largely ruined during the turbulent Yuan-
Ming transition. In 1439, one Tibetan Buddhist monk named Shakya Penden 
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(桑迦班丹) came to the region and was immediately attracted by the place’s natural 
environment and rich religious culture. Therefore, he decided to settle down and 
reconstruct the devastated monasteries. As Shakya Penden’s renovation project 
kicked off, many ethnic Han officials and Buddhist practitioners contributed either 
financial or labor support, thus transforming the crumbling Faquan Monastery in a 
grandiose religious symbol of the region.335  By hosting the restoration of Faquan 
Monastery, Shakya Penden accumulated much repute and religious authority in the 
region, and his disciples thereafter held the abbotships of Faquan and other local 
monasteries for nearly one hundred years.336 
    Some other materials not only point to how free travel enabled certain monks to 
spread Tibetan Buddhism, but also indicate how such preaching tours were tacitly 
sanctioned by the emperor even if they violated imperial law. One stone tablet in 
Jianfu Monastery in Xi’an (西安薦福寺) offers an interesting example. Located in 
modern-day central Xi’an and attracting thousands of tourists with its worldwide-
famous Small Wild Goose Pagoda (小雁塔), Jianfu Monastery seems to have nothing 
to do with Tibetan Buddhism judging from the description in local gazetteers.337 But 
one stele erected in the monastery tells us differently. The inscription on the stele 
records a conversation between Emperor Zhengtong and an official from the Ming’s 
Ministry of Rites, and the dialog was centered around a Tibetan Buddhist’s violation 
of imperial rites. The protagonist of the story is a certain monk named Chökyi 
Gyaltsen (勺思吉監參) who claimed to be a Tibetan Buddhist monk from the 
Hongjue Monastery of Xining Guard in Shaanxi (陝西西寧衛弘觉寺). The monk 
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received his ordination certificate in 1426. But after that, instead of staying at 
Hongjue Monastery, he began to wander around the region, and eventually ended up 
at Jianfu Monastery, which was over 500 miles away from Xining. Being a time-
honored ancient monastery notwithstanding, Jianfu Monastery was in a shabby state 
in the early 15th century. Therefore, the monk started to donate his own savings and 
raise additional funds for the monastery’s reconstruction. It is unclear how long the 
repair work took, but in 1449 the monk sent a memorial to the Ming court to request a 
name for the monastery so that he could host Buddhist rituals appropriately. Along 
with the memorial, the monk also attached an architecture blueprint.338 
    Chökyi Gyaltsen must have never thought that the architecture blueprint he sent to 
the court could cause trouble. As soon as the emperor received the memorial, he 
found out from the monastic plan that the monk was using green-glazed tile 
(綠琉璃瓦) to decorate the Buddhist halls’ roof, and immediately urged the officials 
from the Ministry of Rites to investigate.339 This is mainly because of green-glazed-
tile roof’s symbolic meaning. It was a form of high-ranking architectural design used 
mainly for royal monuments, thus not something common people were allowed to use 
freely. Even within the Ming’s ruling house, green-glazed tile was somewhat 
privileged. In 1443, when a Ming prince wished the court workshop to make some 
green-glazed tiles for his deceased mother’s tomb, the emperor was unwilling to allow 
it and asked him to use black tiles instead.340 Therefore, violating this type of imperial 
rite could be construed as an act of defiance against the throne and would result in 
severe consequences.  
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    The official requested Chökyi Gyaltsen’s immediate response after receiving the 
imperial edict. And the monk soon sent one. But according to the monk’s defense, the 
green-glazed tiles were not something he personally chose. Jianfu Monastery was 
already a famous monastery in the Tang dynasty under the dynastic ruling house’s 
patronage. Therefore, the green-glazed tiles were all Tang dynasty decorations and 
were part of the roof since the 10th century. What the Tibetan monk did was simply 
restore them. Confronting the throne was not his plan at all, and such justifications 
seemed reasonable. But still, the official declared the monk guilty for overtly 
violating imperial rites and suggested a punishment in his ensuing memorial.341 Yet 
for the emperor, as soon as he realized that Chökyi Gyaltsen was not deliberately 
challenging his imperial authority, it became of less an issue. Therefore, he dropped 
the charge against the monk, officially recognized him as the abbot of the Jianfu 
Monastery, and granted him permission to host Buddhist rituals.342 Although the 
historical material does not specify, it is highly possible that the emperor did not even 
ask the monk to remove all the green-glazed tiles.  
    Apart from indicating the breadth of the wandering monks’ range of activity, the 
Jianfu Monastery case also demonstrates the degree to which Ming emperors were 
willing to indulge Tibetan Buddhists: even severe misdeeds that violated imperial 
rites could be pardoned, and whatever requests the misbehaving monk raised were all 
answered as if nothing happened. Another aspect that is worth particular analysis here 
is Chökyi Gyaltsen ’s request for a monastery name, which in other occasions was 
described as plaque- or title-requesting (乞额/乞名). It is important to note that 
neither Faquan Monastery nor Jianfu Monastery were constructed under imperial 
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sanction. In other words, they were both constructed privately and thus, in a certain 
sense, illegally. In this regard, sending memorials for a court-bestowed plaque/title in 
this regard was not a superfluous gesture, but rather an important administrative 
procedure to legalize the monastery. That is why Chökyi Gyaltsen  was so eager to 
have such a certificate from the court: the monk obviously did not want his monastery 
inside the walled city of Xi’an to be illegal. More importantly, such court-issued 
plaque/titles were often accompanied by an imperial edict that appoints as abbot the 
one who filed the request to be the monastery and recognizes his legal rights over 
monastic property. Therefore, rushing the registration of a monastery by requesting a 
court-issued plaque/title became a channel for certain Tibetan Buddhists to lay claim 
over others’ religious complexes.   
    In Mt. Xumi of modern-day Guyuan (固原須彌山), there are two stone tablets 
inside a monastery called Yuanguang (圓光寺). The inscriptions on both stone tablets 
were carved in 1468, yet their contents are completely different and even contradict 
each other. The inscription on the first stone tablet is a 1443 memorial filed by a 
Tibetan Buddhist to the Ming court. According to the memorial, the monk Chökyi 
Wangchuk (綽吉旺速) was traveling in the region during Emperor Zhengtong’s reign 
when he discovered the half-ruined Yuangguang Monastery. Feeling that the place 
was one with Buddha’s blessing, Chökyi Wangchuk donated his personal savings and 
hired workers to repair the monastery. With all reconstruction work completed, 
Chökyi Wangchuk filed a report to the Ming court requesting a monastery plaque as 





requests reasonable, a plaque was bestowed, together with an imperial edict that 
named Chökyi Wangchuk as the monastery abbot.343 
    If this stone tablet was the only one preserved in Yuanguang Monastery nowadays, 
people might naturally believe that Chökyi Wangchuk was the legitimate religious 
leader of the monastery. Yet other stone tablets reveal a much more complicated 
picture. The inscription on the second stone tablet tells us a different story from 
Chökyi Wangchuk’s version. It indicates that Yuanguang Monastery was already 
functioning before Chökyi Wangchuk’s arrival. The monastery was founded by an 
ethnic Han Tibetan Buddhist named Gufeng (孤峰) during the Hongwu reign. Later, 
the abbotship was inherited by Dafang (大方), another ethnic Han monk, who most 
likely practiced Tibetan Buddhism as well. Dafang received his ordination certificate 
from the Ming court in 1440, and as he continued to hold the position as the 
monastery’s abbot, he had many buildings in the monastery repaired or newly 
constructed. Obviously Dafang did not file a request to the Ming court for a 
monastery plaque until 1447, which is already four years after Chökyi Wangchuk 
made the same move.344 One might suspect that there must be certain level of tension 
between Dafang and Chökyi Wangchuk as both of them claimed to be the abbot of the 
monastery, but it is a pity that the inscription does not reveal more information in this 
matter. However, I argue that Dafang’s version of the story is most likely the more 
accurate one. On one hand, other stone tablets on Mt. Xumi also record Dafang’s 
reconstruction work but never mention Chökyi Wangchuk’s name;345 on the other 
hand, the second stone tablet inscription demonstrates an undertone that redresses the 
injustice for Dafang, praising him for being virtuous yet humble while others were 
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using Buddhist affairs for private needs.346 Such a narrative is quite rare considering 
the fact that it is carved in the inscription for a Buddhist monastery, and the way it 
quite strongly implies that Chökyi Wangchuk was the one who unethically took 
advantage of the policy of plaque/title requesting for his own benefit.   
    Even if Chökyi Wangchuk’s actions were indeed motivated by private needs, it is 
understandable considering that there were also enormous economic benefits 
associated with the position he sought. In the mid-15th century highland, in common 
practice an imperial edict that clarified the abbot’s guardianship over monastic 
property came along with the abbot appointment. The imperial edict granted to 
Yuanguang Monastery does not survive nowadays, but those granted to other Tibetan 
Monasteries in the highland might indicate how this mechanism worked.  
    By sorting out existing primary sources, I have found 17 Ming dynasty imperial 
edicts in total issued to monasteries in the highland in response to title/name 
requests.347 Here I will use one issued to Zhaoci Monastery as an example to illustrate 
how such edicts functioned to insure the monastery financially. 
    The Zhaoci Monastery of Minzhou (岷州昭慈寺) received the imperial edict in 
1448, one year before the Emperor Zhengtong learned about the green-glazed tile at 
Jianfu Monastery. The edict begins with the emperor’s praise of Tibetan Buddhism 
for spreading good deeds among frontier inhabitants and for its ability to keep the 
region peaceful. Then, it introduces how the monastery abbot built the place for his 
disciples and raised the request for an imperial plaque, and grants it the name of 
“Zhaoci Monastery.” The most important part of the imperial edict for our analysis is 
the third section. Here, the edict makes an explicit statement that no one is allowed to 
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disturb this religious community, and any invasion of the monastery’s property—
including buildings, lands, mountains, forests, gardens, material wealth, and various 
kinds of livestock—is strictly forbidden. Those who dared to make such disrespectful 
attempts would receive severe legal punishment.348  
    Many imperial edicts bestowed to monasteries in the highland include the same 
language which bestows their absolute rights over a wide array of property. For 
example, similar wording also appears in the imperial edict bestowed to Chökyi 
Wangchuk of the Yuanguang Monastery. And as far as I can tell, all such edicts were 
issued to Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. Meanwhile, 16 out of 17 imperial edicts I 
found were issued during the 15th century. This undoubtedly showcases the privilege 
that Ming emperors granted to the Tibetan Buddhist community. These imperial 
edicts functioned as legal umbrellas that rendered the monasteries immune to any type 
of infringement, which largely equals tax exemption. Such privileges constituted a 
form of autonomy that contrasted Tibetan Buddhist monasteries sharply with the 
Chinese Buddhist monasteries in the Ming heartland that were registered in the lijia 
system and thus had to take on tax and labor responsibilities.349 In the highland region, 
as Paul Nietupski points out, the application of divine power to the physical realities 
of economics or territorial sovereignty were arguably very real.350 With the imperial 
order’s protection, Tibetan Buddhist monasteries had a comfortable nest in which to 
hatch and grow. Probably this is also why the hard-working Chinese Buddhist monk 
Wumao eventually chose to submit his monastery to Tibetan Buddhism: tax 
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exemption was something Chinese Buddhist monasteries dared not to dream of, even 
in the 15th century when monastic policies were already relatively loose.351 
    Combining privileges from the Ming court with local connections, the Tibetan 
Buddhist monks converted the highland society into a Buddhist realm. As a result, 
Tibetan Buddhism blossomed in the region. During the Yuan dynasty, only 23 
monasteries were built in northern Sichuan and Southern Gansu, but the number  
quadrupled to 95 newly built monasteries during the Ming.352 Regarding the eastern 
Qinghai region, 45 and 131 monasteries were built in the Yuan and Ming 
respectively.353 However, the overly favorable policies toward the highland Tibetan 
Buddhist communities and their extensive development gradually led to social 
turbulence in both the frontier region and the Ming capital, forcing the Ming to adjust 
its court policies in the late 15th century.  
Prospering under the Ming Regulations 
    The Ming throne’s patronage for Tibetan Buddhism was not unlimited. From the 
1460s on, more and more court ministers began to pressure the Ming emperors by 
blaming Tibetan Buddhism for causing various types of social problems. This section 
examines how the Ming’s regulation was effective in checking the popularity of 
Tibetan Buddhism in the Ming heartland, but counterproductive as it further 
stimulated the spread of the religion in the highland. 
    The Ming court’s preferential policies in the mid-15th century enabled Tibetan 
Buddhism to spread at an unprecedented speed, thus causing social unrest for the 
Ming in both its frontier and capital regions. Thanks to the Ming emperor’s sanction, 
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Tibetan Buddhists were able to go to Beijing as tributary envoys with an increasing 
frequency. One Ming official recalled that while there were only 30 to 40 Tibetan 
Buddhist monks who visited the Ming court in the 1430s and 1440s, the number 
increased to 300 in the 1450s. By the late 1450s, every year 2,000 to 3,000 would 
come.354 Such high frequency of travel to Beijing extensively promoted the popularity 
of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland, where the excessive return of the tributary trips 
exerted huge influence on the region’s ethnic Han inhabitants. Many Han commoners, 
coveting the abundant material benefits, began to send their sons to learn to speak 
Tibetan so as to join the tributary groups as Tibetan Buddhist monks.355 Others even 
abandoned their duties under the Ming’s civilian and military household systems and 
faked Buddhist identities to join the groups.356 This phenomenon echoes what Hoong 
Teik Toh calls the “increased Tibetanization” among Ming subjects, which refers to 
the fact that Han people made up an increasingly large proportion of the whole 
population of the Tibetan Buddhist monks.357 But while Toh attributes such a 
phenomenon to the attractiveness of esotericism, in the highland, the Chinese’s 
conversion was most likely driven by the desire for the lucrative potential of the trip 
to Beijing. 
    Various social problems emerged at the other end of the tributary route as well. 
While it was difficult for Han people in Beijing to sneak into the tributary embassies, 
they discovered other ways to benefit from the practice. One gruesome story indicates 
exactly how crazy the tributary practice had become. Among all the tribute items the 
highland monks brought along, there was one object called a Kapala bowl, which was 
a cup made from a human skull to use as a Tibetan Buddhist ritual implement. But 
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there were not enough skulls “produced” from the highland, a relatively sparsely 
populated region, to meet the great need of the large volume of tributary monks. 
Therefore, many Han civilians and military in the capital region began to ransack 
tombs, steal skulls, and sell them to the highland monks!358 It was precisely this type 
of social ramification that greatly annoyed Ming court ministers, who, for all their 
differences, were still Confucian scholars who could not tolerate behaviors violating 
their moral principles such as tomb-digging.  
    Because of the Ming throne’s leaning toward Tibetan Buddhism, more and more 
highland monks came to Beijing, which even resulted in a shortage of translators at 
court.359 Court officials began to criticize the frequent arrivals of Tibetan Buddhist 
embassies. They bitterly complained that the Tibetan monks had created too much 
trouble in both Beijing and the highland region. What made the court ministers worry 
even more was the monks’ huge influence on the imperial ruling house, which could 
turn into cause political burdens or ideological issues.360 Therefore, from the early 
years of the Chenghua reign (1464-1487), the court ministers started to press for 
reforms to control the tributary practice.  
    The main focus of the Chenghua reforms was on regulating the size of incoming 
Tibetan Buddhist groups so as to reduce the court’s economic expenses. In hindsight, 
the tributary activities were indeed considerably checked by the series of reforms in 
the late 15th century. Ironically, these reforms also accelerated the spread of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the highland region, especially among the ethnic Han communities.   
    Among many reform agendas, one reform measure that deserves emphasis here 
was a restriction placed on the ethnic background of the tribute payers. In the eyes of 
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the Ming officials, there were unquestionably many unqualified tribute payers in the 
envoy groups, but who should be singled out became a question. In 1465, the Ming’s 
Department of Ritual announced that “from the third year of Chenghua (1467), the 
tributary payers must be the same category of [the tributary group leader], and the 
total number cannot be too many.”361 But it was the term “category” (lei 類) here for 
which different parties held different definitions. From the late 15th century Ming 
officials’ perspective, the concept of “category” meant ethnicity. Therefore, they 
proposed to draw a line that separated Han from non-Han within the Tibetan Buddhist 
community. One high official from the Ministry of Rites proposed that if the monk 
was an ethnic Tibetan, he could retain his religious identity but needed to be 
repatriated to his place of origin, but if he was ethnic Han, he was no more than a liar 
and thus should be forced to return to lay life and resume his tax-paying 
obligations.362 What this proposal implies is that among the tribute monks from the 
highland, only ethnic Tibetans were deemed eligible as tribute payers, not those who 
were ethnic Han. They thought that the so-called Fan religion (番教) was something 
that belonged exclusively to the Fan people (番人), and Han people should not 
practice this alien religion. In this vein, ethnicity was necessarily a reference to 
categorize religion and also became the criteria to classify the highland Tibetan 
Buddhists. Such an emphasis on ethnicity, I argue, was likely tied to the xenophobic 
sentiment among the Han officials following the humiliating Tumu incident. 
    In contrast, the Tibetan Buddhists understood the operating “category” differently. 
They perceived it from a religious perspective: they thought that as long as the tribute 
payers were in the same Buddhist denomination as the embassy leader, they belonged 
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to one “category.” From their point of view, “category” referred to one’s religious 
background, and Buddhist denominations did not have to correlate with ethnicity. 
That is why when the Ming court ministers announced that more regulations would be 
imposed on the tributary groups starting from 1467, one Tibetan Buddhist leader 
immediately acquired as many as 3,400 ordination certificates in 1466 for his newly 
converted monks.363 To him, as long as his followers received ordination certificates 
from the Ming court, a symbol of court recognition, they should be treated as 
someone who belonged to the same “category” with their leaders and thus be fine. To 
be fair, we cannot be sure how many among the 3400 licenses were given to ethnic-
Han people. But I argue it is most likely that many of these licenses were given to the 
highland Han inhabitants who were desperate to acquire a Tibetan Buddhist identity 
in order to join the tributary missions, and it is from their court rewards that the 
Tibetan Buddhist leaders took a share. Therefore, the court ministers’ proposal for 
“purifying the Tibetan Buddhists,”364 without question, greatly upset the Tibetan 
Buddhist hierarchs who began to draw upon examples of previous Ming emperors’ 
preferential treatment toward Tibetan Buddhists in order to keep their privileges.365 
    From the 1460s to 1480s, there had been a constant back and forth over the 
definition of “authentic Tibetan Buddhists” at the Ming court. On one hand, the court 
ministers were strong enough to press the throne to pass policies that “ethnic-Han 
were forbidden from practicing Tibetan Buddhism” or “Tibetan Buddhist monks were 
not allowed to travel freely anymore.”366 On the other hand, the Tibetan Buddhists had 
the private support of the Ming emperor and thus were still able to enjoy their 
privileges at the court. This, from the perspective of political history, could be 
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understood as a clash between the Ming’s inner court, led by the emperor, and the 
outer court constituted of Confucian scholars.367 Yet it is reasonable to believe that 
Tibetan Buddhist leaders were able to use their last opportunity to convert as many 
ethnic-Han followers as possible before the religion was completely politicized as an 
ethnic marker in the last years of the 15th century. 
    Starting from the 1460s onwards, the Ming carried out a series of actions to check 
the development of Tibetan Buddhism. The direct catalyst for these policies was the 
growing economic burden that tributary Tibetan Buddhists imposed on the Ming 
court, but what was behind that was the bigger picture of Tibetan Buddhism’s fast 
spread in the highland from the 1440s. In retrospect, the late 15th century reforms 
indeed eased the heavy economic burdens on the Ming created by the highland 
inhabitants. But at the same time, it also ironically stimulated the further 
dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism on the ground.  
    By the end of the 15th century, Tibetan Buddhism had already spread widely in the 
highland. The degree of its dissemination is suggested in one of Qiu Jun’s (邱濬) 
unprecedented proposals to completely abandon Songpan. As one of the most famous 
mid-Ming intellectuals, Qiu Jun, in his 1487 publication of Daxue Yanyi bu 
(大學衍義補), proposed to remove the entire Ming military from Songpan. Due to 
transportation difficulties and endless local rebellions, Qiu Jun had no faith in the 
military for effective control over the region. Therefore, he advocated to grant full 
control to the indigenous clergy, building them a giant monastery in which to dwell 
and govern and only stationing Ming troops hundreds of miles downstream of the Min 
River at Weizhou or Maozhou.368 Although no evidence indicates that Qiu’s idea was 
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supported by the court, his proposal unquestionably demonstrates how Ming elites 
had adopted the idea that Tibetan-rite Buddhism was the best method for civilizing 
Inner Asian savages. 
    In Qiu Jun’s eyes, the indigenous clergy not only replaced court clergy, but even 
had the potential to completely substitute the Ming garrison system. One Minzhou 
case indicates that the robustness of Tibetan Buddhism even began to encroach upon 
the spiritual realm of the Han soldiers in the Ming’s frontier military. In 1497, one 
Minzhou guard soldier named Zeng Wencai (曾文彩) transcribed a whole set of the 
Prajnaparamita Sutra in Tibetan. The colophon of the scripture illustrates the 
meaning of Tibetan Buddhism to a common Ming soldier. The colophon starts with 
the soldier’s self-introduction. Originally from Xi’an, Zeng had recently moved to 
Minzhou. However, the soldier’s recent life had not been smooth, as he was 
exhausted by a concurrent lawsuit and illness. Soldier Zeng felt helpless. The absence 
of the deities he used to worship back in Xi’an obviously made him quite insecure, as 
there was “no god from whom he could seek protection” (無神可保).369 Therefore,  
Soldier Zeng turned to Tibetan Buddhism, which to him was the most powerful and 
efficacious religion in the local society of Minzhou. This story attests to the influence 
of Tibetan Buddhism in the local context. More importantly, it provides a hard-won 
private account that indicates a common Han soldier’s very religious motivation for 
converting to Tibetan Buddhism. This story of Soldier Zeng resembles a similar scene 
that Michael Szonyi examines in the empire’s outmost coastal frontier region “where 
soldiers found themselves relatively isolated, their old gods were less likely to survive 
 





as objects of communal worship.”370 In late 15th century Minzhou, Tibetan Buddhism 
seemed to have become an indispensable part of the highland soldiers’ daily life.  
    How can we be sure that Zeng’s experience is representative of those of other 
soldiers? To be frank, we cannot, at least not completely. But other materials 
convincingly show that Zeng Wencai was not alone. In Songpan, one stele preserved 
in the rural setting records an inscription of blessing that celebrates the restoration of 
a military fort, Gaotun Fortress (高屯堡). Gaotun Fortress was said to be the northern 
gate of Songpan.371 But even in such a strategically important military base we see 
how just how active certain Tibetan Buddhist monks were. The blessing first provides 
the name, military ranks, and specific responsibilities of the supervisors and workers 
in the fortress’ restoration project. It then lists several Tibetan Buddhist monks who 
were in charge of praying, most likely reciting mantra, when the construction was 
finished.372 From their names, it seems that certain Tibetan Buddhist monks were still 
ethnic Han. The court ban seemed to have little effect in the highland society, and 
Tibetan Buddhism continued to transcend ethnic boundaries. Moreover, although it is 
impossible for us to know the exact attitude that Songpan military commanders held 
toward Tibetan Buddhism, we at least know that they did not think it a bad thing to 
invite some Tibetan Buddhist monks to give a blessing. 
    Tibetan Buddhism’s penetration into the Ming’s military system even became a 
feature of the landscape in the highland society. During my fieldwork in the summer 
of 2018, I found a group of precipice inscriptions several miles away from the 
location of the Xiaohe Battalion of Songpan (松潘小河守禦千戶所). On the cliff, 
huge Chinese and Tibetan inscriptions were carved side by side and painted a golden 
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color (Figure 3.1). While the Chinese inscriptions on the east side praise the longevity 
and prosperity of the Great Ming, the Tibetan inscription on the west side is the 
famous six-syllabled mantra, “Om Mani Padme Hum,” which was the most frequently 
recited mantra for Tibetan Buddhists and means that through “the practice of a path 
which is an indivisible union of method and wisdom, you can transform your impure 
body, speech, and mind into the pure exalted body, speech, and mind of a Buddha.”373 
Since the Chinese inscriptions were carved in the early 16th century, it is highly 
possible that the Tibetan mantra was carved around the same time. Today, the 
precipice inscriptions are frequently used as excellent materials for the local 
government to propagate the harmonious relationship between Han and Zang. As the 
government officials interpreted the inscription as such to me, however, I doubted 
whether the Ming dynasty court official would think in the same way. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3: Chinese and Tibetan Precipice inscriptions in Xiaohe, Songpan 
 
 






    Regulating Tibetan Buddhists’ activities and the religion’s popularity in the Ming 
capital, the Ming court officials’ restraints had little effect on the highland society. By 
the late 15th century, Tibetan Buddhism not only consolidated its control over the 
local non-Han communities, but likely also exerted great influence over the Ming’s 
ethnic Han soldiers. Its strong influence even made certain court officials propose a 
complete withdrawal of Ming military from the region. Though its connection with 
the Ming court was greatly diminished, Tibetan Buddhism remained robust in the 
Ming’s highland frontier. 
Summary 
    Through the activities of a group of Tibetan Buddhist monks, this chapter examines 
the 15th century development of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland society. It 
demonstrates that Tibetan Buddhism was not intrinsic to the highland region, and its 
development was primarily prompted by Tibetan Buddhist monks who proactively 
spread Dharma seeds in the region. From the mid-15th century on, Tibetan Buddhist 
monks made full use of some Ming emperors’ personal interests in Tibetan Buddhist 
practices, received various kinds of privileges from the court, and projected such 
preferential treatments back to the highland society. Relying on lineage networks, 
using institutional loopholes, or subterfuge, Tibetan Buddhists actively engaged 
themselves in the mid-15th century highland society and thus led to the fast 
dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism on the ground that reconfigured the local social 
structure. Such a trend did not slow down even when a series of Ming policies were 
put forward to check the development of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland society. 
     In this chapter, I also spoke to the “ethnicity paradigm” that has dominated the 
field of Chinese frontier studies to a considerable extent, especially when it comes to 





and this grand narrative still takes ethnicity as a decisive element that affected Ming 
China’s interaction with frontier regions. But in the highland, ethnic labels barely 
affected how Tibetan Buddhism transformed the local society. Even if it was 
considered a somewhat exotic religion in the top-down narrative, it was not an ethnic 
marker at all locally. The religion transcended ethnic and language boundaries. 
Equating religious taxonomy with ethnic categories obscures the highly fluid and 
often ambiguous situation in the highland. In fact, as the next chapter will show, it 
was oftentimes status distinctions pertaining to taxation, household registration, and 









Chapter 5: Deserters 
 
    Borderlands were porous spaces where the movement of people was less restrained 
by modern state apparatuses before the implementation of border lines, the 
demarcation between nation-states, and the reification of territorial sovereignty.374 The 
highland was just one such place. As diverse communities flocked to the highland 
with their languages, religions, commodities, and forms of knowledge in tow, the 
region gradually became a crowded and contested contact zone. While some groups 
enjoyed and took advantage of these movements, others wished to bring them under 
control. 
    In Chinese history, across time and space, people frequently moved into and out of 
borderlands. Historiographical interrogations for these borderland-crossings are as 
diverse as the movements themselves. Just to name a few, Naomi Standen, focusing 
on the fragmented north China in the 10th century, argues that political borders were 
not fixed geographical divisions but a function of relationships between leaders and 
followers.375 Therefore, when local leaders changed allegiance, the borderline moved 
with them. Nicholas Tackett, situating Song China in an inter-state system, proposes 
that the travels of diplomats and their contacts with non-Han communities played a 
crucial role for the emergence of a new worldview and a sense of Chinese identity 
among educated elites.376 Michael Szonyi takes a bottom-up perspective and argues 
that the contingently changing identities of Southeast coastal inhabitants—alternating 
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between soldiers, merchants, smugglers and merchants—best illustrate how the Ming 
subjects practiced the strategy of regulatory arbitrage to take advantage of the 
imperial apparatus.377 Siyen Fei, in her forthcoming monograph, suggests that cross-
border captivity in the Ming-Mongol borderland, although coercive human 
trafficking, was also the vehicle of information circulation and knowledge transfer.378 
As there is no common pattern for borderland movements, scholarly examinations 
focus on different aspects and come to different conclusions. 
    This chapter, building on the aforementioned literature, examines the movement of 
people in the 16th century highland, particularly with the case study of northwest 
Sichuan. It focuses on why an increasing number of Ming soldiers deserted and fled 
into the deep mountain, how they perceived the highland region, what chain effects 
were catalyzed, and how different groups intervened in and and negotiated over such 
movements. By scrutinizing these deserters’ experiences, this chapter argues that 
people were a type of resource in the highland, and it was such a resource over which 
various social groups competed. Investigating how people were categorized along 
different social taxonomies, this chapter also challenges the effectiveness of ethnicity 
as a useful analytical category in borderland studies. 
Wax and Wane 
    Many scholars of Ming China would admit that the garrison system began to 
deviate from its original design from roughly the mid-15th century. Such changes, 
although emerging in multiple segments of the institution and demonstrating great 
regional distinctions, are loosely summarized in one classic work: “from a self-
replicating garrison system that supported three million men to a mercenary system 
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whose costs fell entirely to the people and the dynastic treasury; from garrison troops 
with quotas of men to mercenaries with no fixed numbers; from hereditary garrison 
troops to hired mercenaries: this was central to the rise and fall of the Ming period.”379 
The author of these lines, Wu Han, in his 1937 publication that has been generally 
treated as the very first modern scholarly essay on the Ming military, attributes such 
shifts to official corruption and misuse of military personnel. Although Wu Han’s 
“decline” narrative has been widely shared by later historiography,380 some recent 
scholarship, in contrast, perceives these changes not as deterioration but as 
improvised responses to new challenges. David Robinson, for example, highlights the 
correlation between the emergence of hired soldiers and the growing use of silver as a 
medium of exchange, the monetization of labor and material obligations to the state, 
and the decline of the hereditary occupation household system.381 While the causes for 
these transformations are multi-layered and interpretations vary depending on 
perspectives, the decades from mid- to late 15th century witnessed dramatic changes in 
the Ming’s garrison system. 
    As Ming China’s military outposts in northwest Sichuan, the garrison system there 
had been extensively worn out in the late 15th century. Multiple factors contributed to  
its decline. Some of them were nationwide and others regional. First, logistics 
maintenance was difficult due to the region’s environment and topography. Because 
of the region’s mountainous terrain and high altitude, local grain production was not 
sufficient to feed a large army.382 Therefore, rations needed to be shipped in from 
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regions several hundred miles away, most commonly counties scattered across the 
Chengdu plain, all the way into the deep mountains of western Sichuan.383 But the 
sharply elevated terrain made such shipments extremely difficult. For example, the 
distance from Maozhou to Songpan, the region’s military stronghold, is a mere 90 
miles, yet the altitude rises over 1200 meters (Maozhou: 1580 m; Songpan: 2850 m). 
Based on my personal fieldwork experience, such a steep slope makes even modern 
vehicle transportation difficult, not to mention the terrible road conditions and harsh 
climate that the porters had to suffer centuries ago. In the 15th century, grain shipment 
was such exhausting work that even criminals were promised punishment expiation in 
exchange for hauling grain.384 Supplying rations thus can be quite slow. Just as one 
official calculated, it required two porters to walk one entire month to deliver just one 
soldier’s monthly ration.385 Although the empire had tried multiple ways to maintain 
stable grain supply in the northwest Sichuan mountains, such as issuing salt license 
exchange programs,386 establishing fort granaries,387 and hiring local non-Han people 
as escorts,388 none of these solutions really persisted. The difficult transportation 
conditions made the attrition rate high,389 and the unscrupulous porters who dared to 
replace grain with sand only made the situation even worse.390 Such difficulties 
rendered constant shortage in grain replenishment for the northwest Sichuan military.  
    Second, the court’s general attitude, which leaned towards a conservative frontier 
policy, limited and even undermined the proper functioning of the northwest Sichuan 
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garrison system: they were given general instruction for defense instead of offense. 
Unless out of absolute necessity, military actions would always be the last resort.391 
After all, less armed conflicts meant less troop deployments and less ration supplies, 
and thus less financial pressure for the Ming. One memorial points out precisely how 
the court’s extreme policies pushed the frontier officials into a dead end. The 
relatively peaceful period during the Hongzhi reign (1487-1505) catalyzed an 
excessive anti-violence mentality among censorate officials. The result, frustrating 
enough, was that whenever a soldier killed a non-Han person, the censorate official 
would accuse the frontier commander of inciting rebellion; but if a soldier was 
reversely killed by a non-Han person, the accusation would be dereliction.392  
    The court’s obstinate insistence on a defensive stance severely sapped the morale 
of the frontier military. One document shows that the resentment among the soldiers 
was so high that they even wanted to kill and eat the flesh of those non-Han villains, 
but they were forbidden to attack and thus felt extremely depressed.393 Such 
unreasonable policies left the frontier commanders no choice but to assume a false 
peace by bribing the superiors and dumping responsibilities on underlings. Those who 
were successful in disguising frontier conflicts long enough to earn themselves a 
promotion were even praised by others for their wisdom and rich experience.394 The 
nonfeasance in the local military rendered lax maintenance and low efficiency 
throughout the institution in that much military infrastructure, such as forts, garrison 
walls, and barracks was left crumbling,395 and even weapons and armor for soldiers 
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who could not afford to bring their own were not enough.396 Not surprisingly, funds 
for these fields were most likely embezzled.  
    Third, the Ming court’s institutional rearrangements further contributed to the local 
military’s inefficiency. In the late 15th century, the local military bureaucracy suffered 
from two problems: a lack of superior military commanders and the decentralization 
of authority in the army.  Before the 1460s, northwest Sichuan faced great pressure 
posed by the Dongbuhanhu regime and hence high ranking court officials such as 
censors-in-chief (都御史) and state department vice ministers (侍郎) were directly 
dispatched to supervise frontier military affairs.397 Yet in 1470, the position of Sub-
regional vice commander (分守副總兵), which was usually taken by top officials 
from central or regional governments, was eliminated because of the relatively 
peaceful situation on the ground, leaving the Left and Right Assistant Regional 
Commanders (協守左右參將) to take charge of separate regions individually.398 
Without a superior commander, the cooperation between these two officers, who had 
different military concerns and agendas, was problematic, especially during trans-
regional military emergencies.399 Although Surveillance Vice Commissioners in 
Charge of a Military Defense Circuit (兵備按察副使) were assigned later to take the 
supervising position, their relatively low rankings (3b-4b) rendered them incapable of 
overruling local military affairs, considering the fact that those Assistant Regional 
Commander positions were usually taken by Regional Military Vice Commissioners 
or assistant Commissioners (都指揮同知/都指揮僉事), who were high-ranking 
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commanders in the regional military system.400 In the late 15th century, the removal of 
high-ranking officials from regional military office indicated the court’s neglect of the 
northwest Sichuan frontier, and the interlocking bureaucratic system could only result 
in less efficient and effective operations.   
    In addition to these three difficulties that more or less derived from local factors, 
another two challenges were tied specifically to late 15th century social and political 
changes nationwide. The first one was related to changes in the military institution. 
From the mid-15th century, a rotating program was initiated to periodically transfer 
soldiers from nearby garrisons to northwest Sichuan military posts.401 These soldiers, 
in contrast to the locally stationed “host troops” (主軍), were designated as “guest 
troops” or “rotating troops.” (客軍/戍軍). This was most likely to ease the complaints 
of garrison soldiers who were supposed to station in the fortress perennially. 
However, these guest troops were outsiders whose transfer was only temporary. They 
were not familiar with local conditions, and hence less capable of effectively carrying 
out their duties.402 One official commented that even the physical conditions of these 
guest troops were considered weak by northwest Sichuan standards. And when 
assigning military missions, those who were powerful, either physically stronger or 
better at building social connections, would manage to have themselves deployed to 
fortresses with less military pressure. In practice, this left strategic outposts, which 
also faced more military pressure and thus quite dangerous, to the ones who were not 
capable to do so. Many of these less fortunate soldiers came from poor families who 
would use their military rice rations and salary to pay their debts, rather than keeping 
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themselves fed and warm.403 Considering the quality of these soldiers, it is no wonder 
that a frontier official disappointedly commented that even one thousand Sichuan 
troops were no match for only one hundred or so non-Han rebels.404 
    The second new challenge came from the rising non-Han power in the highland. 
While the soldiers had to worry about the most basic needs for survival, the non-Han 
dwellers in the mountains, to use Donald Sutton’s words, were experiencing “rising 
power and prosperity.”405 Such developments, I propose, resulted from the booming 
tributary interactions between highland communities and the Ming court. As Chapter 
2 introduced, much wealth was syphoned off from the Chinese heartland through 
tributary channels in the 15th century and then poured into the highland society. In 
addition, the rich mineral resources in the mountains, such as silver, copper, iron, and 
lead not only attracted local miners but also stimulated long-distance trade which 
connected the highland and lower Yangtze region.406 As the trading interactions 
increased, more and more merchants came to the highland and thus turned timbered 
passageways into busy trading routes.407 A major consequence of the economic 
development of the highland was the changing power dynamics that was an inversion 
of the Ming’s original plan. While in the late 14th century it was the Ming military that 
occupied farmlands in the northwest Sichuan river valley, much of these fertile lands 
were under the highland inhabitants’ control in the late 15th century.408 Some Ming 
soldiers, who oftentimes starved from the slow grain shipments and low quality 
rations, hired themselves out as tenants, but only found their earnings ripped off by 
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the cunning highland inhabitants.409 In other scenarios, the rich highland inhabitants 
played the role of loan sharks and lent money to the Ming soldiers, often colluding 
with interpreters to make up fake contracts and claim ungrounded debts.410  
    One of the heaviest burdens that the highland inhabitants imposed on the miserable 
Ming soldiers was the so-called “Fan reward (番赏/赏番).” Technically, this Fan 
reward was a kind of honorarium to praise the loyalty and good behavior of the 
highland inhabitants. When the strong and powerful highland inhabitants frequently 
attacked and destroyed the Ming’s military infrastructure, slaughtered Ming soldiers 
and raided supplies and livestock,411 the so-called Fan Rewards in fact functioned as a 
type of protection fee that the Ming soldiers paid to buy peace.412 The highland 
inhabitants came up with a lot of names, reasons, and methods to extort such Fan 
rewards, among which the most life-threating one to the Ming soldiers was toll 
collection during grain shipment. The highland inhabitants would implement 
roadblocks in certain transportation spots, usually narrow passages by steep cliffs, and 
whoever refused to pay for their passing-by would most likely be killed and their 
caravans plundered.413 Therefore, many Ming soldiers would accept such extortion to 
buy peace. According to one report, one single battalion garrison from Diexi had to 
take on an annual payment in Fan rewards of 3,700 tael of silver.414 The grain-
shipment fee from inland Sichuan to Diexi, in contrast, was 0.78 to 1 tael per shi.415 
Since one common soldier’s monthly rice ration was 0.8 shi, the grain shipped to 
Diexi with 3700 tael of silver could have fed between 4,600 to 6,000 soldiers. 
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However, all this money was given to the non-Han dwellers, and it all came out of the 
common Ming soldiers’ pockets.416 
    In the late 15th century, Ming soldiers lived miserably in the highland. They had to 
give away their allocated grain under coercion, almost as a form of tribute, to the 
highland inhabitants. And if they refused to do so, what followed would be the 
highland inhabitants’ attack on the forts or raids on the shipment caravans. Yet the 
soldiers’ demands to resolve such problems through military campaigns were 
rejected. This increasingly deteriorating relationship specifically in the late 15th 
century, I argue, stemmed from the wane of the tributary system. As introduced in the 
previous two chapters, the tributary system functioned as a major channel for the 
highland society to accumulate wealth and gain necessities from the Chinese 
heartland. Yet the entire practice was strictly restrained by the Ming court in the 
1470s, particularly during the Chenghua reign, and thus resulted in a decreasing 
volume and frequency of highland tributary groups as well as tributary rewards. For 
the highland indigenes, this meant a diminished transfer of rich resources which put 
their livelihood at stake. They had to turn to alternative ways to acquire living 
necessities. The Ming military down in the river valley, which had become quite 
weak, was thus targeted. As one contemporary commented: “After having seen the 
rich farmland, the non-Han people would look down upon their barren land; after 
tasting the delicious grains, the non-Han people would complain their barley was not 
sweet enough. This is why our land and territory has been annexed day by day.”417 
While the suspension of tributary diplomacy greatly eased the economic burden at 
court, it was the Ming soldiers stationed at the frontier who paid the price.  
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Table. 5.1: Numbers of Tributary groups from Northwest Sichuan418 
    This section has examined the transformation of the Ming military in the late 15th 
century in northwest Sichuan. The development of the garrison system was very much 
shaped by the local topography. Farmland was scarce in the deep mountains, making 
imported rice the major grain supply. But the mountainous terrain created much 
trouble: constant transportation of shipments of rations and other living necessities 
was slow, difficult and expensive. To reduce military operational costs, the Ming 
maintained a conservative frontier policy in northwest Sichuan that led to sapped 
morale and crumbling infrastructure in the military. In contrast to the worn-out 
garrison system, the highland communities were better off due to the wealth 
accumulated from their tributary interactions with the Ming. But the halt of the 
tributary system in the late 15th century transformed the rich highland inhabitants into 
aggressive neighbors who frequently bullied the Ming soldiers for money and food. 
This power dynamic created many changes in the social structure in the mountain. 
One of these changes was the massive migration of Han people into the mountains. 
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Heading into the Mountains 
    Border-crossing in the highland, as in other borderland spaces, was not a new 
phenomenon in the 16th century. However, this was not something that the Ming ruler 
would wish to see his frontier troops practice. Therefore, as soon as the Ming troops 
settled down in the highland in the late 14th century, they were ordered to stay within 
walled cities with their daily activities strictly regulated.419 Many walled cities and 
fortresses in the highland, in this sense, became reifications of the Ming’s imperial 
presence in the frontier.420 Yet the Ming soldiers could not be restrained within the 
Ming enclaves forever, especially when their living conditions in the military stations 
were deteriorating. Therefore, in the late 15th century, many Ming soldiers in 
northwest Sichuan whose living conditions were dreadful chose to abandon their 
military duties completely when they had the chance. 
    The late 15th century decline of the Ming’s military, as well the ensuing growing 
number of deserted soldiers, was part of a nationwide phenomenon. Kenneth Swope 
points out that “by 1500, Ming military strength may have been as low as 3 percent of 
prescribed levels in some garrisons, with desertion rates as high 85 percent in some 
areas despite numerous efforts by the government to ameliorate the problem.”421 
Although the desertion rate in northwest Sichuan was not that high, it is still a 
reasonable estimation that at least several thousand Ming soldiers deserted and 
crossed the border. Why were the Ming soldiers able to desert successfully without 
being chased back by the military? Again, the topography of the region played an 
important role. As mentioned earlier, rations for the Ming army in northwest Sichuan 
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relied heavily on grain shipments. But the rugged terrain in the mountains posed great 
difficulties on logistics. Therefore, the Ming military was not able to build their forts 
too far away from the river valley where the grain shipment routes lay. Topography, 
in this way, affected the spatial pattern of Ming China’s military infrastructure in its 
westmost frontier. The correlation between terrain and imperial power even offers one 
unique and inspiring way to conceptualize the distinction between the Chinese and 
non-Chinese realm. While in most frontiers, the advance of state power was 
conducted horizontally, the Ming’s expansion was carried out vertically in northwest 
Sichuan. As the Ming army entered the region, they only occupied river valleys and 
left the mountains to the indigenes, as indicated in Fig. 5.1. In that regard, what we 
have from northwest Sichuan is an interesting picture in which Ming China is below a 
certain altitude while the non-Ming world sits amid the clouds and mist. Therefore, 
when the Ming soldiers decided to desert, they could just climb up along the 
mountainside or follow mountain valleys to go upstream. Because all the forts were 
concentrated in the river valley near the main transportation line, it was quite easy for 






Fig. 5.1: Sphere of Influence of Ming China in the Highland422 
    In northwest Sichuan, Ming soldiers deserted either of their own volition or under 
others’ compulsion, and both types of movements created much trouble for the Ming. 
Based on their incentives, I categorize the fled Ming soldiers as either proactive 
migrants or passive migrants respectively.  
    Proactive migrants deserted their military positions and resettled in the highland 
mostly of their own free will for survival. In northwest Sichuan at the time, many 
military men were in fact mere beggars who were hired as replacements to fulfill 
others’ military obligations. But as soon as they arrived at the military posts, they 
found it impossible to keep themselves fed and warm to survive the harsh conditions 
in the mountain and simply deserted.423 In fact, in addition to these hired beggar-
soldiers who could not survive, military officials also suffered grain shortages and 
even starved to death.424 When a certain military official died, his entire family 
collapsed with him: the wife was remarried to an underling of her deceased husband, 
the son became a thief, and the mother begged for food from others.425 Such living 
conditions left many Ming military personnel no other option but to desert.     
    Many Ming soldiers took shelter in the deep mountains as they provided a 
possibility to keep away from imposed military duties and imperial tax and corvée 
burdens. Some soldiers would bring tea and cloth to the highland non-Han 
communities as a gift and then acquire permission to work in these communities as 
either tenants or craftsmen.426 Many such hired hands with no ties back home would 
also marry local women and thus blend into the highland society.427 Other fugitive 
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Ming subjects formed their own communities instead of joining the non-Han groups. 
One late 15th century memorial indicates that these deserted Han communities could 
have included more than 800 people and were quite diverse in terms of the identity of 
the community members. Merchants from lower Yangtze regions whose businesses 
failed, military grain shipment porters from Sichuan, and deserted soldiers from 
Yunnan all abandoned their previous lives and flocked to the highland.428 It was in 
this context that the northwest Sichuan deep mountains appeared to be attractive to 
Ming subjects from near and far. 
    Compared with those who left for the highland out of their own will, many other 
Ming soldiers went into the mountains because they were captured and were kept in 
the non-Han societies as slaves. Slavery was part of the social repertoire of pre-
modern northwest Sichuan. To the non-Han dwellers, men were useful human 
resources for heavy labor work such as farming, timber collection, and construction, 
while women could be used for domestic labor or taken as captured wives. In addition 
to slave labor, they were also used in political rituals. When the locals held public 
ceremonies pertaining to political alliance, slaves would be buried alive as sacrifice, 
indicating that whoever break the commitments would suffer the same fate.429 
Because of such demands for slaves, highland inhabitants frequently kidnapped and 
enslaved Han Chinese who were farming, woodcutting, or herding away from their 
communities or took military captives when they defeated the garrisons or plundered 
the caravans.430  
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    Captivity became one major means through which the Ming lost its subjects to the 
highland society. Some materials indicate that for one specific fort within a period of 
two and a half years, while only 60 Han-Chinese were killed during a non-Han attack, 
447 were captured.431 Another memorial points out that more than 2,000 Ming 
subjects were captured within a short period.432 Once captured, many captives were 
sold into the deep mountains so that the Ming troops were unable to retrieve them and 
the captives could not escape.433 In the non-Han communities, the indigenes were 
called “A-ba,” meaning “my lord” in Chinese; while the soldiers were called 
“nuerzha” which meant “servant.”434 Compared with those who proactively joined the 
highland communities, those who were captured unquestionably suffered a great deal. 
    Being captives in the mountains, the Han-Chinese were no longer Ming soldiers or 
civilians but slaves that can be sold or exchanged. Some highland communities must 
have captured too many Ming subjects because they even sold these captives in 
exchange for cattle.435 This indicates that human trafficking was quite rampant in 
northwest Sichuan. In other scenarios, the captives were used to demand ransom. 
While regular soldiers could be redeemed for cheaper items such as lamb and wine,436 
military officials could be very expensive. One memorial indicates that when the 
highland inhabitants captured one guard commander, they asked for a ransom of 700 
tael of silver to keep him alive.437 This amount of money, if measured otherwise, 
equaled almost two years’ protection fee that the Ming military used to buy peace 
from the highland inhabitants.438  
 
431 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 725. 
432 Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 12, “chouyi,” 44b. 
433 Yuan, Quanshu Bianyu Kao, vol. 4, 32.  
434 Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 12, “chouyi,” 44b. 
435 Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 12, “chouyi,” 44b. 
436 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 752. 
437 Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 11, “kanding,” 34a. 





     It should be noted that the value of captive women was quite high by highland 
standards. In 1477, a company commander was captured by the highland inhabitants. 
But instead of ransom, the dwellers required one Maozhou female civilian in 
exchange for the captured commander. The female was once captured by the highland 
inhabitants but had successfully escaped. To retrieve their colleague, the Ming 
military officials agreed to such a demand. The Maozhou lady must have never 
imaged that it was her compatriots who were theoretically her protectors that in the 
end sent her back to the mountain that she had just made every effort to escape 
from.439 Although we are not sure why the kidnappers desired her so much, in this 
case, it is clear that a common woman was valued more highly than a military 
commander from the highland inhabitants’ perspective.  
    The phenomenal borderland-crossing activities in northwest Sichuan suggests the 
Ming’s weak presence in the region, which derived not only from the region’s 
difficult terrain, but more importantly the late 15th century power dynamics between 
the Ming military and highland society. Such phenomena greatly undermined the 
Ming’s imperial authority and also sabotaged the solidarity of the Ming’s frontier 
governance system. Given the situation, Ming officials began to calculate alternatives. 
After all, the western frontier, unlike the northern frontier shouldering the heavy 
responsibilities of defending against the Mongols, was less important to the Ming in a 
strategic sense. The non-Han society in the mountains was decentralized and the 
actual damage they could cause to the empire’s general populace was limited. In 
contrast, it was the massive amount of money originally allocated for the frontier 
soldiers but eventually taken by the non-Han locals in various ways that caused a 
 





greater burden for the Ming.440 Both ministers at court and officials on the frontlines 
recognized this. Zhou Hongmou, a renowned court official, described the situation in 
the region as “greatly damaging” to Sichuan and proposed to withdraw half of the 
military to ease the pressure for grain shipments.441 Tong Xuan, a frontier-stationed 
censor official, suggested a much more radical idea: the most troublesome area 
between Songpan and Maozhou be completely abandoned. Listing all the pros and 
cons, Tong described the region as the appendix, an organ that could be gotten rid of 
without causing damage: “for the vast heavenly empire, keeping this route would add 
no value, and giving it up would not be a loss either.”442 By doing this, the soldiers 
and grain porters could suffer less,443 massive amount of grains could be saved to 
prepare Sichuan for natural disasters,444 and the starving non-Han people might start 
fighting among themselves and thus weaken each other.445 It seems that many Ming 
officials had already lost confidence in this troublesome frontier. 
    In the late 15th century and early 16th century northwest Sichuan, a large number of 
stationed soldiers left their military duties for various reasons, and many Ming 
officials also proposed to give up imperial control over the region, at least partially. 
The back and forth revolving around these issues illustrate the somewhat conflicted 
role of northwest Sichuan in the Ming’s imperial blueprint: spending too much money 
on the region was a waste, yet completely abandoning it was also a shame. This 
situation changed in the early 16th century when the Mongols began to threaten the 
region. 
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In the Wake of the Mongols  
    What prompted the situation in northwest Sichuan to change was not court 
officials’ sympathy for the poor frontier soldiers, but rather an exogenous cause: the 
growing threat of the Mongols. In the 1510s, the Mongols began to traverse the 
Ming’s northwestern walled frontier, settled down near the Qinghai Lake, and 
threatened the highland region in eastern Qinghai and northwestern Sichuan from the 
west.446 This greatly disturbed the local power dynamic. Although the highland 
inhabitants had bullied the Ming soldiers for decades, they were not as powerful as 
the Mongols. Therefore, many highland communities were annexed by the Mongols 
with their land occupied.447 Although some members managed to flee, many others 
were subjugated by the Mongols.448 Because these highland inhabitants were quite 
familiar with the local situation, they also took on jobs as military guides and led the 
Mongols to raid Ming villages and forts.449 Such a geopolitical shift imposed great 
pressure on the Ming. In the 1510s, an increasing number of reports of Mongol 
attacks on the highland began to show up in Ming court documents,450 and many 
officials worried about the forthcoming attacks by a military alliance between various 
individual Mongol and Muslim groups.451 Compared to the heavily guarded northern 
frontier, the Ming’s western frontier was never fully prepared for threats from the 
northern nomads. Thus, from the 1510s on, the Ming began to make an effort to 
solidify its vulnerable borderland military system in northwest Sichuan.  
    The frontier policy in the northwest Sichuan in the early 16th century went from a 
passive to a proactive stance. The transformation of Ming China’s general attitude 
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toward its western frontier is demonstrated in three initiatives: the first two aimed at 
refashioning bureaucratic structure, and the last one was mainly about military 
infrastructure renovation.  
    First, more high-level bureaucratic positions in the military were restored or newly 
established. For example, when the position of Sub-regional vice commander (分守副
總兵) was canceled in 1470, it was still treated as a high-ranking position; but by its 
1515 reestablishment, it had already became a low-ranking office as officials 
proposed to have top-level court officials such as censors-in-chief dispatched to 
northwest Sichuan.452 Even Regional Commander (總兵), a position that had never 
been established in Sichuan, was set up as a direct response to the growing Mongol 
threat.453 The (re)establishment of these two positions signaled that the empire had put 
more weight on the northwest Sichuan military. While a full-fledged military 
apparatus was in shape, new commanders were chosen, and new military positions 
were also created for specific areas with strategic importance.454 The problem of 
corruption was considerably improved in that even embezzling a small amount of 
silver was a crime subject to punishment.455  
    Improving the overall quality of the frontier military was also a significant part of 
early 16th century military reform. To tackle the low quality of soldiers, most officials 
and commanders agreed to suspend the rotating guest troops, but the best replacement 
remained a topic for debate.456 Official proposals fell into three categories. The first 
proposed to stick to the garrison system framework. Officials suggested to trace the 
military households that were supposed to take on military duties, conscript more 
 
452 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 954. 
453 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 928. 
454 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 964. 
455 Zhang, Zhiyuan ji, 134.  





housemen, and then send them to the frontier together with their wives and 
children.457 Although this seemed to be a most convenient solution as it was carried 
out according to a framework that had been in use for over a century, such an idea 
was the least pragmatic when the garrison system was crumbling in the early 16th 
century nationwide.  
    In comparison, the second and third types of suggestions left of the garrison system 
framework and proposed to hire able-bodied men instead of enlisting them by force. 
The only difference between the second and the third approaches lies in where to find 
candidates to hire. The second type of proposal suggested looking for military 
candidates in locales where military households registered. To draw attention from 
potential hired hands, the frontier military would prepare everything for them, even 
wives, so that the soldiers would not miss home and the poor would be willing to 
enlist.458 The third potential solution was to hire mercenaries locally in the frontier 
region. Proponents reasoned that those who grew up in the highland were accustomed 
to local conditions—including the food, climate, geography, and topography—thus 
making them qualified fighters. More importantly, they were willing to enlist because 
in northwest Sichuan rice rations and a salary from the military were “the only source 
to keep people alive that a household of five would need two in military to remain fed 
and warm while having one in military would still starve the rest of the family.”459 
The third proposal was implemented in the end. Indeed, only those locally hired able-
bodied men were feared by the non-Han people.460 One could even speculate that 
many of these locally hired soldiers were actually former deserters who were willing 
to sign back up if given decent pay for a change. And the Ming documents’ usage of 
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the term “local soldiers” (土兵) further highlights how the Han/Fan distinction was 
quite fuzzy and ethnic difference did not play a role in such scenarios. 
    The third prong of renovation in northwest Sichuan military was military 
infrastructure. To provide a safer environment for the frontier military, new routes 
impenetrable to arrows and rock attacks were carved out,461 fences protecting the 
caravans from robbery were erected along the shipping route,462 and garrison cities 
were enlarged.463 In addition, more fortresses were constructed. Table. 5.2 
demonstrates in detail how military forts in different subregions of northwest Sichuan 
were gradually built. It is clear that before the 16th century, most fortresses were 
constructed in areas to the south and west of Maozhou, leaving the area to the north 
and east less well-guarded. On one hand, this is because the regions to the north and 
east of Maozhou were deep in the mountains where the severe topography retarded 
the penetration of Ming forces; on the other hand, these areas were also closer to the 
steppe where Mongol powers were quite active. But starting from the 1520s in the 
early years of the Jiajing reign, more fortresses were built in these regions, indicating 
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1515-24 1 1 1 4 1 
1525-34 2 3 9 4 11 
 
461 Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 8, “fengshou,” 20b-21a.  
462 Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 936. 





1535-44 1 5 1 
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Table. 5. 2: Fortresses Constructed near Maozhou464 
 
    The construction of new military forts demonstrated the Ming’s determination to 
strengthen its defenses on the western frontier where the Mongol threats grew. With 
more soldiers dispatched and fortresses constructed, the court gradually replaced a 
conservative frontier policy with an aggressive one. A military guidebook composed 
in the mid-16th century, Veritable Records of Defense in Wei-Mao Area, indicates that 
within the 21 military actions launched in northwest Sichuan during the Ming 
dynasty, 13 of them took place within the three decades from 1520 to 1550.465 The 
scale of military campaigns also greatly escalated. While most previous military 
clashes in northwest Sichuan were rather small, as many as 30,000 Ming soldiers 
were deployed in certain campaigns in the early 16th century.466 Thus, the military in 
northwest Sichuan was fashioned anew. 
    What followed the military refashioning project was an attempt by the Ming to 
penetrate the frontier society ideologically. In the northwest Sichuan non-Han society, 
people used a pair of colors, “black” (黑) and “white” (白), as references to moral 
standards. Such a taxonomy was in use in northwest Sichuan least since the northern 
Song era,467 and they were most likely reflections of indigenous knowledge of social 
categories. To the indigenous people, “black” and “white” represented the two poles 
of morality. While being called “white” implied kindness, compliance, and civility, 
those who were troublesome, aggressive, and evil were often deemed “black” in the 
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local context.468 Even today, there are still local customs in northwest Sichuan, such 
as worshipping white stones, that derive directly from the cultural implication of 
“white”.469 Put simply, “white” and “black” indicated how the locals distinguished 
good from bad, and these two type of behavior undoubtedly could change in certain 
circumstances, seeing as adjectives of “good” and “bad” are relative concepts.  
    When the Ming began to penetrate deeper into the local society starting in the 
1520s, the imperial forces adopted these terms but twisted their connotations from 
indicators of good and evil to signs of loyalty and disloyalty to the Ming sovereign. 
One map collected in the Enlarged Terrestrial Atlas (廣輿圖) is of particular 
importance for examining how the Ming played with this naming practice and 
intended to impose it onto the indigenous society. The map was named the Frontier 
Map of Songpan (Fig. 5.2 松潘邊圖), and it was compiled between 1538 and 1545.470 
Although highlighting Songpan in its designation, the map actually covered the entire 
area of northwest Sichuan. The most eye-catching feature of the map is the labeling of 
“white people” and “black people” written  next to each hamlet. On the map, there 
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Fig. 5.2: Frontier Map of Songpan 
    Frontier Map of Songpan was the only map in the atlas that includes such a feature. 
Obviously, it should be viewed as a visualization of the local Black-White taxonomy. 
But the map actually provides more. The map was made between Jiajing 17 and 24, a 
relatively peaceful period when a large-scale siege of Maozhou in Jiajing 15 was 
defeated and all the rebels destroyed.471 Therefore, the military leader had this map 
made as a report on collected intelligence so as to prepare for possible future attacks 
from the indigenes. Mid-Ming frontier military commanders preferred to have 
intelligence maps drawn in order to make certain the potential alliances and potential 
threats they were dealing with,472 and the Frontier Map of Songpan undoubtedly 
served the same purpose. It was through this process that the meanings of “Black” and 
“White” experienced subtle yet significant changes. 
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    On the platform Google Earth, I pinned the so-called “black” and “white” groups 
separately for the sake of better visualization and analysis (Fig. 5. 4 & Fig. 5. 5).473 
The resulting maps clearly show that most hamlets of “White” people were in 
proximity to the three most important military strongholds in the Ming’s northwest 
Sichuan frontier: the Songpan and Maozhou garrisons and the Diexi battalion. Yet 
most “Black” ones were located relatively far away from the Ming’s military 
apparatus. 
    In the local cosmology, “Black” and “White” were labels of bad and good 
behaviors. However, it is unlikely that all evildoers lived in the deep mountains, while 
all good people intentionally dwelled near the Ming military bases. A more 
reasonable interpretation is that this map only indicates the good and bad from the 
Ming’s perspective. While those living close to the Ming military were relatively 
well-behaved, most likely as a result of the military’s intimidation, the Ming treated 
them as “good” people and thus borrowed indigenous labels and designated them as 
“white” communities. In contrast, those who lived in the deep mountains between 
Maozhou and Songpan were treated as evil because Ming grain caravans were 
frequently plundered there. That, of course, would render them “bad” communities 
from the Ming’s perspective, and thus “black.” In this regard, the Ming borrowed 
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       Fig. 5.3: Hamlets with “Black” people   Fig. 5.4: Hamlets with “White” People   
    In addition to using old local vocabularies, the Ming twisted them to match the 
imperial will. This was a clear sign of attempts of imperial penetration. Having 
constructed more fortresses and dispatched more soldiers in the mountains, the Ming 
was able to intimidate the mountain inhabitants with military power to a certain 
extent. The Ming further endeavored to exert ideological influence in the local 
society. Trying to adopt indigenous taxonomies while substituting their connotations 
with definitions that accorded with the Ming’s expectation was one typical move. 
Moreover, what happened on the Ming’s western frontier was not a unique 
phenomenon: in other frontier regions, we also see the Ming’s adoption of indigenous 
taxonomies in tandem with imperial expansion. In his monograph on the Ming’s 
southern frontier, Leo Shin examines a similar process that occurred during the 
Ming’s conquest of Guangxi. As more interactions took place and the Chinese 





Guangxi locals became increasingly bifurcated and detailed maps drawn out.474 By 
doing this, the Ming wished to amend social structures in a smooth way. Yet 
questions still remain: To what extent did this practice affect the indigenes? Could the 
Ming’s ideological imposition successfully reshape the local people’s perception of 
social structure? 
    The short answer to these questions is no. Despite that northwest Sichuan was 
largely Sinicized in later periods, in the mid-16th century, the empire had not yet 
penetrated that deeply. For quite a while, local ideas co-existed with imperial 
discourse. One official memorial speaks to the juxtaposition of the different 
understandings of “Black” and “White” from the Ming’s and the locals’ perspectives. 
In March 1545, several indigenous hamlet leaders relatively friendly to the Ming 
forces sent messages to the military to inform them of a forthcoming attack. The 
strike would be mounted by Qingpian hamlet inhabitants, who claimed that the Ming 
soldiers killed some “White” people in their community, and therefore they were 
about to take revenge.475 In the Frontier Map of Songpan, Qingpian hamlet was 
labeled as the home of “Black people” because it frequently attacked Ming forts and 
raided grain stocks. But the Qingpian hamlet villagers were less likely to know how 
the Ming identified them; instead, what they understood was that some “White” 
people in their community, probably community members who were honest and kind 
in their daily lives, were killed by the Ming soldiers. Therefore, in the eyes of these 
Qingpian people, it was those Han-Chinese armed murderers that were truly “Black.” 
In this case, both the Ming and Qingpian inhabitants considered themselves to be 
“white” and the other side “black.” Obviously, there was a gap between how the Ming 
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understood these terms and how the locals perceived them. By the mid-1540s, despite 
Ming attempts, the empire’s survey and categorization has little success in changing 
in how the indigenes understood social relationships.  
    From the 1520s to the 1540s, the Ming drastically refashioned its northwest 
Sichuan military by granting it more political weight, hiring more able-bodied men, 
and constructing more military infrastructure in the face of Mongol threats. Yet these 
changes were mainly made within the Ming’s military apparatus, and as the case of 
“black” and “white” shows, the Ming’s reconceptualization of the region did not have 
much effect on the ground. However, because of the intensive military actions starting 
from the 1550s, we shall see more changes in the northwest Sichuan society, 
especially in the ethnic constitution of its population.  
Blurred Boundaries  
    Many historians of Ming China would agree that the reign of Emperor Jiajing 
(1522-1566) was characterized by extensive frontier crises. In addition to the 
oftentimes singled out ‘Southern Dwarfs and Northern Caitiffs’ (南倭北虜), the Ming 
empire in the early 16th century was in fact haunted by social unrest on nearly all 
sides. One common feature of these frontier turbulences is the intensified border-
crossing activities. Yet the local ramifications varied between different frontiers. For 
example, on the empire’s northern frontier, the White Lotus practitioners deserted into 
the steppe and helped the Mongol Khans to construct lordship on a religious basis, 476 
while on the empire’s coastal frontier, the Han sailors colluded with the alleged 
Japanese pirates and engaged extensively in raiding their own compatriots.477 On the 
empire’s western frontier, as this section examines, the cross-border migrants created 
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an hybrid society which challenged the empire’s ethnic imagination of the region and 
amended its ways of regulating imperial subjects.  
    Unlike in the empire’s northern and coastal frontiers where many border-crossers 
were civilians, deserted soldiers constituted the majority of those who traversed the 
Ming’s western frontier. This was most likely because the Ming’s western frontier 
was under full administration of the military, while the northern and southeastern 
frontier regions were co-governed by civilian and military systems and therefore had 
more civilian inhabitants. Despite the series of reforms in the early 16th century, 
desertion on the Ming’s western frontier was still a serious problem. And quite 
ironically, the situation became even worse as the reforms deepened. I will examine 
this process in detail through the case of He Qing. 
    He Qing (?-1555 何卿) was an experienced frontier general. He was known for 
being a ‘hawk’ advocating strict frontier policy, holding a racist position toward the 
local inhabitants, and successfully guarding the Ming’s western frontier region for 
decades.478 One memorial even praised him as the most essential element for keeping 
Sichuan safe because he alone was worth ten thousand armed soldiers.479 In the early 
years of the Jiajing reign, He Qing was promoted to the position of vice-commander 
of Songpan. Upon arrival, he was shocked by the decrepit fort structures and 
demoralized troops, and thus he decided to bring back its military edge through 
reform. Regulating military deployments, grain shipments, and personnel 
appointments, He Qing also paid attention to military infrastructure maintenance. He 
not only reconstructed many fortresses and built more than 20,000 barracks,480 but 
also erected border walls hundreds of miles long to protect the grain shipment 
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routes.481 However, when He Qing was determined to fully refresh the northwest 
Sichuan military, the local situation ruthlessly struck him: as many soldiers were 
dispatched to reinforce old and construct new fortifications, a large proportion simply 
took this as a great opportunity to desert into the mountains.482 
    The mid-16th century desertions were quite different from those in the late 15th 
century in context, process, and consequence. First, the continued movements of the 
military population into the highland does not necessarily mean that the early 16th 
century reforms were unsuccessful. The reforms did refashion the military apparatus 
and adjust the power balance as the captivity and slavery of Ming soldiers by 
highland inhabitants almost completely disappears from Ming texts thereafter. In that 
case, why did the 1550s Ming soldiers still desert?  
    Zhao Shiyu proposes that the desertion in the mid-16th century should be 
understood in the context of a nationwide migration toward the frontiers. He argues 
that a booming population in the Chinese heartland prompted numerous Ming 
subjects to flood into the empire’s margins where living pressure was lighter but had 
more farmland, natural resources, and business opportunities.483 Therefore, quite 
different from those in the late 15th century who were captured and taken into the 
mountain, border crossings in mid-16th century northwest Sichuan were spontaneously 
conducted by many Ming subjects in pursuit of easier lives. And they indeed had 
better living conditions. As I have demonstrated in previous sections, many Han 
people in the mountain lived miserably as unfree labors or even slaves in the late 15th 
century; but in the mid-16th century, their living conditions improved. Many of them, 
as shown in the Frontier Map of Songpan (松潘邊圖), converged in communities 
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exclusive to Han people and thus were not subject to non-Han rulers (Fig. 5.5). 
Others, although still taken in by the highland inhabitants, played much more 
important roles in those communities, as they could provide military information to 
help the non-Han groups compete with the Ming.484 
 
Fig. 5.5: Hamlet of Han people (漢人寨) in Frontier Map of Songpan 
    Fully aware of the value of these defeated Ming subjects as both fighters and 
laborers, He Qing realized the best and only way to stop the soldiers from deserting 
was to eliminate the communities to which his soldiers were heading. Hence, when 
the maintenance work was done, He Qing began to use violent means to stop 
desertion. Starting from the 1550s, he launched several large-scale military campaigns 
and achieved remarkable success. The bloodiest campaigns were fought with the 
Baicao community. In a series of battles against Baicao, He Qing’s troops in total 
destroyed 47 hamlets, burned down 4,800 Diao Houses (碉房), a northwest Sichuan 
style of stone building that combined defensive and accumulation function, and took 
 





tens of thousands of livestock, grain stores, and weapons as war rewards.485 Countless 
indigenes were killed or became homeless. It was also during this process that He 
Qing started to “filter” the highland communities by teasing the deserted Ming 
soldiers out.  
    Baicao (白草), as one primary target of He Qing’s campaigns, was long believed to 
be an ethnic Qiang community in the Ming court’s narrative. Together with Baima 
and Mugua, the three communities constituted the so-called ‘three Qiang of 
Longzhou,’ and Baicao was considered the most villainous one.486 For a long time, 
Baicao had created significant trouble for the Ming military. It frequently attacked 
Ming forts, plundered grain caravans, and captured and enslaved Ming soldiers until 
He Qing’s ruthless suppression. But according to those who participated in the battle 
or were in charge of post-war reconstruction, Baicao was not a Qiang community at 
all. Zhang Shiche, the civil official who commanded the battle together with He Qing, 
pointed out that Baicao was in fact a community newly established by Fan migrants 
who moved around in the highland.487 Yuan Zirang, a local official who was in charge 
of post-war reconstruction, also wrote in his first-hand notes that “those who we used 
to identify as Qiang in Longzhou such as Baima and Baicao are now all deemed Fan; 
with the Fan expanding in all directions, the Qiang will be forgotten!”488 Yet contrary 
to Yuan’s anxiety-ridden words, Qu Jiusi, another civil official working in the 
northwest Sichuan frontier, noted completely different observations. Qu claimed: 
“The three Longzhou Qiang communities each have around five hundred inhabitants. 
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But most of them are actually ethnic Han. Taking shelter in the mountain, these Han 
people have offered the indigenes much help!” 489  
    Instead of understanding these records as mutually exclusive narratives, I argue that 
they together point to the hybrid nature of the Baicao community. Because of the 
frequent flow of people in the region, the ethnic constitution of Baicao had already 
became quite mixed. In other words, even if Baicao was a Qiang community at the 
time of its first contact with the Ming, in the mid-16th century, Han people and 
Tibetans had already become significant parts of the population’s makeup. Yet in the 
Ming court’s records, the community was still documented as a Qiang group, thus 
prompting Yuan Zirang’s and Qu Jiusi’s surprise. Here we see a gap between macro-
history narrative and local reality. On one hand, many Ming officials tended to 
categorize highland communities with static ethnic labels and even debated whether a 
community was essentially Qiang or Fan; on the other hand, such understandings 
failed to capture the fluidity of the region: flexibility, contingency, and even 
uncertainty. Thus, ethnic taxonomy, as an analytical framework, was of little help for 
both Ming officials and modern historians. As a diverse array of populations 
frequently moved around the highland, ethnic boundaries were easily transgressed and 
transcended.  
    Ethnic terms were not very useful to characterize the hybrid highland communities 
such as Baicao, and the terms were not applicable to categorize Ming subjects in the 
highland either. He Qing’s post-war policy best attests to this point. During the 
military contact, He Qing and other Ming officials noticed that many captured Ming 
subjects were enslaved in the Baicao community. Therefore, by taming the rebellious 
Baicao, He Qing must have thought that it was time for these Ming subjects to return. 
 





But to his surprise, many of these former Ming subjects simply refused to leave the 
mountain. One memorial attributed such a seemingly incomprehensible situation to a 
concern for the safety of the Ming captives. These Ming subjects, who were stuck in 
the mountains under coercion, had stayed with the Baicao community for so long that 
even their appearance and daily mannerisms had changed to the non-Han style. 
Therefore, they were quite worried that the Ming troops would take advantage of their 
unrecognizable appearance and kill them as barbarians for rewards. Many of them 
thus chose to stay alive in the mountains rather than take the chance of being 
misrecognized.490 Once informed of this situation, He Qing immediately took action. 
He ordered white flags to be erected at every traffic intersections with “amnesty for 
the “Han” people (招撫漢人)” written large in Chinese script. In addition, he 
requested Ming officials to stand by these flags as supervisors to make detailed 
registers and testimonials for the returners.491 The information that He Qing wanted to 
deliver was quite clear: the safety of those who were willing to return would be 
guaranteed. By doing this, He Qing believed that those who wanted to reclaim their 
Ming identity would not just die in the woods or go back to the rebellious groups.492  
    What He Qing did was quite considerate, and I believe it is highly possible that, 
although historical materials did not specify, many deserted Ming subjects were 
convinced and returned to their previous lives. However, I argue that the Ming 
official’s memorial only tells half of the story. It serves a specific political purpose to 
create a benevolent and compassionate image of He Qing but disguises some other 
information regarding fugitive Ming subjects in the mountains. In fact, other than 
those being captured, many former Ming subjects in the highland were proactive 
 
490 Zhang, Zhiyuan ji, 367. 
491 Zhang, Zhiyuan ji, 375. 





deserters, just like those who deserted under He Qing’s nose when they were 
dispatched for construction or sentry duty. In other words, these soldiers deserted of 
their own volition. And they must have made this decision after clear consideration, 
and thus would not easily answer He Qing’s call to resume their identity in the Ming 
military. For those who refused to continue to be Ming subjects, it was easy to hide in 
the mountains because, as the previous memorial showcases, it was not difficult for 
people to change their appearance and lifestyle or pick up new languages. In that 
regard, one may wonder: What exactly does ethnic label, such as Han, mean on the 
ground? And how did people decide one’s ethnicity when classic ethnic indicators 
such as language, custom and appearance all lose efficacy? 
    He Qing’s methods for retrieving “Han” people from the mountain address these 
questions to some degree.493 As was written on his flags, those who answered his call 
and resumed their imperial duties would be embraced as “Han.” As the reasoning 
goes, those who chose not to return, although they were ethnically not different from 
those who did return, were thus deemed “non-Han.” In this regard, I argue that one 
important message He Qing’s policy reveals is the transformation of “Han” from an 
ethnic label to a jurisdictional status marker. What separated “Han” from “non-Han” 
did not lie in ethnic features, but whether the referent would serve the Ming in its 
imperial apparatus. “Han” was used by He Qing as a pronoun for “Ming subject.” It 
thus became a frame of reference to determine one’s political identity, according to 
which being “Han” and being a Ming subject were one and the same. In this vein, 
“Han” and “non-Han” were no longer ethnic concepts but were politicized into 
jurisdictional statuses.  
 
493 Here Han in quotation mark is a proper noun in specific context.It refers to what He Qing meant in 招撫漢人. 





    The mid-16th century battles undoubtedly failed to draw all Han people out of the 
highland mountains. Many of them stayed behind and kept playing important roles in 
affecting power dynamics in the late 16th century highland. Some lived in non-Han 
communities and taught tactics to their fellows in the community to deal with 
incoming Ming invasions.494 Others stayed behind for religious reasons. Among the 
Tibetan Buddhists living in Baima, another so-called Qiang community, many of 
them were highly possible ethnic Han judging by their names. To be more specific, 
within the 12 out of 18 hamlets in the Baima community where Tibetan Buddhists 
dwelled, at least 4 had ethnic-Han Tibetan Buddhists. Chapter 3 has already pointed 
out that after the Chenghua reign, ethnic-Han people were not allowed to practice 
Tibetan Buddhism anymore. Therefore, many of them who were already Tibetan 
Buddhists by then and chose religious belief over political affiliation moved into the 
highland mountains where Ming laws were less effective. While these former Ming 
subjects kept their Chinese surname, allowing modern historians to speculate about 
their ethnic backgrounds, many other deserted soldiers successfully assimilated 
themselves into the highland society. They changed their surnames, formed new 
kinship relations in the mountain, and eventually de-sinicized themselves.495 As time 
went by, the Han features in these deserters would only become more and more 
tenuous.  
    In his monograph examining cultural contact between Ming officials and non-Han 
groups in Guangxi, Leo Shin argues that the encounter with the somewhat barbaric 
mountain dwellers catalyzed the formation of a sense of Chineseness among many 
Ming elites and thus shaped the ideological contours of an ethnocultural China.496 
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While Shin mainly pays attention to elite narratives, I have drawn on local highland 
examples to portray a seemingly opposite historical process: as the Ming forces 
interacted with the highland society, many ethnocultural concepts were gradually 
deconstructed by the fluidity embedded in frontier migration. But this does not 
necessarily mean that my argument contradicts that of Leo Shin. Rather, such a 
contrast brings out the nuance embedded in the center-periphery paradigm and 
reminds readers of the importance of examining the two sides of the story together. 
    Here, I have proposed that, in the highland society, ethnic identity, which can be 
quite flexible and thus transformative, was not so important in the local power 
dynamics; what was really at stake was one’s political allegiance, which determined 
his or her social position. In this regard, the highland provides a space where 
ethnicity, as the dominant analytical framework, may be revisited and the 
multidimensionality of many seemingly well-established terms and concepts is 
revealed. 
Summary 
    This chapter focused on population movements in the highland. It demonstrates 
how such movements were initiated, regulated, and negotiated by different parties as 
their intentions and understanding were oftentimes at odds. In the late 15th century, the 
highland was a place where indigenes overpowered Ming soldiers. Highland 
inhabitants, whose stable supply of various resources through the tributary system 
was terminated, became quite aggressive; Ming soldiers, who had enjoyed decades-
long peace and were unable to respond to such aggressions, could only maintain a 
defensive position and behaved rather feebly. Many Ming soldiers were thus bullied, 
killed, and captured by the highland inhabitants, making the region a hell to common 





Mongols moved southwest to the other side of the highland, the Ming was forced to 
reposition the highland in its strategic map. Large-scope military reforms were thus 
carried out with the intention to bring back military morale to prepare for possible 
attacks by the Mongols. Yet the limits of Ming China’s capacity for mounting 
imperial expansion were also exposed through these reforms. As new fortresses were 
built and more soldiers dispatched in the highland, military desertion prevailed. But in 
the process of regulating such unwanted movements, the Ming empire found its 
taxonomy based on ethnic categorizations outdated and useless. Therefore, many 
seemingly ethnocultural labels began to adopt new connotations, morphing into 
jurisdictional concepts and political markers. Tracing the behavior of Ming military 
deserters, this chapter has illustrated how the flow of population played its role in 









Chapter 6: Lands 
 
     In the modern era, territory is a twinned concept with sovereignty, and together the 
two elements function as significant pillars to erect nation-states featuring clearly 
marked border lines. For empires, in contrast, territories at the frontier act as 
touchstones to reveal the extent and facility of imperial expansion. As Charles Maier 
points out, “Empires… emerged from the interactions of frontier with the historical 
center,” thus they were “created from the outside in.”497 This chapter examines the 
role and function of the highland as a buffer zone territory in the geopolitical 
interaction between East and Inner Asian regimes during the pre-modern era. It 
examines how perceptions of the highland were affected by the negotiation and 
contestation between Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan regimes over the region’s 
territoriality. Examining land utilization, natural resource extraction, and the attendant 
jurisdictional disputes, this chapter argues that the late 16th century competition over 
the highland played a key role in the region’s transformation from a borderland into a 
border.  
    In the 16th century, the relationship between Ming China and its neighboring 
regimes was more than what is described in the simplified binary framework of 
“domination” and “resistance.” Rather, the mutuality between the so-called center and 
periphery, as Kathlene Baldanze points out in her examination of the Ming-Vietnam 
encounter, was defined by constant negotiation.498 This chapter further suggests that 
the negotiation over territory-crossing played a major role in such interactions. As we 
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can see from the scholarship reviewed below, it is oftentimes the back and forth 
between attempts of regulating frontier territory-crossing and efforts that aimed at 
challenging such attempts that characterized these interactions, leading to the 
transformation of frontier territory from borderland to border. Eric Talizcozzo’s 
Secret Trades, Porous Borders illustrates how the ability to regulate the unsanctioned 
movement of goods over thousands of miles of coastline became the venue to test the 
limit of imperial expansion and the scope of the imperial control of the Dutch and 
British in their southeast Asian colonies.499 Seonmin Kim’s research on Qing-Chosen 
interactions at their buffer zone speaks directly to the correlation between border 
crossing and the nature of frontier territory. As the Qing sought to maintain a 
monopoly over the production of ginseng in its Manchuria frontier, it put strict 
regulations on the movement of people and wished to militarize a loosely charted 
borderland into a clearly demarcated boundary. In these two cases, the attempts to 
weaken, if not challenge, control over border crossing were all countered from the 
bottom up by forces that intended to prevent the transformation of frontier territory 
from borderland to boundary. While the European colonists’ idea of monitoring and 
curtailing smuggling was confronted by coastal inhabitants for the sake of their daily 
livelihood, the Manchus were persuaded by the Chosŏn Koreans through the rhetoric 
of the tributary system and eventually dropped the idea of demarcating a middle 
ground. In both cases, how to perceive, control, or take advantage of territorial 
crossings was closely tied to how the frontier territory were defined.  
    From roughly the 1540s to the 1590s, the highland witnessed a higher frequency of 
the drastic movement of goods, religious beliefs, and people than before. This was 
 






mainly caused by the Mongol civil war, the forming of a Mongol-Tibetan religious 
community, and the Ming’s military response to these changes at the time. With 
various communities flocking to and mingled in the highland, the region soon became 
a place where new ideas and norms overwrote old principles. By the end of the 16th 
century, the highland had transformed from an uncharted territory into a crowded 
nexus in the “great game” between China, Mongol, and Tibet. This chapter 
consequently looks at how the series of geopolitical interactions over transregional 
movement affected the territoriality of the region. 
Highland as a Shelter Without Enough Oxygen 
    The direct catalyst for a large number of Mongols entering the highland in the early 
16th century was the Mongol civil war, in tandem with the rise of Dayan Khan (1473-
1517) and his grandson, Altan Khan (1507-1582). Known for reuniting many 
Mongols under Chinggisid supremacy, Dayan Khan had subjugated many central and 
eastern Mongol communities by 1500. However, his rise to power was also 
confronted by some Mongols in the west, including a major opponent called Ibarai, 
who was possibly Muslim.500 As the powerful leader of a western horde of Mongols 
whose military base was at the foot of Mt. Helan, Ibarai posed an obstacle for Dayan 
Khan. A civil war eventually broke out. Although he commanded mighty military 
force, Ibarai was eventually defeated when half of his troops surrendered.501 Ibarai 
himself fled northwest toward his military base. But when he noticed that his base 
was within Dayan Khan’s reach, Ibarai turned to the southeast and arrived in the 
highland region after bypassing Jiayu Pass, the far western end of the Ming’s military 
defensive zone (Fig. 6.1). 
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Fig. 6.1: Different Routes for Ibarai and the chasing army to arrive at Xihai area502  
    Though Ibarai was on the losing side in the civil war, his troops remained strong in 
the eyes of many Ming officials on the Gansu frontier and were treated as a 
destructive force and great threat to the area. One of these Ming frontier officials, 
named Zhang Yi, even sent gold and silk fabrics to Ibarai to bribe him to turn away to 
other administrative regions.503 After some wandering around, by 1520, Ibarai and his 
troops gradually settled down around the Qinghai Lake, which was designated as 
Xihai, the “sea in the west,” because of the lake’s extensive size. For this reason, 
Mongol forces who settled down near the Qinghai Lake from then on were oftentimes 
deemed as “hai kou” (bandits of the sea) in Ming texts. One has to note that Ibarai 
was not the only Mongol leader who kept himself away from the northern steppe and 
settled near the Qinghai Lake. Other leaders, such as Mandulai Aqalaqu, another 
opponent to Dayan Khan’s rule,504 and Burqai, Dayan Khan’s half-brother,505 all left 
Dayan Khan’s domain and moved to the Xihai region following Ibarai’s routes. By 
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the 1540s, the steppe to the Ming’s west had become a place where the losers of 
Mongol civil wars or rebels took shelter.  
    Consequently, the highland became an enclave for a large volume of Mongol 
immigrants. Many Mongol leaders who opposed Dayan Khan’s rule formed an 
alliance in the face of constant pursuit from the northern steppe. Although Dayan 
Khan himself had already passed away at the time, his two grandsons, Mergen Jinong 
and Alta Anda,506 who later received the honorific title of “Altan Khan,” clearly 
understood the imperative to eliminate those who had fled to the highland. Therefore, 
in the 1520s and 1530s, they frequently sent large parties to the highland in order to 
completely eliminate the rebels.507 However, the expeditionary forces did not take the 
detour as Ibarai had: they departed from Ordos, cut through Ming territory directly, 
and swiftly entered the highland region (Fig. 6.1). Although nominally belonging to 
the Ming, the region of the eastern part of modern-day Gansu was scarcely populated. 
The statewide inefficiency of the Ming’s garrison system starting from the mid- to 
late 15th century made the military in the region even more incapable, and that is why 
frontier generals like Zhang Yi had to buy peace from the transient Mongols. Similar 
to the sparsely distributed weak troops, the frontier walls in the region were also 
unable to stop the Mongols: they came by tens of thousands, tearing down any walls 
along their way and moving on.508 To these expeditionary Mongol troops, traversing 
the Ming claimed territory was just like traveling through no man’s land.  
    The Ming military’s inability to check the Mongols’ movement in and out of the 
highland was not unknown to Ming officials. From the early decades of the 16th 
century, certain frontline commanders proposed and geared up for military 
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confrontation with the trespassing Mongols. On the one hand, they were busy with 
deploying soldiers and preparing military logistics such as purchasing horses and 
digging trenches.509 On the other hand, they sent many memorials to the Ming court to 
ask for financial support as well as approval for their possible military actions.510 But 
these radical agendas were not all favored among other officials. Many frontier 
officials were more cautious about launching large-scale military action after a 
detailed evaluation of the costs and benefits of war.511 Others who thought the tension 
between different Mongol groups was a good opportunity to carry out the somewhat 
classic “divide and rule” strategy proposed to pacify the Mongols by gradually 
drawing them back into the tributary system through political and economic 
benefits.512 Such prolonged discussion of frontier policies was not unique at the time: 
similar protracted debates had taken place at the Ming court several years earlier 
concerning the walling project in Ordos.513 By 1525, the Ming court had decided to 
maintain a conservative position in response to the Mongols’ frequent traversal of the 
highland by acting only in defense.514  
    The way the Ming reacted to the Mongol actions reflected this defensive stance, 
which included the building of an extensive new military infrastructure. According to 
Arthur Waldron, the 16th century marked the peak of the Ming dynasty’s walling 
project.515 But most walls built at the time were located in Xuanfu or Datong, regions 
closer to Beijing with more strategic significance, while fewer were built in more 
remote regions such as the northwest highland. In this area, it was military 
infrastructure such as forts, instead of walls, that were primarily constructed. Drawing 
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on data from local gazetteers and military guidebooks, in addition to my own 
fieldwork, I used GIS software, namely Google Earth and ArcGis, to pin down a total 
of 520 military infrastructures in areas of contemporary southern Gansu and eastern 
Qinghai. An analysis of their spatial distribution reveals nuances about Ming China’s 
frontier policies at the time. 
 
 
Fig. 6.2: The Spatial Distribution of 520 Military Infrastructures in the administrative 
zones of Hezhou, Taozhou, Minzhou, and Xining Guard516 
    Fig. 6.2 demonstrates the spatial distribution of Ming military infrastructures within 
the administrative zones of Hezhou, Taozhou, Minzhou and Xining Guard. These 
military infrastructures were not built at the same time, but most of them were 
constructed in the early 16th century, making possible a deep dive into the logic of 
mid-Ming military deployment.517 As a defensive belt that includes various 
infrastructures such as fortresses (堡), guard posts (墩), hamlets (寨), mountain passes 
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(关), river ferries (渡), and relay stations (站), the Ming empire implemented in the 
highland a plan which greatly resembled what was being constructed around the same 
time in the empire’s north– the Great Wall, or, to use the contemporaneous phrase, the 
Nine frontier zones (九邊). One may argue that these frontier fort projects came from 
the similar court ideology which relied on physical military infrastructures to guard 
ward off nomadic Mongols. But even if they were challenged by the same type of 
enemies, there was much that the Ming’s northern and highland frontiers did not hold 
in common.   
    Topography was one important and unique factor that characterized how the Ming 
constructed its defensive infrastructure in the highland. Unlike the empire’s northern 
frontier where the terrain was flat, the Ming’s western frontier was much more 
mountainous. Therefore, both the way that topography factored into the construction 
of military infrastructure and the importance of terrain varied between the two 
frontiers. While in the north, topography, as one among many strategic concerns, 
mainly determined the course of the wall, on the Ming’s western frontier, it was a 
vital factor for to the survival of the frontier soldiers. Map 6.2 indicates that the 
Ming’s military infrastructure was mostly constructed along the eastern edge of the 
steppe and the base of the mountains. The reason for this spatial pattern was not 
because the regime explicitly forbade its army from marching toward the steppe or an 
anti-steppe sentiment. Drawing on geographic and topographic data, I argue that such 
a spatial pattern did not stem from strategic or ideological concerns but was related to 
environmental constraints: constraints not posed by steppe grassland or mountain 
forests, but by tenuous oxygen.   
    To reveal the logic behind this map, I first converted a three-dimensional 





military construction. Then, after data mining and matching with digital elevation 
model (DEM), I managed to extract the altitude data of each military construction  
 
Table. 6.1: Amount of Ming Military Infrastructure by Altitude 
    Table 6.1 shows a bar chart that measures and groups the number of Ming military 
infrastructure by altitude. More than half of the military’s infrastructure was built 
within the altitude range of 2,200 and 2,600 meters. As the altitude rises, the chance 
of building military construction decreases. Also, the Ming soldiers seldom chose 
places with an altitude higher than 3,000 meters for building stationing outposts, even 
if many strategic spots, such as the Qinghai Lake, were higher than 3,000 meters. In 
this regard, strategic concerns were not at play either. The reason behind such 
behaviors, I argue, is related to altitude sickness.    
    Altitude is a crucial factor that restrained the Ming’s imperial penetration into its 
western frontier. Because the higher the elevation, the easier the Ming soldiers would 
suffer from altitude illness. Biological and medical studies have suggested that high 
altitude environments can result in multiple health problems for those unacclimated, 
such as acute mountain sickness, high-altitude cerebral edema, and high-altitude 
pulmonary edema. Although not recorded in Ming dynasty texts, symptoms of 
altitude illness such as headaches, vomiting, dizziness, or oxygen deficiency were 





highland.518 Ming soldiers were not immune to these sicknesses. Contemporary 
studies have shown that in the Swiss Alps, symptoms of high-altitude sickness 
occurred only in 9% of climbers at the height of 2850 m, but increased to 13% and 
34% when altitude reached 3,050 m and 3,650 m respectively.519 One has to note that 
Ming soldiers in the highland were not merely hiking: they had to wear heavy armor 
and took on work that required intensive physical labor, such as infrastructure 
construction and combat. Therefore, they were much more vulnerable to altitude 
sickness. Taking the risk of being ahistorical, this chapter suggests that high altitude 
sickness constitutes one significant ecological factor that affected imperial agendas, 
just like how the deep forest in Qing dynasty Yunnan and the mosquitos in the early 
modern Caribbean islands demonstrated the agency of the environment.520  
    High altitude not only weakened Ming soldiers’ physical conditions; it also affected 
the empire’s logistics. First, farming in high altitude environments was quite difficult. 
Not only would dry air and low temperature damage grain yield, the barren soil of the 
region also rendered production quite low. Locally produced grain, as previous 
chapters have shown, could not meet the needs of a large army. But when it came to 
grain shipment, the high altitude posed great obstacles yet again. One can imagine 
how difficult and inefficient hard labor such as hauling grain can be in high altitude 
environments. This partially explains why Songpan was the most controversial 
military outpost in the Ming court debates, since its 2,850m altitude makes it the 
highest in the northwest Sichuan military zone and thus very difficult for logistics 
management. In the high-altitude highland region, it was the inadaptability of both 
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human beings and grains to a tenuous oxygen supply that slowed the pace of Ming 
China’s imperial expansion 
    The high altitude also affected the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols in the 
highland. According to several Ming military housemen who were captured by the 
Mongols but later managed to escape, the Mongols in the highland would move 
southward to the steppe of northwest Sichuan for the winter and only returned to the 
pasture near the Qinghai Lake during summer.521 Gradually, this became a seasonal 
pattern of nomadic movement for the Mongols in the highland.522 Such a pattern, I 
argue, was related to the high altitude of the region as well. The Qinghai Lake area 
was quite elevated, and thus too cold and dry during the winter for livestock to 
endure. In comparison, the northwest Sichuan steppe, which was lower in both 
latitude and altitude, was a warmer place to herd livestock. The high altitude of the 
highland not only kept the Ming soldiers away, but also affected the nomadic pattern 
of the Mongols. 
    What did the highland region mean to both the Ming and Mongol regimes in the 
early 16th century? This section has argued that what various groups valued about the 
region was not the land itself, but its strategic importance. For the defeated Mongols, 
the highland was mainly a shelter that provided accommodation. The Ming military, 
in contrast, relied on the highland to construct its defensive military infrastructure in 
the face of the growing Mongol threat. In the meantime, the activities of both parties 
were affected by the local environmental conditions. Neither side could make use of 
the land in a more substantial manner, and it is not likely that they had developed 
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much of a sense of territoriality toward the highland. These changes would took place 
in the coming decades. 
   The highland was a shelter for Mongols for decades. But it was very difficult for 
Ibarai and his allies to hide forever as their locations were soon known to Dayan Khan 
and his successors. In order to completely eliminate the threats to their unification 
enterprise, Mongol leaders in Ordos conducted in total six expeditions from 1525 to 
1550s to attack the Mongols in the highland. Although they managed to resist and 
survive for decades, the Mongol rebels were eventually defeated by Altan Khan in 
1558, which brought an end to the long-term Mongolian schism and opened a new 
page for the highland’s history.523 
Highland as a Religious Realm 
    In the early and mid-16th century, transregional movements in the highland were 
prompted by the fierce Mongol civil war to which the Ming responded with passive 
and defensive frontier policies. With the defeat of the Mongol renegades, the highland 
region entered a new era of peaceful Ming-Mongol relations and laid the foundation 
for a Mongol-Tibetan alliance. The following two sections focus on how religious and 
economic factors incentivized the flow of people and how such transregional 
movements reflected different territorial perceptions of the highland.   
    From the mid-16th century, divisions began to emerge in the Mongol steppe shortly 
after the death of Dayan Khan, who managed to unite many individual communities 
for the first time in centuries. Different Mongol groups attacked each other for various 
reasons and interacted with the Ming individually. Out of this geopolitical 
fragmentation, Altan Khan gradually came into power and greatly reshaped the power 
dynamics in the highland. 
 





    Altan Khan was born in 1508 as one of many grandsons of Dayan Khan. Despite 
starting from an inferior military rank, Altan Khan gradually gained reputation and 
power through his remarkable military achievements and became the ruler of the 
western wing of Mongols. In addition to eliminating the rebels in the Xihai area and 
subordinating Uriyangqad in the north and Oirads in the west, Altan Khan also 
actively consolidated his power via diplomatic and ideological means.  
    Diplomatically, Altan Khan endeavored to improve the relationship with the Ming. 
But unlike his grandfather who sought to unite all Mongols, Altan Kahn was more 
keen to consolidate power only in his own ulus.524 From 1542 afterwards, Altan Khan 
attempted to establish trade relations with the Ming by dispatching envoys and 
returning Chinese captives.525 However, the conservative Ming court, exemplified by 
Emperor Jiajing’s extreme resentment toward the Mongols, was not interested in 
Altan Khan’s peace-seeking gestures. Therefore, Ming-Mongol relations were highly 
charged throughout the xenophobic Jiajing reign (1522-1566)  until the throne was 
passed to the relatively open-minded Longqing emperor (1567-1572). Persuaded by 
court ministers such as Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng who were much more realistic 
toward interacting with the Mongols,526 the Longqing emperor made up his mind to 
end the Mongol issue with a peace treaty in 1571.527 
    Throughout his life, Altan Khan tried to solidify his authority by drawing 
legitimacy from various religions. Following Mongol indigenous religions in the very 
beginning, Altan Khan later turned to the White Lotus religion for political 
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legitimation.528 However, as was agreed in one article of the 1571 peace treaty, the 
White Lotus hierarchs, seen by the Ming as subversives (and therefore heretics), were 
extradited back to the Ming for torture and public execution.529 From then on, Tibetan 
Buddhism, the Geluk sect specifically, became the dominant religion of Altan Khan’s 
regime.530 
    In the 16th century, the Mongols, especially those in modern-day Northern Tibet 
and Southern Qinghai, already had close and frequent interactions with Tibetan 
Buddhist monks.531 For Altan Khan himself, after encountering Tibetan Buddhism in 
1558 for the first time,532 he decided to convert to Tibetan Buddhism in 1571.533 
Although Chinese materials suggest that Altan Khan made this decision to cleanse his 
soul after decades of war and violence,534 Elverskog argues that conversion into 
Tibetan Buddhism went along with Altan’s regime-building enterprise that he was 
only seeking benefits for his own ulus but not the entire Mongol nation.535 Whichever 
the reason was, in 1574, Altan Khan sent an envoy group with an invitation to the 
great Geluk sect monk, Sonam Gyatso, who was later known as the third Dalai Lama, 
for a meeting. 
    Sonam Gyatso was quite hesitant at first when he received the invitation, until a 
patron of the Geluk sect, Ngawang Drakpa from the Phagmodru family in central 
Tibet, encouraged him to accept it.536 After all, the support from a powerful Mongol 
Khan could be a significant source of support for the Geluk sect’s disadvantaged 
 
528 About Altan’s choices for different religion as his ideological source, see Lü, “Shilun Andahan Dui Yishi 
Xingtai de Xuanze.” 
529 Qu, Wanli Wugong Lu, 444. Xu, “Zhao Quan Qiren.” 
530 Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road. 
531 A‘wang luosang jiasuo, Yishi Sishi Dalai Lama Zhuan, 187. Also see Sperling, “Notes on References to ‘Bri-
Gung-Pa-Mongol Contact in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,” 743. Serruys, “Early Lamaism 
in Mongolia.” 
532 Elverskog, The Jewel Translucent Sūtra, 108. 
533 Daoruntibu, Xinyi Jiaozhu “Menggu Yuanliu,” 376. 
534 Qu, Wanli Wugong Lu, 708. 
535 Elverskog, The Jewel Translucent Sūtra, 14-15. 





position in Tibet’s fierce political and religious competition.537  Moreover, Sonam 
Gyatso was looking for chances to build a diplomatic relationship with the Ming, and 
Altan Khan had such connections. In retrospect, Altan indeed helped to introduce 
Sonam Gyatso to the Ming frontier officials and court ministers afterwards.538 
Obviously for a religious leader under heavy political pressure, support from external 
sources was always welcome. Therefore, Sonam Gyatso accepted Altan Khan’s 
invitation.  
    Upon hearing this news, Altan Khan began to prepare for the Tibetan monk’s 
arrival. On the one hand, from 1574 to 1578, he dispatched in total five groups of 
Mongol envoys to greet Sonam Gyatso. Each of them was comprised of hundreds of 
envoys, and the last one had more than 3,000 people.539 On the other hand, Altan 
Khan sent his fourth son, Bingtu, to the Xihai area to take charge of building a 
monastery for Altan Khan to meet Sonam Gyatso. At first, Bingtu planned to build 
the monastery at Wuwang Cheng, “the city of five kings” (see Map 5.3). But after a 
series of negotiations with the Ming, which I will elaborate on in the next section, 
Bingtu at last chose Chabchiyal, a site just to the south of the Qinghai Lake, to build 
the monastery. The entire project for the religious complex took around two years, 
and many laborers, craftsmen, and architecture materials were provided by the 
Ming.540 In 1577 when the construction was done, the Ming also granted a Chinese 
name, Yanghua, to the monastery, meaning this monastery symbolized the Mongols’ 
“admiration for China.”541 
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    After years of preparation, in 1578, Altan Khan finally met with Sonam Gyatso in 
Chabchiyal. It was said that more than one hundred thousand Chinese, Mongol, and 
Tibetan believers gathered for the great ceremony.542 During the meeting, Sonam 
Gyatso claimed himself to be the reincarnation of Phagpa and Altan Khan the 
reincarnation of Qubilai Khan. In this way, he made an analogy that the alliance 
between himself and Altan Khan was similar to the time-honored priest-patron 
relationship between Phagpa with Qubilai Khan. Meanwhile, Sonam Gyatso gave the 
monastery a Tibetan name, rnam par rgyal ba'i phan bde legs bshad gling, which 
means “the continent of victorious and blessed teachings.”543 In return, Altan Khan 
designated Sonam Gyatso as "Dalai", a Mongol word that means “Ocean.”544 The 
meeting by Qinghai Lake was a watershed moment in the history of Mongol-Tibetan 
relations, and it reflected the Mongols’ changed perception of the highland region. 
    Before the 1578 meeting, the highland was nothing more than a shelter to the 
Mongols. From an environmental perspective, the area was not very attractive to the 
Mongols simply because it was too cold. In 1559, when Altan Khan eliminated the 
rebels in the highland and, according to some accounts, was planning to settle for 
good, he could not get used to the climate and got sick; thus he went back to Ordos.545 
Probably for this reason, the Mongols did not consider the area as a land fit for the 
Mongols. As mentioned by Altan Khan himself, Qinghai Lake was where the Han, 
Mongol, and Tibetan worlds intersected, meaning that the highland region was an 
outside world according to traditional Mongol geographical perception.546  
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    However, the highland region’s meaning to the Mongols radically changed after the 
1578 meeting. It was no longer taken as a cold and dry temporary refuge or foreign 
land, but as a religious bridge that connected the Mongols to central Tibet, the sacred 
Buddhist realm. Therefore, although Altan Khan did not dwell long in Xihai and soon 
returned to the Mongol steppe after the meeting, he left quite a large number of 
underlings to stay in the highland region to further consolidate the politico-religious 
alliance with the Geluk sect Tibetans.547 Scholars have concluded that it was not until 
the Qinghai Lake meeting that a large number of west wing Mongols began to 
migrate and settle down in the Xihai area.548 Thus, religion was the primary incentive 
for the Mongols to change their perspective on the highland region. 
 
Fig. 6.3: Mongol-patronized Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries from 1574 to 1578549 
    From the 1570s on, many Mongol activities in the highland were centered around 
religious affairs. Fig. 6.3 displays the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that the Mongols 
built or had planned to build from 1574 to 1578. It is clear that other than the 
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Wuwang Cheng site, all the other monasteries were constructed near the Qinghai 
Lake and, unsurprisingly, all of them were Geluk sect monasteries. In the coming 
decades, more monasteries were built in the area, such as Niegongchuan Si and A-wa 
Si.550 However, most of them did not leave much of an imprint on history, which is 
probably because they were portable monasteries that fit the Mongols’ nomadic 
lifestyle better.551 One should also note that in addition to the Geluk sect Tibetan 
Buddhism, the Mongols had established a patron-priest relationship with other sects. 
Yet because of the Gelugpas’ hegemony in historical narrative, this evidence was 
omitted.552 One good example, as pointed out by Elliot Sperling, is that Chöjé Gön, a 
Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Dzamtang on the modern-day Sichuan-Tibet frontier 
south of the area covered by Fig. 6.3, was also under the patronage of the Mongols 
who arrived in the Xihai area in the 1570s. This monastery belonged to the Jonang 
sect of Tibetan Buddhism, and its monastic abbot, Gyelwa Senggé, was given 
numerous gifts, along with a seal and official documents from Yüngsiyebü dayičing, a 
lord of western wing Mongols and also an underling of Altan Khan.553 The scarcity of 
existing materials does not allow for a full picture of Mongol patronage of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the highland region in the late 16th century, but the Mongols’ intense 
religious engagement at the time is quite evident.  
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Fig. 6.4: Routes of traversing Ming Territory by Tibetans and Mongols in the 1570s 
and 1580s 
Yellow: 1574 Mongol itinerary to the Qinghai Lake 
Green: 1578 Altan Khan’s round-trip itinerary for the Qinghai Lake Meeting  
Blue: Third Dalai Lama’s itinerary from Changdu to Tümed from 1582 to 1584 
 
    Religious factors not only played an important role in many Mongols settling down 
in the highland and reorganizing of their lifestyle. They also facilitated the 
transregional movements of many others in and out of the highland. Fig. 6.4 traces the 
Mongols’ cross-regional itineraries from 1574 to 1584. It is clear that the western 
wing Mongols in the 1570s, unlike their early 16th century predecessors, did not take a 
detour that bypassed Jiayu Pass (Jiayu Guan) to enter the highland. Instead, they cut 
through Ming territory directly. Moreover, this traversal was not done by force as they 
were before, but with the Ming’s permission under the peace treaty. In 1574, when the 





Ming’s frontier official reluctantly agreed to the requests. Yet he still directed the 
Mongols to the less populated frontier region in modern-day Jinchang in order to keep 
them away from eastern Gansu, which was considered as part of the Ming 
heartland.554 However, several years later, when Altan Khan himself needed to travel 
the Qinghai Lake and back, the Khan ignored the regulations and took the most direct 
route to cut through Ming territory.555 The reason that the Ming did not overly react to 
such actions, other than the fact that Altan Khan was the leader of the western wing 
Mongols, was also related to the purpose of the Khan’s trip: the Ming thought that 
since the Mongols were about to convert into Buddhism, a religion featuring 
benevolence and kindness which could keep the Mongols at peace, a minor violation 
of the rules would be tolerable. 556   
    The loose regulation of religion-related transregional movements was even more 
evident in Sonam Gyatso’s trip in the early 1580s, which had a long-lasting effect on 
the religious landscape of the highland. In 1582, Altan Khan was terribly sick and 
sent Mongol envoys to invite Sonam Gyatso, who by then was already known as the 
third Dalai Lama, to go to Tümed to carry out blessing rituals for his well-being. Yet 
when the third Dalai Lama arrived at the Qinghai Lake, he received news of Altan 
Khan’s demise. Since there was no need to rush anymore, the third Dalai Lama spent 
the next two years wandering around the highland region preaching. He attended and 
held numerous Buddhist ceremonies, visited many religious sites and Mongol 
communities, and helped build several new monasteries.557 From his biography, it is 
clear that he frequently traversed the Ming-controlled highland region and yet met no 
obstacles. Moreover, many monasteries that the third Dalai Lama visited during this 
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period, such as the Kumbum Monastery and the Youning Monastery, all became the 
most important Geluk monasteries in the near future. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that because of the support from Altan Khan, modern-day northeast Qinghai became a 
stronghold for the Tibetan Buddhist Geluk school by the late 16th century. And that is 
most likely why Sonam Gyatso later announced Altan Khan’s grandson as his 
reincarnation, the fourth Dalai Lama. 
    As the Mongols were converting a rebel base into a Buddhist realm after the peace 
treaty, the Ming continued its earlier project—building military infrastructure. Taking 
the peaceful period as a golden opportunity, the Ming spent great effort to solidify its 
defensive fortifications in the region. In the previous decades, as the last section 
demonstrated, most military infrastructure the Ming constructed in the area were 
fortresses and watching outposts, and border walls were only erected in certain 
regions. But after the peace treaty, the Ming could devote more energy and funding to 
such projects without worrying about surprise Mongol attacks, leading to what 
archeologists describe as the “large-scale construction stage” of border walls in the 
region.558 In the 1570s, continuous walls were constructed, especially surrounding the 
Xining region in order to protect the most strategically important city in the area from 
potential Mongol attacks. 
    In this regard, we can conclude this examination by noting that while the Mongols’ 
territorial perception of the highland experienced transformative changes from a 
military shelter to a religious landscape, the Ming’s territorial perception of the region 
as a military stronghold did not change in essence, only in degree. From the Ming’s 
perspective, the Mongols’ transregional movements were not harmful since they were 
primarily for religious purposes. By 1580, the Ming did not yet treat the Mongols as 
 





permanent inhabitants of the highland region, and they thus allowed their traversal of 
Ming territory under certain conditions as a friendly gesture after the Ming-Mongol 
peace treaty. In the meantime, the Ming continued to emphasize the region’s military 
value and built more defensive infrastructure. In the 1570s, the Ming still considered 
the highland a region that ought to be closely monitored, but the court was also 
willing to see its society remain autonomous. The Ming valued the region’s strategic 
importance in the empire’s Mongol diplomacy but gave less attention to the highland 
itself and its inhabitants.  
Ripping off the Highland 
    One of the most important results of the 1571 Ming-Mongol treaty was the 
normalization of mutual trade. While the Ming interpreted this change in a typical 
China-centric tone in which the Mongols submitted to the Ming as a tributary sub-
regime,559 the Mongols depicted it as a moment when the Ming bought peace with 
various goods from the Mongols.560 Nevertheless, exchanges of various types of 
goods did kick off with increasing volume and frequency after the 1570s.  
    Despite a game change in Ming-Mongol relations, the Ming side made various 
rules to normalize trade. First, trade was confined to just a few appointed markets, and 
they were all located around the Ming’s Xuanfu, Datong, and Shanxi frontiers.561 
Secondly, no free trade was to take place in the market: the Mongols could only 
attend the market periodically, usually once a year, and the trade volume was 
technically fixed. Thirdly, each Mongol group was only allowed to trade at its 
specifically assigned market, and responsibilities were divided among the Mongol 
leaders to regulate the behavior of their underlings.562 
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    To no one’s surprise, the Mongols were not satisfied with these restrictions. 
Therefore, in the early 1570s, they used various tactics to break through the trade 
limits. For example, annual trade was quite inadequate for the Mongols. Therefore, 
they successfully requested monthly trade from the Ming in certain frontier 
markets.563 Moreover, the Mongols managed to convince the Ming to open up new 
markets in various places, including the highland region. 
    At first, the Ming did not plan to establish trade markets in the highland at all. One 
official noted that since there were already various indigenous groups, such as Fan 
people and Muslims, trading with the Ming in the highland region, allowing the 
Mongols to trade there would unnecessarily complicate the situation.564 In contrast, 
the Mongols were eager to have markets there. They kept pushing the Ming, even to 
the point of making threats, for new trade markets near the highland.565 At last, the 
Ming softened its attitude, but only agreed to establish one more market in Ningxia. 
In 1574, officials from Ming’s Ministry of War declared: “Markets cannot be set up in 
regions to the west of Ningxia. There is nothing to trade.”566 However, this conclusion 
was overturned by the Mongols in less than one year. 
    In 1575, the Mongols successfully persuaded the Ming, if not outright forced, to 
open up a new market specifically for those who dwelled in the highland. They were 
able to do so because they bundled this trading request with a pledge for monastery 
construction, toward which the Ming held a relatively favorable attitude. In 1574, 
when Bingtu was first dispatched to the region to build a monastery for the meeting, 
he filed a report to the Ming about the forthcoming construction in the highland. The 
Ming agreed to the request, arguing that believing in Buddhism was not a bad thing 
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for the Mongols. Still, the place that Bingtu picked made the Ming nervous. He 
wished to build the monastery at Wuwang Cheng, an open steppe merely 150 miles 
away from the Ming’s northwest Sichuan military base.567 Compared to the Ming’s 
northern frontier that was heavily consolidated during the previous decades, military 
defense in northwest Sichuan was still fragile. Therefore, Sichuan frontier officials 
were quite worried about Mongol presence and requested Bingtu to leave. But Altan 
Khan, the architect behind Bingyu’s moves, responded that the reason for Bingtu to 
linger around at Ming’s Sichuan frontier was that there was no trade market at Gansu, 
and the Ningxia market was too far away.568 By phrasing his narrative in this way, 
Altan Khan implied that once there was a Gansu trade market, Bingtu would be 
immediately recalled.  
    Some Ming officials at court maintained a pragmatic attitude toward such requests. 
Fang Fengshi, for example, was sure that the only reason for Bingtu to hang around 
the northwest Sichuan steppe was to give the Ming a certain level of anxiety; it was 
unlikely he would lead the troops to enter the deep mountains. For Bingtu, the trade 
market in Ningxia was indeed quite far away. Thus, once a functional market within 
his reach was opened, his defiant actions would naturally quiet down.569 Zhang 
Juzheng, another Ming court minister, agreed with this idea by saying that since the 
Fan people were allowed to trade in the highland regions, there was no reason why 
the Mongols shouldn’t be allowed to do the same.570 He was quite confident that 
various kinds of requests from the reckless Mongols could all be subtly dealt with. 
With the support and advocacy of these top-level officials, in 1575, a new market was 
established in Biandu Kou, which, according to Zhang Juzheng, was a perfect site for 
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mutual trade (Fig. 6.5). It was not too close to Xining where Bingtu could easily 
monopolize the trade, and it was also not too far from the Ming territory so that Ming 
subjects would not have to take a detour to get to the market.571 The Mongols warmly 
welcomed the approval of the Biandu Kou market. From 1576 to 1580, the market 
opened once a year, and each time for an entire month.572 According to Li Wenjun, 
the trade volume was quite considerable and even comparable to that of the northern 




Fig. 6.5: The spatial relationship between Wuwang Cheng and two Ming frontier 
markets 
    From the late 1570s to the early 1580s, as more and more Mongols began to settle 
down in the highland, the region’s geopolitical function also began to change. On the 
one hand, it remained an important area to solidify the Mongol-Tibetan alliance. 
Knowing the importance of tea to the Tibetans, the Mongols in the highland 
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frequently asked for tea from the Ming and gave it to the Tibetans as gifts to 
consolidate their alliance.574 On the other hand, the region’s economic function 
gradually came into play. It changed into a place where many Mongols settled to 
make their living. Such a changing role of the highland derived from the increasing 
economic independence of highland Mongols from their Ordos compatriots. As 
previously mentioned, each Mongol group could only trade at one specific market. 
For the highland Mongols, it was the Biandu Kou market per Bingtu’s earlier 
request.575 The Ming even announced that all the markets in the northwest frontier 
would have the exact same opening and closing dates in case any Mongol group 
attempted to commute between different markets for more trading opportunities.576 
Therefore, to trade with the Han people for various daily necessities, the Mongols in 
the region could only rely on the local land to raise livestock such as horses, instead 
of herding them from other regions. To feed themselves, they need to know the local 
pastures well in order to raise enough good-quality horses to trade with the Ming. The 
relatively higher price for horses at the Biandu Kou Market provided further incentive 
for the Mongols to work hard on the land.577 In this vein, the Mongols in the highland 
began to pay more attention to the region for the sake of their livelihood instead of 
religious reasons. 
    In 1578 when the meeting between Altan Khan and the third Dalai Lama ended, 
many Mongols returned to Ordos with Altan Khan. Yet at the same time, many others 
chose to stay in the pastures near the Qinghai Lake and began to treat the highland 
region as their new home. In this regard, we see that the nature of the highland in the 
eyes of the Mongols changed one more time. The place was transformed from a 
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shelter for rebels, to a venue imbued with religious sacredness, to a piece of land on 
which make a living. Fom then on, the Mongols in the highland poured in much effort 
to make the region prosper. 
     After 1578, the Mongols who remained in the highland used multiple methods to 
benefit from the land. First, they brought more horses to the market regardless of the 
fixed trading number set by the Ming. The Ming usually accepted the excess horses to 
demonstrate their generosity, warning the Mongols that the fixed quota should be 
strictly obeyed, only to pardon their violations again the next time.578 Second, the 
Mongols began to sell horses of inferior quality to the Ming. In 1583, a Gansu frontier 
commander reported to the court that the horses traded by the Mongols were either 
old or too skinny, and these feeble horses often died during military drills.579 Such 
situations also existed in frontier markets in the north.580 Third, having one trade 
market opened up for them, the Mongols in the highland wished to have more. In 
1578, Bingtu requested to establish a market in Taozhou, in addition to Biandu Kou, 
for his underlings to trade.581 The Ming rejected his demand. One year later, Altan 
Khan himself raised the same request to the Ming, but it is unlikely to have been 
successful as there was no records of trade there in the Ming documents.582 In 1584, 
Bingtu made the request again and wished to have not only Taozhou, but also Hezhou 
as legitimate trade markets.583 Although the Ming did not agree to these demands, 
they reflected the highland Mongols’ eagerness to have more trading opportunities 
with the Ming. 
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    The demands that highland Mongols made on the Ming attest to the development of 
their communities in the early 1580s. The Mongols gradually became accustomed to 
the highland natural environment. Therefore, they were able to increase horse 
production. In the meantime, they settled down well and thus needed more daily 
necessities which could only be acquired from the Ming. As pointed out by one Ming 
official, the Mongols “herd their livestock in the region, produce and raise their 
children in the region. Drinking the sweet water and enjoying the rich pasture, these 
Mongols begin to treat their northern base as a desert…there were all sorts of things 
that exist in the Xihai area but not the north steppe.”584 In the early 1580s, the 
Mongols actively exploited the highland region for economic purposes.   
    As the Mongols grew stronger in the highland, they began to act more aggressively 
and even challenged the peace treaty. Some of their reckless behaviors were checked 
when Altan Khan was still in power. In 1581, some underlings of Bingtu trespassed 
on the Ming territory, murdered several Han civilians, and plundered their property 
and livestock. The Ming, instead of going after Bingtu, asked Altan Khan to regulate 
his subjects better. With Altan Khan hastening Bingtu for an explanation, Bingtu 
eventually apologized and accepted the Ming’s penalty.585 But once Altan Khan 
passed away in 1582 and his successor died a mere three years later, the power 
dynamics in the highland shifted. In 1586, Altan Khan’s grandson, Namudai Jirüke 
Qong Tayiji, nicknamed Cherik (扯力克) in the Ming texts, became the nominal lord 
of the western wing Mongols. However, as a relatively young leader, Cherik was not 
adequately recognized and thus less capable of keeping all his underlings under 
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control.586 Therefore, in the 1580s, the Mongol groups in the highland began to act on 
their own. 
    Various Mongol groups in the highland region deepened their exploitation of the 
local land, especially by squeezing its indigenous inhabitants, the Fan people. 
Because of the restraints of the Ming-Mongol peace treaty, the Mongols were 
technically not allowed to plunder the Han people.587 Moreover, many of them were 
worried that raiding the Han people increased the possibility of getting contaminated 
of small pox,588 a deadly disease for low-density, non-resistant populations like the 
Mongols, but one to which higher-density Chinese populations typically were 
resistant since childhood. In comparison, raiding the Fan people was less risky. As 
mentioned in the previous chapters, it is clear that the Fan people in the highland 
accumulated much wealth in their centuries-long interactions with the Ming through 
trade, the tributary system, or simply plunder. Therefore, they became prime targets in 
the eyes of the Mongols.589 When Altan Khan was alive, he still had the authority to 
stop highland Mongols from plundering the Fan in case it violated the peace treaty.590 
Yet as soon as he passed away in 1852, such violent actions resurged.      
    In the 1580s, the power dynamic between the Mongols and the Fan people in the 
highland was tremendously reshaped. Conflicts over pastures were frequent, and 
plundering became the most convenient way to acquire daily necessities. In 1583, the 
Mongols raided certain Fan communities, murdering and injuring more than 1,000 
people and removing more than 4,000 livestock.591 In 1584, eight communities of Fan 
people ran to the Ming’s frontier military for protection after being attacked by the 
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Mongols.592 Although some Fan groups were courageous enough to fight against 
Mongols and even killed some Mongol leaders, many others just ran away.593 
According to Li Wenjun, the Fan people who fled from the highland in the late 16th 
century migrated toward the east, west, and north, and thus left their fine pastures to 
the growing number of Mongols.594  
    More and more Fan people submitted to and then acknowledged the Mongols’ 
power. Some formed inter-marriage relationships with the Mongols to keep 
themselves safe,595 and others gave up their property.596 The Mongols treated these 
new subordinates as resources for extraction. They requested the Fan people to pay 
“tianba,” which was a tax in kind of 10% of the grain, livestock and cloth or whatever 
they produced.597 Even the Han people scattered in the highland submitted tianba to 
the Mongols to buy peace.598 The wealth accumulated through these means 
undoubtedly improved the conditions of the highland Mongols. In 1586, some 
Mongols went to the Ming’s frontier town to ask for goods, including silk fabrics for 
hats, musical instruments such as pipa and guzheng, grapes, leather suitcases, rice, 
and wheat. Moreover, they claimed that they wanted hundreds of bags of these items 
at the least.599 It seems that the living quality of the Mongols had already greatly 
improved as they started to demand opulent goods instead of daily necessities. 
Moreover, there are records that the Mongols traded extra horses and other livestock 
not only to the Ming, but also Muslims from the west.600 By the late 1580s, the 
Mongols had successfully taken root in the highland and prospered. 
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    While the Mongols gradually converted the highland into a settlement with 
compliant subjects and rich resources, the Ming still treated the region and its 
inhabitants as part of the barbaric world and therefore did not care so much about its 
annexation by the Mongols. On the contrary, they were aware of and even somehow 
helped along the Mongols’ penetration of the highland. Receiving reports about the 
Mongols’ attack on Fan people, Sheng Shixing, the leading cabinet minister at the 
time, suggested to the Ming’s frontier official that “if the Mongols are merely 
plundering the raw barbarians, just ready the military as a preparation; but if it is the 
Han people and their property that are damaged, then you shall send out the army to 
pursue them.”601 Gao Gong, another top-level official even claimed that the Mongols’ 
attack on the Fan people was quite understandable: “Since we do not want the 
Mongols to raid us, it is inhumane to forbid the Mongols from plundering the Fan!”602 
Such attitudes certainly emboldened the Mongols to continue exploiting the Fan 
people in the highland since they knew where the Ming’s bottom line lay. 
    Moreover, Ming frontier officials allowed the Mongols to traverse the territory 
technically under the Ming’s control to conduct various activities. During Altan 
Khan’s time, the so-called “borrowing routes” (借路) were still a form of diplomatic 
interaction that involved the circulation of official documents between the Mongol 
Khan and the Ming’s top bureaucrats. But over time, traversing the Ming’s territory to 
enter the highland gradually evolved from a diplomatic protocol into common 
practice.603 On the ground, it was reduced to a custom that the Mongols took as a 
natural and normal request, and even the Ming’s frontier military found it no big deal. 
The Mongols gradually developed multiple routes to cut through the Ming territory to 
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enter the highland.604 Each time, regardless of whether it was for hunting, plundering 
the Fan, or other business, the Mongols would find some excuse and ask for rewards 
from the Ming. The Ming officials, in comparison, by then had become sluggish due 
to the long peace and stopped fixing and building their military infrastructure. They 
frequently took bribes from the Mongols for their borrowing route demands and even 
prepared banquets for them as long as they did not cause trouble during the journey.605 
In the 1580s, the Ming’s attitude toward the highland region was not even comparable 
to previous decades when an active defensive policy was in effect. In the 1580s, the 
Ming simply did not care about the highland territory or its inhabitants. 
From Borderland to Border 
    In 1588, one high-ranking military commander of Xining, Li Kui, got himself 
involved in a Mongol-Fan clash and was eventually killed by the Mongols. The Ming 
court officials knew it was primarily Li Kui’s fault as he should have not intervened 
in the Mongols’ raiding business, especially while drunk, but such a conflict allows us 
to imagine the precarious power dynamics on the ground.606 While the Mongols were 
getting increasingly stronger and therefore aggressive,  the Ming military were told to 
keep their distance from the Mongols and maintain a defensive position. It seems that 
the clash between the Mongol forces and the Ming was only a matter of time. This 
section examines the Ming-Mongol interactions in the highland in this context. In 
particular, I argue that the transformation of the region from a borderland to a border 
was one outcome of these clashes. 
    In the late 1580s, other than Bingtu who was old and soon died, Qolachi (火落赤) 
was another powerful Mongol leader in the highland. Following Altan Khan’s order 
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to stay in the highland as an intermediary between Mongol and Tibet,607 Qolachi 
gradually became powerful after receiving his deceased brother’s underlings.608 
Moreover, his name frequently shows up in Ming texts because of, among other 
reasons, his pompous personality. Qolachi was quite a character. He not only asked 
for the title of “king” from the Ming,609 which previously was granted only to Altan 
Khan and his successors, but also publicly announced that he could easily take over 
the Ming’s entire northwest frontier if he wanted.610 As a swaggering and ambitious 
leader, Qolachi was insatiable and considered the plundering of the Fan people 
unsatisfying. Therefore, he invited Cherik to the highland to plan something bigger.611 
    When Cherik was informed of Qolachi’s plan in 1589, he was still in Ordos. To get 
to the highland quickly, Cherik and his wife, who is usually referred as “the third 
lady” (三娘子), jointly wrote a letter to the Ming court, asking for permission to 
borrow routes and traverse the Ming territory. With a humble tone, the couple raised 
three reasons for the request. First, the border clashes that led to Li Kui’s death two 
years prior had greatly sabotaged the hard-earned peace between the Ming and 
Mongols, and the couple desired to go and tackle the conflict as soon as possible. 
Second, the western wing Mongols were recently attacked by the Oirads in the west, 
and thus Cherik needed to traverse the Ming territory to lead the punitive expedition. 
Third, the third Dalai Lama had recently passed away while he was preaching in the 
Mongol steppe. Therefore, Cherik needed to escort his ashes back to Tibet for 
Buddhist rituals. Believing these requests reasonable, Cherik asked for some subsidies 
from the Ming and pledged to keep the trade market functional during his absence.612  
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Despite there being no consensus in the Ming court,613 the Mongol Khan was 
eventually granted permission.614 Later that year, Cherik and his underlings arrived at 
the Yanghua Monastery. 
    Knowing that Cherik had arrived in the highland, Qolachi was quite excited. It was 
said that he even paid daily visits to Cherik’s tent to discuss various matters.615 Soon, 
Cherik began to dispatch troops, prepare boats to cross the Yellow River, and claim 
that he was going to mount a large-scale raid in the area.616 In 1590, the Mongols 
began to attack the Ming’s highland frontier, especially Taozhou and Songpan. The 
Ming border troops tried to defend their territory but were met with a disastrous 
defeat: they lost dozens of battles, in which several high-ranking military 
commanders were killed, including one called Li Lianfang who enjoyed great 
reputation both in the court and among the local troops. The frontier crisis greatly 
shocked the Ming Emperor Wanli, who immediately requested a detailed report from 
grant minister Sheng Shixing to find a solution.617 From then on, just as Emperor 
Wanli reminded Sheng Shixing, “We should not please the barbarians any more,”618 
the Ming began to revise its defensive policy, claiming that it was time to “cut off the 
barbarian’s right arm.”619 After the 1590 frontier crisis, with its “right arm” becoming 
stronger, the Ming decided to turn to military actions for a solution. 
    To solve the highland Mongol issue once and for all, the Ming assigned Zheng Luo 
(鄭洛), the supreme commander of the Xuanfu and Datong military districts, to be the 
superintendent of the western frontier region.620 Once Zheng Luo arrived at the 
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highland, he noticed that the Mongols had become rampant in the highland for two 
reasons: they came and went through the Ming territory freely, and their exploitation 
of the indigenous Fan people was unrestrained.621 This points to the Ming’s lack of 
attention to both the highland and its inhabitants. It was the Ming’s loose attitude in 
previous decades toward various transregional movements in the highland, especially 
in the context of the Mongol-Tibetan alliance, which resulted in a series of frontier 
crises. Therefore, Zheng Luo devised a three-step plan to take the region back from 
the Mongol control: checking the Mongols’ transregional movements, taking back 
control over the highland inhabitants, and eliminating the Mongols’ influence in the 
region. 
    Zheng Luo first issued strict control over the “borrowing routes” requests through 
which the Mongols wished to traverse the Ming’s Gansu territory to enter the 
highland. He pointed out that the recent chaos caused by Qolachi and other Mongol 
leaders could be traced back to the permission they received to cut through Ming 
territory to get to the highland. It was because of the Ming’s loose control over such 
requests that the Mongols were able to conceal themselves in the highland and 
covetously exploit the region.622 Therefore, from then on, they could only take the 
detour from the Jiayu Pass if they needed to go to the highland. Ming territory was not 
open to their passage anymore. If they insisted on forcing their way through, serious 
consequence awaited them.623 Obviously not all Mongol leaders were intimidated by 
Zhang Luo’s warning; when a Mongol figurehead named Bushitu attempted to muscle 
his way through, Zheng Luo dispatched a heavy army to attack the Mongols and 
drove them away.624  
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    While those who wished to enter the highland were forbidden to do so, those who 
left the highland could still borrow the routes from the Ming.625 In fact, Zheng Luo 
wished to see more Mongols leave the region, particularly Cherik. Zheng Luo knew 
that the arrival of Cherik had invigorated the highland Mongols and fueled their 
aggressive actions. Therefore, he decided to force Cherik to leave the highland first. 
In the beginning, Zheng Luo informed Cherik that if he continued to linger in the 
highland, the court rewards for him would be suspended, and the frontier market 
where his subjects acquired their daily necessities would be closed.626 Cherik did not 
care. He even began to lobby other Mongol leaders to break with the Ming.627 Seeing 
that threats of cutting off the Mongol’s economic supply did not work, Zheng Luo 
turned to political means to regulate them. He wrote Cherik a letter and informed him 
of the possibility of granting more Mongol leaders the title of “king.”628 This made 
Cherik nervous because it would sabotage his prestige if other Mongol leaders were 
upgraded from Cherik’s underlings to his equals. Cherik weighed the political 
situation and eventually decided to go back to Ordos. He did not want to risk his 
political privilege for some meager plunder. Qolachi, undoubtedly, was strongly 
against Cherik’s departure ideas. He knew that the Mongol leader’s leave would 
greatly weaken the highland Mongols, and therefore he “frequently went to Cherik’s 
tent and used one hundred ways to persuade him to stay, including his big plan to take 
over the Ming’s entire highland frontier.”629 But Cherik still left later that year, a 
move that Ming officials commented was a result of the “Ming’s king-changing 
plans.”630 
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    Dividing the highland Mongols by convincing Cherik to leave, Zheng Luo wished 
to further weaken them by winning the Fan people back. As the previous section 
points out, the Ming gave away the Fan people as one way to keep the Mongols from 
raiding Ming’s frontier subjects. Considering the disappointment of the Fan people 
when treated by the Ming generals in this way, it is unsurprising to see that numerous 
Fan people began to work for the Mongols against the Ming. Fan spies who were 
helping the Mongols were frequently captured by the Ming soldiers. In another 
memorial, Zheng Luo notes that the Fan people even made up more than half of the 
Mongol forces in the highland.631 It became clear to Zheng Luo that duly handling the 
Fan people would be decisive for his overall strategy to settle the troubles caused by 
the highland Mongols. 
    Many civil officials in the frontier also raised their opinions in support of 
embracing the highland Fan people for the sake of weakening the Mongols. Overall, it 
was widely believed that there were many benefits for doing so. First, the scholars 
argued that the policy went along with the conventional geopolitical strategy: the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend. The Ming could take advantage of the clashes 
between the Fan and the Mongols and therefore weaken the Mongol threat. Once the 
Fan became stronger with the support of the Ming, the Mongols’ rampant actions in 
the highland would die down as well. Second, improving the relationship with the Fan 
could result in a constant supply of leather, meat, dairy products, and timber to the 
Ming’s frontier society, which were military and daily necessities that were 
previously confiscated by the Mongols. Third, being friendly and protecting the Fan 
from Mongol exploitation would play an important role in the long-running process of 
converting them into the Ming’s formal subjects, which would be vital for the Ming to 
 





secure the frontier.632 To comply with these ideas, Zheng Luo devised the plan of 
“pacifying the Fan, welcoming the Fan, and encouraging the Fan.”633 He believed that 
the Fan was an underestimated group whose hatred toward the Mongols should be 
made full use of to weaken the Mongols’ power in the highland. 
    Collecting suggestions from his civil advisors, Zheng Luo began to use multiple 
methods to foster intimacy with the highland Fan people. For example, he promised 
rich material rewards of tea, grain, and cloth for those who fought the Mongols or 
stole their horses for the Ming.634 Also, he agreed to provide materials and labor to 
build defensive fortresses for the Fan communities and offered military protection.635 
It was said that with his proactive policy, more than 80,000 Fan people from nearly 
two hundred highland communities submitted to the Ming in the first several years of 
the 1590s. Even many alleged raw barbarians deserted from the Mongols’ control and 
subordinated themselves to the Ming.636 To the people at the time, this was an 
accomplishment that could pacify the region for at least another half-century.637  
    While the Ming texts highly praise Zheng Luo’s efforts in appealing to the Fan 
people and thus successfully encouraging them to break their alliance with the 
Mongols, I argue that what is depicted is more propaganda than objective picture and 
may be inaccurate in certain ways. What really took place in the highland is most 
likely enhanced Ming control over the indigenous Fan people through coercive 
actions with military intervention. Close surveillance, control over material goods, 
and forced conscription were all very likely measures adopted by the Ming’s frontier 
military to cut off the Fan people’s contact with the Mongols. Moreover, the 80,000 
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Fan people’s submission is also not likely to be a factual number. Instead, it is highly 
possible that eighty communities surrendered to the Ming, and these communities’ 
leaders all received official titles of chiliarch (千户) from the Ming, and the numbers 
were taken from their nominal command number. If they were really converted into 
the Ming’s subjects, there should have vastly more records attesting to the fact. 
Nevertheless, local gazetteers indicate that after the Ming army’s active campaigns, 
some Fan communities migrated to the east toward the Ming territory and began to 
submit horses to the Ming yearly;638 others, once submitted to the Ming, experienced 
what was literally called “opening up the community” under the command of Zheng 
Luo.639 These changes on the ground, if not understood as stemming from the Fan 
people’s volition, should be interpreted as a form of social categorization and 
jurisdictional registration forcefully imposed by the Ming. The purpose of these 
measures was to tighten the Ming’s control over the Fan communities so as to weaken 
the Mongols and avoid the appearance of a real border crisis. 
    A similar gap between the Ming’s politically charged narrative and what really 
happened on the ground existed in other parts of the highland as well. In northwest 
Sichuan, when the indigenous Fan people attempted rebellion and were suppressed by 
the Ming in the 1580s, we also see narratives of a certain pattern that are riddled with 
China-centric discourses: the non-Han people surrendered to the Ming’s mighty 
military power, petitioned to have the Ming’s mercy, received Chinese surnames, 
learned the Han-Chinese language, adopted the Chinese dressing style, and wished to 
be the Ming’s subjects.640 Modern scholars often deem these records biased because 
they were written by Chinese officials and thus by nature had a Sino-centric 
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inclination. However, putting their cultural aspect aside, I argue the much more 
important and less exaggerated content in such records reflects the changing political 
identity of the Fan people from the Ming’s dependents into the Ming’s subjects. In 
northwest Sichuan, the Fan people were incorporated into the late Ming grassroots 
administrative system, the baojia system.641 In eastern Qinghai and southern Gansu, 
they became the Ming’s “ears, eyes, and wings” to fight with the Mongols.642  
    In Zheng Luo’s understanding, the Mongols grew rampant in the highland for two 
reasons: they came and went through the Ming territory freely and their exploitation 
of the indigenous Fan people went unrestrained.643 Adopting multiple methods, Zheng 
Luo checked these two issues to a certain degree by the early 1590s. In the meantime, 
Zheng Luo also attempted to convert a highland with dense Mongol characteristics 
into a region culturally influenced by the Ming, especially in the religious aspect. 
    When Zheng Luo turned his attention to the highland Mongols, Qolachi attracted 
much of his focus. What prompted Zheng Luo to take action was Qolachi’s attempt to 
build a huge monastery quite close to the Ming’s territory. Qolachi himself was a 
devoted Tibetan Buddhist practitioner. When the third Dalai Lama bypassed the 
highland in 1584 to go to Ordos for the ritual after Altan Khan’s death, he stayed in 
Qolachi’s lands and enjoyed his warm hospitality.644 In 1587, Qolachi wrote to the 
Ming to ask for materials and labor to build a monastery in his domain but was 
rejected.645 In addition to religious reasons, Qolachi must have already noticed the 
political functions of such religious sites: they could not only boost Qolachi’s 
personal prestige, but also attract many potential able-bodied men to gather together. 
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In 1590, as Qolachi frequently attacked Ming towns and fortresses, he decided to 
build a monastery on his own and chose a place just outside the Ming’s military zone. 
With this religious complex as a stronghold, Qolachi intended to construct a political-
religious center to ground his control over the region and further his challenge of the 
Ming.  
    To prepare for the construction, Qolachi sent one of his sons to the nearby 
mountains in the Ming’s Sichuan province to collect timber. Source indicate that in 
total the Mongols cut down tens of thousands of huge trees and piled them at the 
construction site waiting for the project to kick off.646 Informed of Qolachi’s plan, the 
Ming was quite anxious as the monastery would gather many Mongols, just as the 
Yanghua Monastery did, and it would expose the entire region to Qolachi.647 Zheng 
Luo decided to eliminate the threat before it sprouted. In 1590, when the Mongols 
were preparing for the seasonal movement and Qolachi was away, Zheng Luo 
dispatched a small number of Ming troops to sneak into the construction site under 
the cover of dark and set fire to the timber supply the Mongols had gathered. With the 
help of a heavy wind, all the construction materials burned up as the Mongols were 
unable to put out the fire.648  
    Having successfully destroyed the unfinished monastery and thus considerably 
weakened Qolachi, Zheng Luo had a clear idea of the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries’ 
geopolitical importance to the highland Mongols. Therefore, he further planned to 
have the Yanghua Monastery, a site of much greater geopolitical and religious 
significance, burned down as well. Because the Yanghua Monastery was nominally 
under the Ming’s patronage, Zheng Luo sent a memorial to the Ming court before 
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making a move. He argued that the Mongol threat in the highland had grown bigger 
and bigger. They came to the highland and settled down in the name of Buddhist 
pilgrimage, but their true purpose was to subordinate the local Fan people. Yanghua 
Monastery was the deepest root of all these problems. If they wished to solve the 
Mongol problems in the the highland, the monastery must be torn down.649 With a 
determined tone, Zheng Luo claimed that destroying Yanghua Monastery was critical. 
The Ming court granted him permission. In 1591, Zheng Luo dispatched a large army 
for a surprise attack on the Yanghua Monastery, set the entire religious complex on 
fire, and defeated the Mongols who came to save the monastery. Successfully 
destroying the stronghold of the highland Mongols, Zheng Luo was ecstatic and even 
wrote several poems to commemorate his success.650 The loss of the Yanghua 
Monastery was a major blow to the highland Mongols, resulting in their low morale 
as well as a series of defeats in the ensuing clashes with the Ming.651 
    Having Zheng Luo burn down the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries controlled by the 
Mongols, the Ming did not leave a religious vacuum in the highland. Instead, it filled 
the void by portraying itself as a legitimate patron of Tibetan Buddhism. The most 
typical example came from the Zhenzhu Monastery of Guide (贵德珍珠寺). In 1597, 
an inscription was carved onto a stone tablet in the monastery. Quite strangely, as 
pointed out by Chen Qinying and Ma Lin, the content of the inscription seems to have 
nothing to do with the monastery itself: it is completely concerned with the history of 
one Buddhist statue of Shakyamuni preserved in contemporaneous Beijing.652 The 
inscription begins with Buddhism’s early history when the statue was claimed to have 
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been made. Then, it describes how the statue circulated to and within China over time 
and arrived at the Jiufeng Monastery in Beijing some 2,580 years after its original 
casting. Throughout the text, there is not even one word about Buddhist developments 
in either Tibet or Mongol, not to mention the highland region or Zhenzhu Monastery. 
In that case, why was it carved on a Zhenzhu Monastery stone tablet? 
    Chen Qinying and Ma Lin, the scholars that first studied the stone tablet, argue that 
this inscription indicates the Ming military’s attempt to foster good relations with the 
Fan people during the series of military campaigns in the 1590s against the highland 
Mongols.653 This is undoubtedly a correct observation. However, I wish to push the 
analysis one step further. I argue that the inscription not only serves the pragmatic 
needs of the Ming military, but also more importantly demonstrates the Ming court’s 
wish to exert influence over the religious realm of the highland following the 
diminution of the Mongols’ patronage over Tibetan Buddhism and the destruction of 
the Yanghua Monastery. Highlighting the sacredness of Beijing, the Ming capital,  
served this goal because the Shakyamuni statue was the embodiment of religious 
legitimacy.  
    Controlling the inhabitants and penetrating the religious realm on the frontier, the 
Ming also tried to exploit the highland for material resources. By the final years of the 
16th century, the Ming had already taken back control over the highland and begun to 
make full use of its productive capacity. In 1596, a Ming official discovered an iron 
mine near the northern mountain of Xining and set up an iron mill there.654 
Previously, the Xining region alone would require 7,500 jin of iron yearly, and it all 
had to be shipped in from Xi’an several hundreds of miles away.655 But the discovery 
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of the iron mine allowed the Ming to extract natural resources locally in the highland. 
The official allocated 400 soldiers to build two furnaces and dozens of dorms and 
offices at the foot of the mountain. All the timber could be acquired from the nearby 
mountain, and all the iron production was used to make weapons for the highland 
Ming army.656 
    In the 1590s, due to the changing geopolitical situation, the Ming decided to revise 
its loose attitude toward territorial crossing in the highland. More attention was paid 
to the highland’s territoriality and its inhabitants. By the end of the decade, as the 
Ming put more and more restraints over the movement of people, goods, and 
information, the highland transformed from a borderland into a border. 
Summary 
    This chapter charts the conflict between the Ming and Mongol forces over the 
highland from the mid- to the late 16th century. In the first several decades, the 
Mongols consistently demonstrated the greater will toward the highland. Using the 
highland for refuge, religious pilgrimage, and their livelihood, the Mongols facilitated 
a complex and constant flow of people, goods, and religious ideas across the highland 
region. The Ming, in contrast, remained passive in the face of these movements. In 
one respect, this was a continuation of the Ming’s general attitude toward the 
highland in the previous centuries, but it was also a result of the Ming- Mongol peace 
treaty. Such a defensive stance only shifted in the last decade of the century when the 
Mongols’ movements in the region had spiraled out of control and evolved into a 
frontier crisis for the Ming. With a series of military campaigns, the Ming drove the 
Mongols away and also put an end to the transregional movements in the highland 
that had lasted for centuries. 
 





    One important historical theme this chapter illustrates is a borderland’s 
transformation into a border as territory-crossing gradually diminished. Unchecked 
movement characterizes a borderland. With the termination of such mobility, a 
borderland featuring open access morphed into a border where accessibility was 
strictly regulated. Through the negotiation revolving around various territorial 
perceptions, this chapter suggests the correlation between a regime of mobility and 
the essence of a frontier society. With the Mongols’ withdrawal from the highland 
and the Ming’s redefinition of the region as a zone not to be trespassed, an uncharted 







Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
     This project examines the turbulent history of China’s northwest Inner Asian 
highland from 1368 to 1600. Competing visions, as both a historical phenomenon and 
a conceptual tool, highlight the fluid nature of the highland and its bridging role in 
transregional geopolitics. Straddling different geopolitical units, the highland was a 
convergence zone for the constant flow of people, goods, and knowledge. While 
movements in and through the highland encompassed not only geographic shifts but 
also socioeconomic, religious-political, and environmental exchange, the meaning of 
the highland changed accordingly in the eyes of different social groups. This 
dissertation examines how communities, commodities, and information in motion led 
to various forms of encounter in the highland and how such encounters were initiated, 
regulated, and perceived. Simply put, it asks how these competing visions over the 
highland shaped the cultural connotations and social landscape of the highland world. 
Through the activities of five types of historical actors—namely Ming emperors, 
highland lords, Tibetan Buddhist monks, Ming deserted soldiers, and Mongol riders—
this project takes the highland as a geographical and analytical unit of study in its own 
right. Repositioning the highland in the transregional interactions in the East and 
Inner Asian world, this dissertation points out that various ideas and designs for the 
highland shaped, and were shaped by, the highland’s basic path of historical 
development. 
Changes in the Highland from 1368 to 1600 
 
    Stretching through modern-day southern Gansu, eastern Qinghai, and western 





the Tibetan Plateau. In the mid-14th century, as a result of its steep terrain and harsh 
environment, the highland was only sparsely populated. However, the power 
dynamics in the broader East and Inner Asian spheres redefined the geopolitical role 
of the region. From the late 14th century on, Chinese troops were dispatched to the 
highland to guard the Ming empire’s western frontier and secure its diplomatic 
interaction with the Tibetan world, while Tibetans entered the area from the west as a 
result of the eastward movement of Islam. The pouring of outsiders into the highland 
extensively reshaped the economic and social structure of the region. While the 
hegemony of the highland’s indigenous lords gradually faded out, Tibetan Buddhist 
forces rose to power, infiltrated, and took root in the highland, significantly 
reconfiguring the highland’s religious landscape and its relationship with the Ming’s 
political center. 
    While the highland remained a non-Chinese realm in the 15th century, it was 
increasingly pulled into the Ming’s imperial orbit since the 16th century. The Mongol 
civil war resulted in a large-scale Mongol migration into the highland and thus posed 
a threatening frontier crisis for the Ming empire. In response, the Ming began to adopt 
a proactive frontier policy toward the highland. By constructing more military 
infrastructure and dispatching more soldiers to the highland, the Ming was able to 
mitigate the human trafficking of captured Ming soldiers that prevailed in the 
highland. Yet as the number of Ming soldiers stationed in the highland increased, the 
desertion rate also surged. The relocation and ultimate settlement of many Ming 
soldiers in the highland changed the ethnic constitution of the highland population. As 
more and more Mongols frequently traversed the Ming-controlled Hexi Corridor and 
entered the highland, the region’s strategic value in regional geopolitics also changed. 





finally to a resourceful settlement, the Ming empire began to view the highland as an 
indispensable border instead of a semi-autonomous borderland. By the end of the 16th 
century, the highland region had already transformed from an uncharted middle 
ground where the East and Inner Asian worlds interacted to an outpost on which the 
Ming empire relied to regulate Inner Asian influences.  
Competing Visions for the Highland 
    Though traditionally left out of master narratives, the highland obliges a scholarly 
revisiting of early modern borderland spaces. This dissertation employs “competing 
visions” as an analytical framework and addresses the following questions: How, 
when, and why did various social groups became interested in the highland? How 
were their actions in the highland initiated, conceptualized, and managed? And what 
were their practical ramifications? With diverse communities flocking into the 
highland with their languages, religions, commodities, and forms of knowledge in 
tow, the region became a place where customs, rules, and ideas were re-
conceptualized. By unpacking this process, this dissertation highlights the complexity 
of social interactions, the fluidity of borderland spaces, and the volatility of regional 
geopolitics.  
    On the multidimensionality of encounters: “Competing visions” serves as a 
microscope that reveals the multi-faceted nature of certain historical phenomenon. 
Exchanges of material goods in the tributary system, for instance, have been treated as 
a mechanism through which Chinese dynasties bridled frontier regimes. Yet from 
those who were recognized as tribute payers in Chinese sources, such interactions 
meant differently. Tea, in the eyes of Ming people, was a life-sustaining daily 
necessity for the highland inhabitants. But in the highland, tea was not only a 





excuse for territorial expansion, and a catalyst for the (re)creation of social relations. 
As the exchange of tea encompassed a wide array of activities such as gift giving, tax 
collection, tribute payment, and long-distance movements, the highland setting 
highlights material aspects of tea that are less visible in most historical accounts. 
Another example is the movement of people throughout the highland. While many 
able-bodied men were dispatched to the region as Ming frontier soldiers, they were 
reduced to goods that indigenous leaders of highland communities captured for 
ransom or sold as slaves. In other scenarios, these Ming soldiers were treated as 
valuable military guides and spies by the Mongols or potential religious converts in 
the eyes of Tibetan Buddhist monks. The encounters in the highland demonstrate the 
broad range of the connotations of specific materials or behaviors in a borderland 
society. 
    On the fluidity of borderland space: Fluidity is one of the very essences of pre-
modern borderland spaces. Straddling distinct geographical units and bridging 
multiple cultural and political spheres, the highland was a space where the 
connotation of certain categorical labels, such as religion and ethnicity, became 
contingent and flexible. As Tibetan Buddhist monks actively preached in the highland 
and converted many Ming subjects, the emperors found it difficult to regulate these 
monastic practices. There were no criteria to decide what being a Tibetan Buddhist 
entailed since inter-religious conversion was common and religious practices often 
transcended ethnic and lingual boundaries. Similar dilemmas applied to ethnicity. 
Although ethnic segregation was technically implemented in the highland society, it 
had little impact on the ground. As different groups of people comingled in the 
highland society, rigid labels based on supposed ethnic features such as Han, Fan, and 





categories were porous and contextual. The encounters of multiple variables made the 
highland society a conglomeration where everything was deconstructed, mingled, and 
reconstructed. It was such practical transformations that oftentimes nullified idealized 
lines of distinction, separation, inclusion, or exclusion that were usually imposed by 
alleged political centers.  
    On power dynamics of regional geopolitics: As middle ground for transregional 
social and economic interactions in peacetime and battlefields when geopolitical 
powers scrambled for supremacy, pre-modern borderland spaces were epicenters of 
geopolitical vicissitudes. This dissertation takes the highland as a lens to examine the 
mechanics of East and Inner Asian diplomacy. Previous scholarship has mainly taken 
up the tributary framework, a top-level orientation to study transregional interactions, 
but focused less on how exactly such interactions were carried out on a day-to-day 
basis. This dissertation, in contrast, investigates how cross-regional interactions were 
perceived, regulated, and contested in the highland, a process that enables analysis of  
on-the-ground geopolitical negotiations among the Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans. 
Competing for hegemony became a touchstone for these regimes’ political capacities, 
and the contestation revealed how different regimes measured the strategic value of 
the highland. But even though the outside powers attempted to infiltrate the highland, 
in reality it was oftentimes the highland inhabitants who decided how to define the 
region. The uncertainty and flexibility of the highland challenged familiar historical 
interpretations of concepts such as loyalty, rulership, and sovereignty in pre-modern 
Eurasian geopolitics and also pointed out the limitations of these imperial powers. 
Highland as an in-between Region  
    Pre-modern borderland spaces were contested zones in geopolitics and, to some 





well-defined territories and sovereignty. The highland was only one such hot spot in 
the interaction between China and Inner Asia. It was Ming China’s outpost for laying 
claim over the Silk Road and was also the bridging point for the formation of a 
Tibetan-Mongol alliance. Encounters at this crossroads were transformative in both 
scale and scope. On the one hand, macroregional geopolitical crises in Ming-Mongol 
relations had various effects on the highland, such as escalating tension over natural 
resources and territory and the erection of defensive walls. On the other hand, 
seemingly trivial skirmishes could entirely reshuffle geopolitical power balances on a 
great scale as the death of a single military commander might be the last straw that led 
to a complete redirection of geopolitics. As the highland itself transformed from an 
uncharted territory into a crowded intersection, its role in geopolitics also evolved 
from an indifferent margin to a decisive key point. 
    How can a research project on a continental inland region contribute to the field of 
frontier studies? This dissertation emphasizes the importance of revising the current 
paradigm of frontier studies and promotes a comparative framework. I have argued 
that the framework of “competing visions” can shed new light on important historical 
phenomenon such as migration and diaspora or travel and cultural encounter. 
Moreover, the approach I have outlined gives scholars an opportunity to revisit 
assumptions that have characterized early modern Chinese societies as ethnically 
charged or socially static. Meanwhile, it has comparative potential for parallel studies 
on China’s interaction with the southwest Zomia highland, southeast Asian maritime 
world, or Inner Asia through the Silk Road. These themes, together with the subaltern 
whose silence this project has endeavored to unmute, enables this project to appeal to 





    The conventional center-frontier framework has proven inadequate for studying the 
history of crossroads. Interpreting the highland as either a passive frontier subject to 
imperial annexation or a resilient local society resisting top-down imposition still does 
not fully break away from the binary framework. Therefore, this dissertation has 
examined the region on its own terms. Due to its distance from various geopolitical 
centers, the highland society was not restrained by any political principle or cultural 
tradition. Power balances in the region were diffuse and fragile, and human actions 
were not determined according to concepts like settlement and permanence. This 
dissertation frames a narrative in which the highland society is not passively 
mobilized for various regimes’ ends, but shown to have significantly bent the 
instruments of outside regimes to its own will through its own agency. In this regard, 
the “frontier” in fact initiated geopolitical changes, fulfilling the traditional function 
of the “center,” while the metropole became the passive recipient of such changes. 
This dissertation argues that the notion of the “frontier” as a conceptual tool 
peripheralizes alleged border zones and their roles in history-making. However, it was 
the “frontier” that shaped the nature of the “center,” not vice-versa. By portraying the 
historical process by which the “frontier” developed on its own terms while the 
seeming center was at best one of many forces in this “frontier,” and by eschewing 
the predominant center-frontier framework which silences those who inhabited the 
periphery, I contextualize my dissertation within postcolonial subaltern studies. 
    The highland serves as a fine reference for comparative studies. On one hand, it 
resembles other upland regions such as the southwest Asian Zomia, as these specific 
terrains all created societies of identity fluidity, cultural hybridity, cross-regional 
connectivity, and indigenous ingenuity. On the other hand, the perspective of 





studies. Oceans, as spaces away from landlocked centralizations of power, have 
always been spheres where the driving force for transformative exchanges, transfers, 
and interactions is not so much state imperatives as it is what happens on the ground. 
As the analytical concept of “competing visions” reveals nuances embedded in the 
process of material exchange, knowledge circulation, and people’s movement that are 
otherwise lost, erased, or silenced, it provides a fine lens through which to see how 
geographical/spatial “in-betweens” created opportunities for new and different 
interactions. In this vein, this dissertation breaks new ground in a broader sense 
concerning borderland society and pre-modern macroregional geopolitical interaction.  
Highland in the China-Tibet impasse: Past and Present 
    Contemporary political disputes can hamper historical research, especially that on 
borders, nationalism, ethnicity, and religion. This is especially the case in studies of 
the Chinese-Tibetan relationship. The field has been at an academic impasse primarily 
due to political constraints. While some scholars draw on Chinese-language materials 
to claim China’s absolute sovereignty over Tibet throughout history, others, 
referencing Tibetan primary sources, assert that the historically independent plateau 
was only recently annexed and colonized by the communist Chinese regime in the 
1950s. Such politically charged disagreements not only tremendously affect academic 
discourse, but also cast a shadow over the daily lives and mentality of highland 
inhabitants whose in-between position brings them under suspicion and pressure from 
both sides.  
    This dissertation pushes beyond these divisions by excavating the livelihood, logic, 
and perspectives of an understudied society. It argues that an examination of the 





contemporary disputes have taken shape and how historical actors have dealt with 
such political tension.  
    First, studying the history of the highland can help us better understand Ming China 
and Tibet from the 14th to the 16th century. For the Ming empire, the highland region 
was its Achilles’ heel that represented the bitterness embedded in its empire-building 
process. The Ming empire indeed created a system in favor of the borderland’s 
livelihood. However, to cope with the ever-changing situation on the ground, the 
Ming had to keep updating and tailoring its imperial policy. Such constant adaptation 
became a significant component of its empire-building process. In this regard, the 
highland exemplifies the predicaments that imperial China had to grapple with. Its 
endeavor to construct a multi-ethnic universal empire inadvertently helped to 
establish the grounds for a separatist consciousness among its frontier subjects. The 
extension of the state apparatus eventually backfired and created a huge political 
burden for the empire.  
    Examining the social dynamics of the highland also allows for a revisit of the 
nationalist framework that dominates Tibetan history studies. In the historiography of 
Tibetology, the highland has always been seen as the eastern periphery that only 
receives influence, particularly in the religious manner, from central Tibet. This 
Lhasa-centric view greatly underestimates the variety of social structures in the Great 
Tibetan world. Unlike other Tibetan regions such as Bhutan or central Tibet where 
secular rulers were subordinate to the ecclesiastical forces, in the highland region, the 
hegemony resided in the authority of lay figureheads but not in the religious clergy. 
Such reversed power dynamics enabled a reconsideration of the effectiveness of 





type of historical narrative that is different from the conventional heavily religion-
charged history. 
    Understanding the history of the highland as an indispensable part of the Chinese-
Tibetan borderland helps to situate the Chinese-Tibetan relationship in a historical 
context. By tracing the structuring process of the Chinese-Tibetan relationship, this 
project suggests that the bilateral relationship hovered somewhere at the intersection 
of suzerainty, sovereignty, political alliance, and diplomatic rivalry. A fixed definition 
is hard to pin down because this relationship contingently shifted from one mode to 
another. In this regard, taking up the perspective of the highland society allows for an 
illuminating exploration of how, when, and why the Chinese-Tibetan relationship 
changed and thus situates supposedly ahistorical political disputes in their historical 
context. 
    Current disagreements on sovereignty and mutually exclusive historical 
interpretations obscure the position of the highland society in relation to both China 
and Tibet. Following an ontological turn to excavate the livelihood, logic, and 
perspectives of the highland inhabitants, this project illuminates how contemporary 
disputes have taken shape and how historical actors dealt with political tension. In this 
regard, the borderland perspective has the potential to immunize academic projects 
that have been infected by political wrangles. By eschewing the predominant nation-
state framework which silences those who inhabited the periphery, this project is a 
probing interrogation of what it means to have political subjectivity, to be able to 
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